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ABSTRACT 
COGNITIVE PROBLEMS. MET.A.COGNITION. AND PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE 
December 1997 
Rossen I. Roussev. M.A .. Sofia University --st. Kliment Ohridski ... Sofo.1. Bulgaria 
M.A .. University or Massachusetts Boston 
Directed by Professor Arthur Millman 
I compare the metacognitive procedures for overcoming cognitive problt:ms (such 
as .. low self-esteem:· .. permanent anxiety.'· .. motivational deficit ..... bad learning 
strategies:· or .. student-teacher conflict of values .. ) with the procedun::s contemporar~ 
philosophy uses to overcome its traditional problems (such as .. absolute truth:· .. ideal 
knowledge.'· or .. adequate language .. ). By means of J. l·labermas · rnncc:pt ofphi/0.,11/Jhy 
as a mediating interpreter I conceptualized the two types or problt:rns as prr1hle111.1 of 
mediclfinn which remain out nfthe scope of science as an expert field hut in the ~cnre ni" 
philosophy as a non-expert field. and thus justified their eligibility to be overcome 
through the latter procedures. 
Four scientific concepts were examined. including M. V. Covington·s conct:pl of 
srraregic thinking. J. Lochhead·s concept of the role ufverbaliza1ivn in 1hi11king. R. 
Paul· s concept of rnnceptuali::ation and e/emems of rhoughr. and M. Lipman ·s concept or 
the role ufphilosophy in children·s wgnirive development. which all consider 
ov..::rcoming of cognilil'e prohlems. Four philosophical concl!pts were examined. 
iv 
including L. Wittgenstein ·s early concept of the correct use of language. his later con:cpt 
of languu!{e games. J. Searle ·s com:ept of spee,:h u,·1.1. and R. Rurty's com:t:pt of tht: 
politirnl answer w philosophirnl c1uestions. which all considt:r overcoming of 1raJitio11<1/ 
philo.rnphirnl prohlems. Since both scientists and philosophers regard their problt:ms as 
being epistemological in character and see their overcoming in the utilization of 
appropriate concepts of cognition. I attempted to delineate the scienti tic procedure of 
mctacognition in terms of concepts of contemporary philosophy of languagc. 
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The pragmatist thinks that the tradition no.:i.:ds 10 he uti lized. as one utilizes a bag 
of tools . Some of these tools. these ·rnnceptual instruments· - including some whid1 
continue to have undcservcd prestige - will turn out no longt!r In hi.!l'O.: a use. ,md can just 
be tossed out. Others can be refurbished. Sometimes new tools may have to be in vcnto.:cl 
on the spot 
Rio.:hard Rorty 
CNTRODUCTION 
Reason has split into lhrcc moments - modem science, positive 
law and posttraditional ethics. and autonomous an and 
ins1i1u1ionali:lCd an criticism - bul philosophy had precious little 10 do 
"'ith 1his disjunclion. lgnoran1 of sophislicalcd criliqucs of reason. 1hc 
sons and daughters of modcmit)' ha,·c progn:ssi\'cly learned 10 
dilTcrentia1c their cultural lradition in tcnns of these thrcc aspccls of 
rational iry such 1ha1 lhcy deal wiUl issues of truth. justice. and 1as1c 
discrclcly ra1hcr lhan simlllrancously. 
Jurgen Habcrmas. Philosophy as Stand-In 
and Interpreter 
The ls.me: In what follows, I try to show that negative psychological and cognitive 
dispositions (such as "permanent anxiety," ··motivational defici1," "indifference to 
learning," "low self-esteem," or "inappropriate strategic approaches" (Covington 1985). 
which interfere with problem solving (and which I will call for convenience cog11i1ive 
problems), are often rooted in individuals' philosophically naive notions of how their own 
cognitive abilities work. I will discuss a possible relation between cognitive problems and 
problems that are said to be traditional philosophical problems (such as "absolute truth," 
"ideal knowledge," or ·'adequate language")_ Then I show a relation between the solution 
of the cognitive problems as proposed in four educational views 
(M. V. Co,..ington (1985), J. Lochhead ( 1985), R. Paul (1990), M. Lipman ( 1985)) and 
the disso/u1io11 of philosophical problems proposed in four philosophical views 
(L. Wittgenstein (1922/1963, 1953/1958), J. Searle (1986), R. Rorty {1991)). 
If my argument identifies a common co11cep111a/ co11ten1 in the main points 
of scientists' and philosophers ' approaches to, respectively, cognitive and 
philosophical problems, it will enable me to co11ceptuali::e the two types of 
problems and the procedures for overcoming these problems within a common 
terminology. Such a conceptualization will provide a ground for justifying a 
m11thodology of transfer of the procedure for overcoming the philosophical 
problems as a procedure for overcoming cognitive problems. 1 Subsequently, if! 
am able to i/111.wrate how cognitive problems can be overcome through a 
philosophical procedure, I will have conveyed an argument on behalf of the 
contention that these problems ca,1 be adequately treated as still ·undisolved 
philosophical problems' which persist in individuals' personal views about 
intelligence. In this way, I will have also conveyed the argument that a specific 
'extension' of individuals' philosopnical backgrounds would adequately help 
overcome their cognitive problems. 
Conceptual Co11te111: To co11cepl11alize the two types of problems and the 
procedures for their overcoming within a common termi11olow, l will examine and 
summarize the notions above mentioned in two compositional concepts2, 
respectively, scientific and philosophical ones. The former involves M. V. 
Covington' s concept of strategic thi11ki11[l, J. Lochhead's concept of the role of 
verbali:atio11 in problem solving, R. Paul's concept of critical and creative 
thinking, and M. Lipman 's concept of the role of philosophy in education. The 
latter involves L. Wittgenstein's early concept of the so-called correct use of 
la11guaxe, his late concept of lan!(Uage games, J. Searle' s concept of speech acts, 
and R. Rorty's concept of the political al/.\wer to philosophical questions . Such a 
synchesis of different concepts in compositional concepts is intended 10 highlight 
their common conceptual points rather than to neglect their conceptual differences. 
In my argument, what is in common to al/ these concepts is a notion of 
philosophy which they employ (either more explicitly or more implicitly) in 
treatme111 of problems that are essentially the same . Accordingly, l will try to 
show not only that these problems are conceived of as different because they 
1Thc distinction between method and content is itself a contro\.'crsial issue in philosophy and I make it 
hen: in a conditional sense. Regarding tliis question. my position is in favor of the notion tllat method and 
contcm o•,crlap in the accounts which are empirically insufiicicm and arc fairly distinguishable only in 
lhc accounts which arc empirically sufficient. 
2 I understand as ·compositional· a concept that consistently involves a few other concepts so that their 
points can be intcrpn:tcd as complcmcnt.ary. 
2 
reflect different conceptual frameworks, but that as they appear in one such 
framework so they disappear in another. From the philosophical point of view 
which I will consequently adhere to, the fonner framework is termed 
metaphysical, while the latter one is termed therapeutic which could be the 
appropriate name of this principle of treatment, too. 
In my argument, I will presuppose that scientists and philosophers treat, 
respectively, cognitive and philosophical problems in terms of both expla11atio11s of 
their sources and prescriptions for their overcoming. In these terms, my goal can 
be formulated as an inquiry into whether cognitive problems can be explained in 
philosophical terms and overcome through a philosophical prescription. I argue 
that the conceivable connection in the treatment of the two types of problems 
initially comes up as a matter of explanation which poses them as being 
epistemological in character since they are concerned with the use of cog11itio11. 
Thus, as traditional philosophical problems can be explaim:d as stemming from the 
use of epi.wemological concepts or concepts of cognition, so cognitive problems 
can be explained as stemming from inappropriate uses of those epistemological 
concepts which individuals spontaneously form by combining the various 
epistemological poillls in their views of how their own cognitive abilities work. 
General as this explanation is, it may be used in determining individuals' cognitive 
problems ( which wc:re originally <letectt:d in lhc: scope of science) i11 philosoplii,:u/ 
terms. In an attempt to do so, I will use, on one hand, Rorty's term "set of beliefs" 
to signify what in the above explanation of the two types of problems was 
distinguished as "epistemological concept"3; and on the other, the term "language 
use," which is commonly associated with the philosophy of Wittgenstein, to signify 
3 Herc. I am using the phrase ·set of beliefs' as a conditional tenn which is a pan of a condilional 
explanation that. as such. coniains also a recognition that the equation of the two l)pcs of problems is 
onl)· a spcculath·e one; buL I am not using it in !he sense of an atomic tcnn being lhc goal of an analysis 
as a paI1 of an explanation. since such a use could be legitimately criticized as aiming at an ·ultimate· 
explanation. Similarly. the tenns 'signify ' and ' specify ' an: used in a conditional sense, too; for. being 
themsch·es speculative. ~ -arc intended 10 put into light otlicr speculative tenns. If such a use has any 
\'aluc, it would be to build up a context of undcrslanding by way of showing an intcm:lalion of all such 
terms exercised. 
3 
what in the same explanation was distinguished as "use of epistemological 
concepts." Thus, like the traditional philosophical concepts, individuals' views of 
how their cognitive abilities work can be explained as epistemological , ·011c:epts 
which consist of certain se1s of heiiej•! that are formed by mediation of certain 
language uses which are philosophically unjustified (and perhaps unjustifiable) and 
consequently entail their cognitive problems. 
Further, I presume that such a connection between the ·explanations' is a 
ground for relating both scientists' and philosophers ' prescriptions for treating, 
respectively, cognitive and traditional philosophical problems, and ultimately, for 
justifying a philosophical prescription ar a prescription for overcoming , ·ag,1ilive 
problems. In my view, what is in c:ommon to both sc:ielllijic: and philosophical 
procedures of treatment is that they relate the overcoming of the two types of 
problems to the mediation of a c:on,·ept of c:01:11itio11 which el:5elllially involves a 
knowledge of how these prohlem.,· come illlo bei111; and how they disappear. for 
example, the common features of the sciemific prescriptions which I discuss in 
chapter one can be subsumed under the term metacog11ilio11 which in the scientific 
literature signifies a mind's problem solving activity standing for the 11tilizatio11 of 
one' s knowledge of how one's own intelligence works in problem solving: 
Metacognition is your knowledge of and awareness about cognitive processes .... 
Metacognition is .. . a process [in which] we use our cognitive processes to 
contemplate our cognitive processes. Metacognition is ... our knowledge about [how J 
our cognitive processes can guide us in arranging circumstances and selecting 
strategies to improve future cognitive performances. (M. W. Matlin p. 248) 
4 
I undersland the lcnn "belier here 10 mean an ''epistemological belier' . This is the sense in which 
Rorty uses it ahhough. unlike Beruand Russell. he docs nor find it necessary to spccilY In my argumenL 
I consider as irrclC\·ant the possibly arising questions "How docs a 'belief which has been initially 
ooncci,·cd of as an epistemological phenomenon later on affect certain psychological dispositions?". or 
"To what extent is a 'belief an epistemological phenomenon. and to wha1 e.~1en1 is iL a psychological 
oner. Such questions cannot be answcn:d by mere speculation. Rather, a psychological phenomenon 
could be 1rca1cd by rested prescriptions which sometimes could appropriately utili1.c epistemological 
concepts (for example, the various questionnaires and interviews psychologists use in their practices can 
be considered as such utili:ted epistemological concepts). Similarly. educational scientists who treat 
individuals' negative learning dispositions do not necessarily need 10 explain how, for example. a 
psychological phenomenon like "permanent an:<iety- is Lo be overcome by mcdia1ion of mctacogni1ion 
which aims to utilize a 1ypically epistemological content like "knowledge of one' s own capacities. 
limi1a1ions. and idiosyncrasies regarding the learning of different kinds of material .. (Covington p. 402). 
4 
Similarly, philosophers whom I discuss in chapter two relate the overcoming of the 
traditional philosophical problems to an appropriate philosophical 1111dersta11di11g of 
language which is basically a knowledge of how mind produces beliefs by coordinating 
language and thinking. Howevt:r, bt:e<1Ust: the:: philosuphicill prucc::<lurc::s fur uv1:rcu11u11i:; 
philosophical problems are 1101 specifically known within common terms, I will here 
subsume them under the tenn methodolt>K)' of dissol111io11. 
For the purpose of this paper, l will further specify the twofold sense of the 
procedure of metacognition as involving both an explanation of how one's cognitive 
abilities work (i .e., some sort of a personal epistemological concept or concept of 
cognition) and an application of this concept that would overcome one's cognitive 
problems, and will explore the possibility for such a specification of the philosophical 
procedure, too. In this way, throughout this paper, I will ultimately relate the scientific 
concept of metacog11itio11 as substitutable or supplementary with a philosophical 
methodolofO! Q( disso/11tio11 which I will discuss here in terms of some concepts of 
contemporary philosophy oflanguage. If my argument is convincing, it will show that 
cognitiw problems can be both explained in philosophical terms and overcome by 
mediation of a philosophical prescription. Further, if the scientific prescription of 
metacog11itio11, as an epistemological concept, is conceived of as a subject of a possible 
acquisition, a philosophical 1111dersta11di11g of language, insofar as it is a concept of 
,:og11iliu11, can be .:on.:civcd of as a subject of possible prescription and of acquisition, 
too.i In other words, as the concept ofmetacog,tition, as an epistemological concept, 
needs first to be acquired in order to be applied for overcoming problems that are of 
l Hereafter. I will use 1hc 1cnns epistemological concept. concept.< of cognition. concept of language. 
philosophical understanding of language , and metacognilion interchangeably. W11at is in common lo all 
of them is 1ha1 1hcy Sland for concepts of cognition which. howl:'·er. an: being used for different purposes 
and as such arc differen1ly termed. This is why, ll10ugh [ emphasize Whal they have in common. their 
senses \\ill necessarily \·a1y in the different contcx1s of my argument One may notice that lhc tenn 
concepl of cognition represents 1hc sense common 10 both melacugnilion and concept of language as a 
mailer of procedure of treatmenl beuer lhan lhc term epistemological concept. Conversely. lhc 1erm 
epistemological concept expresses better the characteristic common to both cognitive and /radilional 
philosophical problems. At lhe same time. the lenn philosophical underslonding of language is more 
appropria1e for emphasizing lhc: aucmpl of the philosophical concepts to break with the epistemological 
problematic in philosophy. 
5 
epistemvlogica/ character, so, in this terminology, the philowphical understanding of 
language could also be acq11ired and then applied in overcoming such problems. In these 
terms, my goal becomes to shaw that a problem solver' s negative cognitive dispositions 
and thinking skills can be adequately treated through acq111sitio11 and application of an 
epistemological concept in the form of a more sophisticated u11derstwuii11g of the way 
philosophers approach what is known as cog11itio11. 
Methodology of Tramfer: Now that the two types of problems and the 
procedures for their overcoming have been com:eptuali:::ed within a common 
terminoloJzy, I need to justify the specific methodology of transfer of the 
philosophical ' methodology of dissolution' as a methodology for the solution of 
cognitive problems. The goal is to overcome what can be called the major 
conceptual difficulty ofmy interdisciplinary theoretical undertaking, namely, how 
to employ legitimately concepts and methods that have become customary for the 
theoretical exercises of fields as differelll as science and philosophy. ln this case, 
it results from the unusual practice of using philosophical methods, which are 
substantially different from scientific ones.6 in treating problems that come up in 
the scope of science. 
In my view, any justification which tries to overcome this difficulty should 
essentially involve two points: first, that the expertise of science is somehow 
i11s11Jficie,11, and se~ond, that the .:umµ.:teru:e of philo.,opl,y is apprupriale for an 
·adequate treatment' of the cognitive problems. l argue that the expertise of 
scien,·e can be considered in.mfficient, insofar as 'scientific explanations' of the 
cognitive problems were to rely on philosophical j11stifkalio11s, and insofar as 
' scientific prescriptions' for overcoming those problems were to recommend the 
acquisition and application of epistemological concepts. And, I argue that the 
competence of philosophy can be considered appropriate, insofar as the 
philosophical methodology of disso/111io11 can be represented in the form of the 
scientific prescription ofmetacognition, namely, as an explanation and application 
6 For example. scientists usually use experimental methods. while philosophers usually do not. 
6 
of a concept of cognition. 7 Thus, in chapter one, I will try to expose the 
· insufficiency' of the expertise of !>-cience for treating cognitive problems and in 
chapter two, to represent the 'appropriateness' of the competence of philosophy 
for treating these problems. 
However, these necessary steps in the overcoming of the maJor cu11ceptua/ 
difficulty of my argument are to be accomplished in narrow contexts of understanding 
which are themselves constituents of a broader coll/ext that generally qualifies the 
cognitiw problems for the ,·ompetenc:e of philosophy rather than for the expertise of 
science. As it will hopefolly become clear, this broader context is indispensable for 
overcoming this difficulty, and so I need to set up its background before undertaking t.he 
accomplishment of my argument in a narrow sense. Consequently, in chapter three, I will 
need to illustrate the overcoming of cognitive problems by mediation of the philosophical 
methudolo10• of ciissol11tio11 in both narrow and broader contexts of understanding. 
A Broader Context of U11dersta11di11g: A critical reader would notice that a relation 
of the methodology of dissolution of philosophical problems as methodology of the 
solution of cognitive problems means not only to 'compensate' a certain scientific 
insufficiency regarding particular types of problems, but also to ignore the traditional 
dijferemiation between science and philosophy. Hence, the point I will be trying to 
convey here is necessarily grounded in such an expla11atory coll/ext that concerns the 
7 
One m.1}' ask the question why I will try 10 represent the philosophical methodology of dissolution in the 
fonn of the scientific concept of mctacognition instead of vice versa. M}· reply is that 1hc philosophical 
concepts to be examined an: analytically mon: indeterminate than the scientific concepts to be examined. 
Morco\·er. it is a necessary peculiarity of the ' therapeutic sense· of the former that they remain 
charactenstically as indeterminate as possible. Thus. since the scientific procedures for overcoming 
cognitive problems an: better established in common terms than the philosophical ones for O\'Crcoming 
epistemological problems, the latter an: more susceptible to rcpn:scmalion in tcnns of characteristic 
features of the fonner. 
All()thcr question might be that since I am trying to substitute or supplement the scientific 
procedure with the philosophical one. how [ can avoid the disach·antagcs of the scientific procedure. given 
that t take its form in the philosophical procedure. My reply is that here I do not try to search for ccnain 
disadvantages of the form of this procedure; howC\·cr. an implicit answer to such a question could be 
detected throughout the paper. insofar as the distinction between the metaphysical and therapeutic notions 
of philosophy becomes clear. And yet. the proper understanding of my argument must render that it is not 
about advantages and disadrnntages of ccnain proccd=. but about their belier understanding. Aller all 
I am able to discuss the two procedures and pla~ them against each other only insofar as they form an 
opposition. 
7 
relationship and the possible cooperation between the two fields, and ultimately, the 
question of their foundations . 8 In this context. I will draw attention to a 11otio11 of 
philosophy, for I already claimed that such a notion is what scientific and philosophical 
concepts under consideration have i11 common as they employ it in treating problems 
which were explained as being essentially the same. Ultimately, it is the ~·oncept11a/i:atio11 
of the two types of problems and the procedures for their overcoming within this context 
which will ensure the proper understanding of my argument as conveyed by the common 
termi110/ogy. 
Because the eventual relationship and possible cooperation between science and 
philosophy will be a major concern throughout this paper, at this point I will adhere to a 
working notion of the role of philosophy in the modem world which I will modify and 
clarify subsequently. This is the role which Jurgen Habennas conceives of as a mediatin~ 
interpreter that accounts for the problems remaining out of the scope of the scientific 
fields. given that these fields have already divided and appropriated all the opponunities 
for expenise, or what are known as reasonable accounts of reality ( l 990. p. 19; 1992. 
p.39). In what he calls a "division of labour," the expen fields tum out to be in the 
position of needing a common medium of communication; first, between themselves, 
however different they are, and second, between themselves and social practices they 
serve. In maintaining this recurrent communication. the "linguistic medium of reason" 
.:nwunt.:rs c.:rtain µrub/em:, of 111.:diutiun which, according to Hab.:m1as, ar.: to n:main in 
the scope of philosophy: 
. .. [T]hese eminent trends towards compartmentalization, constituting as 
they do the hallmark of modernity, can do very well without philosophical 
justification. But they do pose problems of mediation. First, how can reason, 
once it has been thus sundered. go on being a unity on the level of culture? And 
second, how can expen cultures, which are being pushed more and more to the 
level of rarefied. esoteric forms, be made to stay in touch with everyday 
communication? To the extent to which philosophy keeps at least one eye 
K In my \;cw. the necessity of this broader context of understanding would not arise in a purely scientific 
theoretical framework which would limit its justification of the methodology uf Jransfer 10 the exposition 
of both the ·jnsufficiem;y' of the one type of arguments and the ·appropriateness' of the other. Howc-.·cr, 
an inlcrdiscipliruu)· undertaking cannot dispense iL for it nCCCS5.lrily grounds its argumentation in an 
account of the characteristic differences of the two approaches lo their 1:0mmon problems. 
8 
trained on the topic of rationality, that is, to the extent to which it keeps 
inquiring into the conditions of the unconditional, to that extent it will not dodge 
the demand for these two kinds of efforts at mediation. ( 1990, pp. 17-8) 
In my interpretation, I accept that the first type of problem of mediation 
has to do with the self-justification of expert cultures ("science, technology, law 
and morality"( 1992, p.39)), i.e., with some sort of rational erplanation of the 
'expert knowledge' which theoretical fields pres,-rihe for the practical fields, while 
the second has to do with the acquisition and application of those cultures' 
·expertise' in social practices on the level of everyday communication. It is 
notable, that although Habermas claims that the problems of mediation are a work 
of philosophy, he confesses that the expert cultures and social practices could do 
quite well "without philosophical justification." Eventually, this implies that either 
the experl ,11/11,res themsefres • solve somehow' 1he 'problems of mediation', too, 
or at least, that they hm•e not e11co11111ered any, yet. In either way, this is the point 
on which I ground my contention that if any philosophical j11stificatia11s or 
epistemological co11,·eprs are involved in the exchange of expenise on the levels of 
expert culture or everyday communication, they can be considered symptoms of 
expert im11fficie11cy which indicate some existing problems of mediation on any of 
those two levels. 
In an attempt to interpret the sense of the concept of problems of 
mediation for the purpose of this paper, i.e., in terms that I already have been 
using, I will accept generally that they are problems of the utili;;ation of concepts 
in the process of the tra11Silion of expertise between the two levels mentioned; and 
more specifically, that they are problems of experts' explanation and prescription 
of certain concepts on the level of c11/t11re, and of individuals' acquisition and 
applk·ation of experts' prescriptions on the level of e~·eryday comm1111icatio11. 
Insofar as they are generally problems of the transition of expertise, i.e., of the 
mm~er of knowledge by mediation of concepts which have been generated in one 
problematic situation and then used in another one, the problems of mediation can 
be qualified as various problems of epistemological character which come into 
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being as a result of epistemological pr<1':edures with these concepts. Funher. as 
created in the transition of expenise, these problems can be viewed as taking 
different or concrete forms on its different stages. One may note that both 
cognitive and traditional philosophical problems fit the general panern of 
problems of mediation, but that they do so at different stages of the exchange of 
expenise: the former at the level of everyday comm1111icatio11 rather than at the 
level of culture; the latter at the level of culture rather than at the level of everyday 
communication. 9 Nevertheless. in terms of the notion of"philosophy as a 
mediating interpreter," the two types of problems are to remain in the scope of 
competence of philosophy. 
Thus, in terms of my interpretation of Habermas' view of philosophy, both 
cognitive and philosophical problems can be understood as prohhtms of mediation which 
have just been actualized either in the paradigms of different expert fields on the level of 
erpert c11lt11re, or in the subjective paradigms of the problem solvers on the level of 
everyday comm1111imtion. Implicit in this point is the claim that if the expertise of the 
former level is unproblematically exchanged through the latter level, there would be no 
problem.~ of mediation; this claim. therefore, constitutes what could be properly termed 
9 
Insofar as some of the 1:ogniti\"e problems ('permanent am.icty'. ·motivational defi-:it ') arc also known 
:is psycho!ogic:il phcnomen:i. the question :illout the relationship between epistcmologic:il and 
ps)"Chological comes up again in tcnns of the notion of the exchange of expertise. Ps)·chological 
phenomena arc largely bclie\"cd to csist on an indi,idual's personal level rather than on an expert IC\·el. 
Indeed. for tl1e products of the C'.\")IC'1 cultures. it appears to be essential that they lrnnsccnd an expert· s 
personal le\'cl and so gain an epistemulogica/ aspect. while the products of e"cryda)· communication 
practices transcend an individual's personal IC\-cl only insofar as individuals arc rcfem:d to as experts and 
so du nut necessarily gain sue/, an aspect but rather mark its disappcardllcc in the exchange of C'.\")ICniSC. 
If such an assumption is 1:rcdiblc. 1hcn we could infer that psychological problems arc based on still 
unsol\·cd epistemological problems persisting in indhiduals' personal views rather than that the 
epistemological undertakings on the level of culture arc just psychological undertakings.• This is why I 
argue that the ,-arious cognith·c problems tltat indi,iduals face in everyday communication practices arc 
based on · epistemological beliefs' which arc. however. philosophically unjustified. 
• The pretension of psychology to the status of science is based on such an assumption. Regarding the 
problem of p!;)·chology to define itself as a science sec. for c:o1amplc. L. Miller·s summary of the points of 
the two ma.in sides in the debate on anificial intelligence in Cognitive Science , 1978. 2. 111-127. In this 
relation. the late pltifOS(Jphical writings of Wiugcnstein give a variety of arguments of why psychological 
and other forms of private C'.\")ICriencc cannot back up concepts lia,ing transcending power. A thematic 
sci CCI ion of these arguments can be found in A. Kenny· s The Wi11gens1ein Reader, 1994, Blackwell 
Publishers hie .. Cambridge. MA. 
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the general principle for overcoming any such problems. Further, this principle implies 
that wherever these problems arise in the exchange of expertise, the problem solver who 
faces them would need the competence to overcome them. For, in both scientific and 
philosophical paradigms, it is the lack of competence for dealing with such problems 
(respectively, the lack of a good understanding of how intelligence works and of how the 
mind deals with language) which is conceived of as conditioning their emergence and 
persistence. In this way, three co11ditio11s can be isolated which generally qualify certain 
problems as problems of mediation and thus relegate them from the scope of science to 
philosophy: the problems under consideration are of epistemological character; the 
er:perli.i-e of science proves insufficient for their overcoming; and the competen,·e of 
philosophy is represented as appropriate for their treatment. Since the cognitive 
problems already have been co11cept11a/ized as being in essence epistemological i11 
character, they must be eligible to be overcome by mediation of such a methodology that 
has been used in dissolving the very epistemological problems-the traditional 
philosophical problems. But since the expertise of science is insufficient for their 
treatment and itself appeals to the competence of philosophy, the later already can be 
considered a justified, methodological alternative to the former. 
To sum up, provided that the cog11itive problems are problems of 
mediation on the level of everyday comm1miwlio11, that their overcoming 
111:1.:cssitat.:s appropriate .:xp.:rtisc on lht: ltt~·l!i uj L'ul111rtt, lhal th.: ttX/Nrli.\1: uf 
science turns out to be insufficient while the competen,·e of philosophy is 
appropriate, the latter can be called up on the le,•e/ of culture to help overcome 
these problems in ewrydoy ,·omm1111icatio11. ln other words, if philosophy is to 
'specialize' in the field of the problems of medialio11. we can assume that when 
expert cultures and social practices encounter them, they do not have the necessary 
' expenise' to deal with them, while at the same time philosophy does. The 
stipulation here is that the ·expertise' of philosophy is an expenise only in a 
conditional sense in which it is conceived of al most as a ,·ompelence, for 
philosophy is supposed to 'specialize' somehow paradoxically in a field that is 
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supposed to remain non-special insofar as the expert fields have already 
apponioned all the possibilities for specialized accounts of reality. 
In this way, the proposed scheme of the distribution of problems of 
mediation 10 indicates, on one hand, that there appears to be a possible division of 
labor in which philosophy could find its place along with the specialized fields of 
the expel'I c:11l111res, and on the other, that a specific extension of individuals' 
philosophical background would adequately help their metacognition in everyday 
cumm11nicutio11. The specific competence of philosophy becomes a good reason 
for calling it up in the role of a 'mediating interpreter' which can help elaborate an 
adequate prescription for overcoming problems that could be explained as 
problems of mediation. As already pointed out, such a prescription essentially 
involves an epislemologica/ c:011cept or a co11c:epl of cog11itio11 which is to be 
acquired and applied; in the philosophical terms I adopted here, it is a11 
1111dersla111lin~ uf how the mind produces 'beliefs' by coordi1iati11g lat1!f11Gge and 
rhinking I will try to promote such an ·understanding' in the form ofa 
compusi1iunal philusophirnl c:011L·ep1 which is based on the above mentioned four 
contemporary philosophical concepts that will be examined in chapter two. Its 
central point will be a notion of philosophy which, in this broader context, 
becomes a notion of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and 
philosophy, i!nd which I will considc:r in 1:hc1ph:r lhrc:.:. 
fo Resume my Arg11me111: In this paper, I will try to show that scientists' 
efforts to overcome individuals' cognitive problems are attempts at solving 
problems of mediation, and thereby I will expose science' s 'insufficiency' for 
10
11 is important to note tliat. in this scheme. insofar as it is derived from Habennas' \icw of philosophy, 
the efforts of science and philosophy converge for solving ·problems of mediation· only on the level of 
c•,cryday 1:onunu.n.ication, i.e., lheireffonscom·crge in the solution ofindh·iduals' cognitive problems. but 
not in the overcoming of traditional philosophical problems. This is in relation to tl1e question of why 
philosophy cannot take its scientific Ii.kc variant which is known as 'metaphysics·. This question is an 
aspect of all the philosophical con.eplS which arc reviewed in this paper, and thus an inevitable 
consideration of~· argument and of the ph..ilosophical understanding which I am trying Lo promote as a 
pan of any problem soh·er's mctacognition. (I will di~ss the relationship between science and 
philosophy in chapter three). 
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dealing with these types of problems. On the one hand, I will consider any 
philosophical j11stificatio11s that scientists embark on in their explanations as 
scientific attempts at solving problems of mediation on the level of expert c11/t11re. 
On the other hand, I will consider any philosophical concepts that scientists 
recommend for utilization in their prescriptions as scientific attempts at solving 
problems of mediation on the level of everyday communication. 11 Conversely, I 
will consider that in everyday L"Vmm1111icatio11 practices, individuals encounter the 
problems of mediation as their cognitive problems in the fonn of either negative 
psychological dispositions or inappropriate strategic approaches (such as 
"permanent anxiety" and "failure avoiding tactics") to the problems to be solved. 
Further, I consider that cognitive problems stem from individuals' own 
explanations of their cognitive abilities (i.e., from their views of cognition) in 
which they establish ·reasonable ' , 'logical', ·sufficient ', 'clear' or 'well-proven' 
connections among those problems, their solutions, and themselves as problem 
solvers. Being essentially epistemological, these connections can be considered 
philosophically unjustified and perhaps unjustifiable, for they are made out with a 
reference to a presupposed level of expert culture, while solving 11011-<!xpert 
problems on a presupposed level of everyday communication. 
In elaborating an ' appropriate' epistemological concept for the treatment of 
cognitive problems, I will consider philosophers' ·competence' for dealing \,i:h 
epistemological problems, in the conditional sense in which they are assumed as 
being 'experts ' in dealing with these kinds of problems. This will be a 
consideration of the overcoming of problems of mediation in tenns of knowledge 
expla11atio11 and knowledge app.'icalion as it is in the scientific concept of 
metacognition. The point l will be trying to convey is that, though philosophers 
11 One may find 1ha1 it is betler lo say 1ha1 scicntiSls sv.lve lhe ·prot,!~ms of mediation· on the IC'\·el of 
cu/1ure. bu11ha1 lhC)' ac/cireJ~·· 1hcm on lhc IC\'CI of every,'dt.:y c'J:,1municalion. In lenns of my argumcnL 
this will be considered a metaphysical point of view because ii somehow presupposes 1ha1 science can 
ocrua/(v solve 1hcsc problems wltich arc after aU philosophical. But since in this interdisciplinary 
undertaking I am uying to convey a therapeutic point which excludes the possibility of a scicnlific 
solution of 1hcsc problems. I say 1llat science only 011empts 10 solve these problems 011 the two levels 
mentioned. 
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traditionally address such problems more directly on the level of expert culture 
than on the level of f!veryday comm1111ica1ion, it can be worthwhile that their 
concepts become subjects of prescription and acquisition and thus bridge the 'two 
ievels ' in a way that would ensure a ·smooth ' transition of expenise. In my 
argument, this alternative prescriplion is to help problem solvers acquire a specific 
extension of their philosophical background in tenns of concepts of contemporary 
philosophy. 
However, it would be naive to believe that the concepts, which we acquire 
in order to apply, are mere words whose meanings we just retain and thus know, 
and that a simple form of inquiry, like the use ofa dictionary, would easily fill up 
the 'blanks· of the concepts which we have need of. Indeed, in the act of those 
concepts· application we do not necessarily highlight the whole capacity of 
knowledge which entails our self-confidence to use exactly these certain words. 
But, as one acquires a language not through mere learning the dictionary by heart 
but rather through a holistic interaction with the uses of this language, i.e., through 
an interaction in which many 11011-discur~'ive aspects are involved, too, so the 
acquisition of a certain concept is not to come simply through the mere learning of 
definitions, but rather through a building up of its ha1.:kgrou11d which is not 
discursively present in the act of this concept's application. In this sense, it also 
would be naive to believe that the necessary philosophical extensicn cf individuals' 
views of cognition would be so easily achievable a goal 3S we would wish it to be. 
Most of the philosophical concepts are complicated and very hard to represent in 
a simple or easy to acquire form, and sometimes such a representation comes along 
with the understanding that it is just a misrepresentation of the original. In those 
cases, one can even expect a further complication in applying concepts which have 
been thus acquired, for, as it would hopefully become clear, what are here 
understood under the 'problems of mediation' not only need to be overcome by 
mediation of a procedure which utilizes concepts of cognition but also come into 
being by mediation of such procedures. 
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In this relation, it is worthwhile to note that in this broader context the 
differe111iatio11 between the epistemological procedures of' explanation' of a 
certain concept and of· application' through a permanent utilization of this concept 
results from the differe111iatio11 between the attempts for soiving the ' problems of 
mediation' on the level of expert cu/Jure and the level of everyday comm1111ic:a1io11. 
Here. this differentiation serves explanatory purposes only, and is, in this sense, 
just a methodological ass11mptio11 in which the connection between the efforts of 
experts to explain and prescribe certain concepts and the efforts of individuals to 
acquire and apply those concepts could be easily represented as reversible. For 
instance, assuming that, as is practically the case, all individuals are also experts as 
well as all experts are also individuals who just happen to uti/i;;e concepts on 
different stages of the exchange of expertise, then the above pairs of tenns just 
become interchangeable, and so, their distinction-conditional. Likewise, in the 
process of their elaboration. experts' ' explanation' and 'prescription' can be 
regarded as being at once the a,·q11i.Iitio11 and application of certain concepts; 
conversely, individuals' 'acquisition' and ·application' can be understood as their 
personal expla11atio11 and pre.l'criptio11 of concepts for solving their own cognitive 
problems. In this sense, the l!xpla11atio11 and prescription, acq11isitio11 and 
applicalio11 of certain concepts can be in no way distributed to certain individuals 
or ..:xpcrrs who arc. so to speak., 'in charge' in the different stages of the exchange 
of expertise because such a distribution (in Habermas' terms, "trends toward 
compartmentalization") would be the way to actually create the conditions for 
·problems of mediation'. Rather, these problems are 1111avoidable for all the field\' 
a11d problem solvers, and their solutions inevitably go through the mediation, i.e., 
through a permanem 11tili::atio11 of some philosophical concepts 011 hoth expert 
a11d individual /evels.12 This is. therefore, what constitutes the major 
me1hodological difjkulty of my argument, namely, that by promoting philosophy 
12 Such a conclusion is potential to the explanation . prescription. acquisition. and application of the 
concept of metacognitivn in U1e ·exchange of cxpcnise ·: for otherwise lbC)· would not rely on 
·philosophical justifications· . nor would they ~ntain 'epistemological conccp15'. 
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on the level rif cull/Ire to help overcome the problems of medial ion l am actually 
contributing to conditions for their persistence rather than for their overcoming. In 
the concluding chapter, I will try to explain the unavoidability of the 'problems of 
mediation · as a resuit of the necessity of tram,ferring • concepwai comen( 
generated in one problemati,· situation to another (for instance, from an expert to 
a practical level) and to overcome the ·major methodological difticulty ' in tem1s of 
the distinction between the m,!laphysical and therapeutic notions of philosophy. 
Thus, the problems of mediation become problems of a certain use of 
concepts which is always concrete. and which is a f)t!rmanefll "ti/i:ation (and in 
this sense, an 'undoing') of these concepts. This is why their solutions could take 
place only in a concrete situation in which 'individuals' have already become 
·experts' and do not need the mediation of 'other experts' in order to solve 
problems. In this way, they would not need to be philosophers in a metaphysical 
.wmse, since they would have already become philosophers in a therapeutic sense. 
If that were so, there would be no · problems of mediation'. nor would individuals 
have any cognitive problems; they would just solve the problems to be solved and 
the issue of 1he cognitive problems would not arise. In light of the point I will be 
trying to convey, the sol111io11s of the cognitive problems are to come as 
disso/11tio11s of the epistemological poi111s which email them; at the same time, 
these 'dissolutions' will tum out to be aspects of the so/11tio11s of th.: concrete 
problems in the everyday communication practices. 
Sixnifirnnce: The outlined approach already suggests that with respect to its 
significance, the justification of the issue under consideration would become clear insofar 
as the claim being argued is convincingly accomplished. For, only a relatively well-formed 
concept could understandably serve a concept-employing practice. Nevertheless, the 
significance of the proposed question of research is justified through the associations of 
some undesirable discrepancies in the mind's problem solving activity directly with the 
way the mind produces 'beliefs· by mediation of language and thinking. 1 refer to such 
discrepancies as the negative psychological and cognitive dispositions encountered by 
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educational and cognitive scientists-permanent anxiety, low self-esteem, motivational 
deficit, student-teacher conflict of values, failure-avoiding tactics, or indifference to 
learning. Thus, anticipated contributions can be made, which relate to practices involving 
the mind ' s intensive problem solving activity, in environments such as education and 
business. But, because language and thinking are indispensable means of communication 
and so, necessary in dealing with all kinds of problems, even broader extrapolations of the 
claim being argued may also be possible. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COGNlTlVE PROBLEMS AND THE CONCEPT OF MET ACOGNITION 
Alll1ough verbalizing helps 10 bring more of the process into 
view. ii is a representation of the process and may invoke 
significant alternations. The full c~1cn1 10 which verbalizing 
changes thought pancms is probably unknowable. Those of us 
who do research in the area feel that the changes arc much less 
than skeptics fear. 
Jack Lochhcad. Teaching Ana~vric Reasoning 
Skills through Pair Prohlem .\,i/ving 
Overview 
In this chapter, I examine four scientific concepts in which authors treat 
educational learning problems such as motivational deficit, low self-esteem, 
permanent anxiety, indifference to learning, bad learning strategies, and student-
teacher conflicts of values. For convenience, I categorize those problems as 
cognitive problems because they are concerned in one way or another wi1h 
individuals' acquisition and application of cognition. M.V. Covington's concept of 
strategic thinking, J. Lochhead 's notion of the role of verbali:atio11 in problem 
solving, and M. Lipman 's philosophy for children program address cognitive 
problems in educational environments. Similarly, R. Paul's notion of 
co11cept11ali:ation and the eiemems of lho11ght addresses practical and 
philosophical aspects of cognitive problems but he conceives of it as applicable 
also in other than educational problem solving situations. 
In the process of examining these notions, l focus on the scientists' 
expla11ations of and prescriptions for overcoming those cognitive phenomena: in 
their explanations, scientists widely rely on ·philosophical justifications', and in 
their prescriptions, they recommend acquisition and application of 
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'epistemological concepts' by mediation of the mind's problem solving activity, 
me1acow1itio11. As already pointed out, in my view scientific expla11atio11s and 
prescriptions which involve, respectively, 'philosophical justifications' and 
·epistemological concepts' indicate a certain ·insufficiency' of the scientific 
accounts for an 'adequate treatment' of those problems. 13 At the same time, the 
overcoming of the cow1ilive problems as a matter of 111i/i:a1io11 of epistemological 
co11cepl.~ also indicates that these problems are of epistemological character 
which, along with scientific 'insufficiency', qualifies them as problems of 
mediation in terms ofmy interpretation ofHabermas' concept of philosophy 
which l stated in the introduction. 
Covington's Concept of Strategic Thinking'' 
Examining the causes of students' unsatisfactory performance in an 
educational environment, Manin V. Covington explains the negative cognitive 
dispositions "anxiety, indifference to learning and motivational deficit" (p. 389) by 
the lack of efficiency of their personal "thinking skills" and the e,cisting "classroom 
reward system" (p. 390). He finds that reward systems encourage students to use 
"failure-avoiding" :md "self-defeating tactics" which include Y:uious tricks for 
cheating (p. 392) and "post-dictive explanation (excuses) for success and 
failure"(p. 403). According to him, students' thinking becomes highly susceptible 
to similar ·strategies' which ultimately amount to a "teacher-student conflict of 
values" with respect to learning efforts, personal ability, and test outcomes (p. 
393). At the same time, the understanding of how unlikely such ·tactics' are to 
13 This point is implicit to Wittgenstein's early conccp1 of the correct use of language which I discuss in 
chapter two. 
1
~ All references to M. V. Co\inglon in this paper arc from ~strategic Thinking and the Fear of 
Failure·· . Thinking and Leaming Skills. Ed. Segal, Chipman, and Glaser. Hillside NJ: 
L.Erlbawn. 1985 
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gain success in a new or unexpected problematic situation leads to either a lack of 
self-confidence, low self-esteem, a feeling of insecurity, or persisting anxiety: 
Meaningless success cannot long sustain a sense of positive self-regard nor 
increase achievement. (p. 397) 
Covington contends that those are symptoms of "bad strategic thinking" 
which is detectable in students either setting up easily attainable, low-effort goals, 
or striving for unattainable ones that "literally invite failure, but 'failure with 
honor"'(p. 392). In his view, the sources of the "mind's strategic mismanagement" 
are identical with the conditions which ensure effective acquisition and application 
of cognition: "the intimate relationship between memory and strategic thinking," 
the "ability to retrieve material from semantic memory", and the "knowledge of 
procedures for transforming this material (inferences, generalizations)" (p. 403). It 
is in this conection that Covington emphasizes the necessity of such specific 
responsiveness to "the more subtle nuances" of the functions of intelligence that is 
available only to "metacognitively more sophisticated individuals" (p. 404). 
Consequently, he addresses the epistemological aspects of the work of intelligence 
and, to conceptualize them, inevitably needs a philosophical j11s1ifica1io11 which 
more or less concerns the question of the nature of intelligence: 
The concept of strategic thinking firmly locates cognitive attributions as 
antecedent determinants of behavior. (p. 403) 
.. [T]o understand intelligence, it is important to make a distinction between 
basic abilities and the mechanisms by which abilities are translated into 
intelligent thought and action. (p. 409) 
On the other hand, Covington's pres,ription for the solution of these problems 
involves two elements which relate to their respective sources: developing and 
cultivating of the concept of so-called "strategic thinking" and "reconstructing of 
classroom reward systems" (p. 395). He defines strategic thinking as "the capacity to 
identify and analyze problems and to create and monitor plans for their solutions" (p. 
390). Its more detailed representation involves three steps: (I) problem form11la1io11, 
or ex-planation which is basically "a well-developed sense of the problem, or an 
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understanding of what makes it a problem in the first place and how it might be 
reformulated to reduce its difficulty"; (2) selecting of the most effective straiew after 
considering a few possible strategies; and finally, (3) selj-mo11itori11g, a metacognitive 
requiremem which involves, on one hand, "knowledge of one's own capacitit:s, 
limitations, and idiosyncrasies" and, on the other hand, the permanelll utilizatiofl of 
this knowledge through balancing among "hard and easy-to-learn-materials," "time 
constraints," and "teacher standards" in the process of solving the problem (pp. 401-
402). To put it in another way, Covington's concept of strategic thinking claims that 
effective dealing with problematic situations in educational environments is 
accompanied by metacog11itio11 which essentially involves an expla11atiu11 and 
application of a concept of cognition. 
Similarly, the other element of Covington' s solution, the reconstruction of 
the classroom reward system, rests on a philosophical basis too : the cultivation of 
effective thinking skills necessitates aj11stificatio11 of the reliability of the 
"standards for intelligent behavior" (p. 398). Covington conceives of them as 
"well-defined." "absolute standards" which, however, must be applied with respect 
to " realistic goals" (p. 398) in order to suppress s111dt:11ts' inadequate notions that 
the problems they encounter in their school performance are a matter of personal 
ability or inability. Indeed, he notes that systematic training in thinking skills may 
not affect "individual differences" in "ability" (p . 41 ! ), but he considers that its 
goal will be achieved if it "reduces the dependency of performance on ability and 
increases the saliency of various 1rai11ahle plans and rules" which can e11able 
indi~iduals to "exercise more (J4!rsonal colllrol over their memo/ resources" (italics 
added)(p. 410) 
Finally, in conformity with my argument, Covington ends the justification 
of the two elements of his prescription with the philosophical conclusion that the 
evaluation of the mind's problem solving activity is practically relatable to a 
parlicular problematic situation only, and that its improvement involves both an 
21 
1111der.1·1a11ding of how i111e/lige11ce works and a perma11e111 llli/i;:a/ion of this 
understanding in a new problematic situation: 
Although the fundamental nature of intelligence will likely remain as elusive as 
ever. this newer approach should lead us to a more sophisticaled 
11ndersta11di11g, largely throuxh the recugnilion thal illlellige,m! can be 
defined only in lerms of the con/ext in which it is req11ired. (italicss added) 
(p. 409) 
/11 .mmmary, Covington's explanation relates the students ' negative 
learning dispositions to both the existent reward system and the lack of a good 
understanding, respectively, of effective self-control of their personal thinking 
abilities. Hjs prescriplion links the overcoming of those problems with the concept 
of strategic thinking which takes into consideration the two main points of his 
explanation. On the students' part, they need, on the one hand, to identify and 
correct any inadequacies in their problem solving strategies by mediation of the 
melaco!(ltilive practice of self-mo11i10ri11g, and, on the other hand, to have this 
metacognitive practice supplied with a more sophisticated understanding of how 
their own intelligence works, i.e .. with an adequate epistemolo~ical concept, or a 
concept about the nature of knowledge. Because the concept of strategic thinking 
is intended to respond to students ' need of such a 'more sophisticated 
understanding' , it takes the fonn of such a11 epistemological concepl to be 
acq11irt!d and applied. At the same time. the other element ofCovington's 
solution, the 'reconstruction of the classroom reward systems' is to ensure a 
coherence between subjective and objective factors oflearning and thus to ensure 
an effec1ive 'adequacy' between the individuals ' epistemological notions and the 
standards for testing of intelligent behavior. 
Because in his explana1io11 of the concept of strategic lhinking Covington 
usesphilosophicaljus1ificatio11s which concern individuals' cognitive problems (as 
based on the ·student-teacher conflict of values'), the ' nature of intelligence' ('as 
elusive as ever', but still eligible to be a subject of a 'more sophisticated 
understanding'), and 'the standards of intelligent behavior' (as 'absolute ones' but 
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depending upon the ' context' in which the knowledge is required), he may be 
considered to be attempting to solve 'problems of mediation' 011 the level of e:,..pert 
c:11lt11re . At the same time, because this concept is intended to respond to the 
individuals ' needs of acquisitio11 and applicatio11 of an adequate epistemological 
,·om:ept in overcoming their cognitive problems, it is also a prescriplio11 for 
overcoming the problems of mediation on the level of everyday c:omm1111icafio11. 
The identification of 'post-dictive explanations for failure and success' accounts 
for an active involvement of linguistic behavior in students' justification of 
inappropriate learning strategies. It is the role of'linguistic behavior' in 
establishing fallible 'beliefs' concerning students' own cognitive abilities which 
suggests that the concept of meta,·og,1itio11 call be adequately delim:ated i111erm!>· 
of a philosophical 1mdersta11di11g of how the mind deals with la11g,1age. 15 In this 
context, the lack of a good understanding of how one coordinates language and 
thought opens the possibility for a permanelll s11fficie11cy of any post-dictive 
(linguistic) expla11atio11.1· which thus leaves the 'mind's strategic mismanagement' 
unnoticed (p. 403). At the same time, the subsequent failure in task perfonnance is 
fallibly ascribed to personal ' inability' and thus retained in the fonn of belief in the 
degree of one's cognitive abilities which, applied as an inadequate epistemological 
co11,·ep1, amounts to pennanent anxiety, low-self esteem. or a lack ofself-
confidence. Interpreted in this way, the main points of Covington' s concept of 
'strategic thinking' support my argument that the negative cognitive deficiencies in 
question are based on fallible beliefs which are fanned as a matter of inadequate 
epist,:mo/ogk·al uses of concepts that establish seemingly 'reasonable', 'tested', 
'well-proven', or 'clear' connections between different problematic situations. 
1
~ ln chapter three. I will discuss the intem:lalion of the notions ofnuth. ra1io11ality, and language as an 
issue arising in the metaphilosophical perspective of the question of the relationship and possible 
cooperation be1wecn science aad philosophy. 
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Lochhead's Concept or the Role or Verbalization in Thinking 16 
Unlike Covington, Jack Lochhead regards individuals' linguistic 
explanations as causes rather than as effects of inappropriate thinking strategies. 
Consequently, he focuses directly on the role of language in the elaboration of 
students' views on learning. But like Covington, he first explains students 
cognitive problems in terms of both learning environments and their views of 
problem solving and learning, and then prescribes for their overcoming a 
metacog11itive 111ili::atio11 of epistemological concepts. 
In his explanation, Lochhead notices, on one hand, that students' 
adherence to the so-called "copy theory of learning" as a matter of their own 
epistemology conditions their passive learning attitude, and on the other, that in 
their task to present material "as clearly as possible," teachers often encounter 
problems in the 1ra11silio11 of information between two ~11hsta11tia/ly differelll 
levels of competence. (pp. I 09-110) In his view, the "passive learning attitude" 
suppresses students' potentials to "generate their own knowledge" and prevents 
them from discovering for themselves what the teacher has explained. He argues 
that it is essential for the practice of teaching and learning that, along with 
requirement for teachers' "clear presentation," students develop an ''active learning 
attitude" and adequate "own epistemo!o0,y" (pp. l l 0-11 ! ). 
Thus, as in Lochhead's explanation the cognitive problems are problems of 
the transition of knowledge between two levels of competence, so he prescribes 
educational techniques that "change the traditional roles of both student and 
teacher" (p. 111) In examining the cognitive theory behind one such technique, 
the so-called "pair problem solving," he promotes as its essential part a notion of 
the specific role of verbali::ation in thinking. This technique is intended to make 
easier the transition of knowledge between the two levels of competence and the 
16 
AU the references to Lochhead in this paper are from "Teaching Analylic Reasoning Skills Through 
Pair Problem Solving". Thinking and learning Skills. Ed. Segal. Chipman. and Glaser.Hillside NJ: L. 
ErlbaunL 1985. 
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verbalization is to help overcome the epistemological difficulties arising from the 
unobservable aspects of teachers ' thinking. For example, "analyzing complex 
material is an activity which is generally done inside your head" and "a beginner 
cannot observe how an expert thinks and solves problems"(p . i 21 ), while 
"thinking aloud" is an observable verbalization of thoughts and "helps students 
externalize ideas and strategies so that they can examine and improve on them" (p. 
122). In his view, this method can help "the development ofa self-correcting 
feedback loop in which students can observe and modify their own cognitive 
behavior" in conformity with Dewey's notion that "reflective thought" is "the 
single most important objective of higher education" (p. 122). Lochhead goes on 
with a more detailed explanation of the reconstruction of thinking's ·unobservable' 
aspects into •observable' terms by means of Piaget ' s notion of the mental 
procedure as a communicable representation: 
Communicable representations are in consciousness not because we can relay 
them to other people but because we can relay them to ourselves. We may run 
through the steps of a procedure and observe each one in sequence. 1his self-
observalio11 is awareness and 1h11s lhe basis of all c:omc:iou.mes.I. (italics 
added)(p. l23) 
Lochhead argues that so complex an activity as 'three-ball juggling' 
becomes easy to acquire if all its routines are carefully verbalized. However, he 
notices that, once it becomes an automatic activity, juggling does not need 
verbalizing for its performing; rather, verbalizing in the process of performing 
becomes an obstacle for the performing itself(p. l24). In this way, Lochhead 
promotes verbalization as a matter of consciousness as the most important 
mechanism of learning which clarifies and conceptually shapes the material to be 
learned in the form of knowledge. However, he seems to relate its value to a 
situation of knowledge acquisilion rather than to a situation of knowledge 
application, and so to distinguish a situation in which this epistemological 
procedure is appropriate and another in which it is inappropriate. ln his view, if 
properly used, this procedure is conceived of as involving three subordinated 
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elemer.ts: (I) precise thinking as exercised in terms of "carefully verbalized 
definitions for each variable"; (2) verbalization as "including all the meaning of the 
variable"; and (3) variable as "meaning all the things included in its verbal 
definition .. (p . i 25j. In Lochhead's view. such precision appears to be the 
condition which would save the mind from what he calls "a failure to coordinate 
thought and language" in the process of learning (p. 125). 
Another aspect of the concept of verbali:atian is the explanation of the 
growth of knowledge which Lochhead employs from Piaget's constructivist theory, 
too. The main point of the constructivist concept of conceptual development 
represents an interrelation between perception and conception (in Piaget ' s terms, 
assimilatio11 and a(.'(.:ommodalia11) which is comprised of the claim that "at any 
particular instant we can only perceive those things for which we have concepts" 
(pp. 125-6). At first, this may seem to be a self-contradictory postulate since an 
available concept is what one needs in order to have a perception that on the other 
hand should condition one's formulation ofa new concept. Nevertheless, the 
growth of knowledge is here conceived of as a gradual acquisition of new concepts 
whose sequence may not necessarily be precisely accounted for. To explain this 
unaccountability, Lochhead employs the term "mess with" to si1:,'lllfy the child's 
cognitive activity in the acquisition of a concept such as "cup" which is eventually 
refined through the concepts of "object" and "in." If the child does not have any 
other better relined concepts to enable an effective verbalization, what could be 
associated with a corresponding cognitive activity here is just the child 's "messing 
with" the object. Similarly, a concept such as "potential energy" is acquired later 
on but the "messing with" is replaced by "verbalizing" which is supposed to be an 
already comcious and, in this specific sense here, observable process. 
For Lochhead, the constraints that may prevent students' effective learning 
stem from this. specifically developmelllal, cognitive problem in conceptual 
growth. The acquisition of a new concept often goes through another "vaguely 
defined concept" that can negatively affect the perception of a book's content or 
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the effective teacher-student cumm1111ica1io11 (p . 126). In this respect, Lochhead 
notices that the overcoming of the cognitive problems must take into consideration 
the tendency that students move from a preference for lecture type teaching (a 
view which is most iikeiy ·'baseci on a copy theory ofleaming" ) in the early stages 
of learning lo a preference for a "more relativistic system in which each individual 
must determine the truth for himself' in the later stages of his or her education (p. 
127). 17 According to Lochhead, in order for this tendency not to function as a 
constraint in students· conceptual growth, they need to adopt an "active learning 
aptitude" which is comprised of the notion of makit11( s111de111s aware of themsell'es 
as thinkers (p. 127). In this case. the requirement for students' awarene.fs of how 
their cognitive abilities work, which is basically an awareness of how thinking in 
the form of verba/i:ed thinking becomes comciom thinking, is in essence a 
metacow1ilive requirement. 
In summary, Lochhead erplains individuals' cognitive problems in tenns of 
both their inadequate views of learning and the difference in the levels of 
competence of the students and teachers. He points to the so-called ·copy theory 
of learning' as an example of an inadequate view of cognition which prevents 
students from 'discovering the material for themselves' and thus from ensuring an 
effective transition of information between the ·two levels' of competence. 
Lochhcad' s prcscriptiu11 for overcoming cognitive problems is based on his 
concept of 'verbalization' whose details are specified in terms of the constructivist 
concepts of communicable representation and conceptual growth. He conceives of 
verbalization as an externalized trunking which is thus observable and susceptible 
to conscious corrective manipulations. Verbalization appears to be helpful in the 
17 One might interpret this students' tendency from a ·unqucslionable acquisition' to a ·peTliOnally 
elaborated acquisition· of concepts as projecting the twofold sense of the comcpt of · mctacognition ·. 
( rcspccti,·cly. 3\'3ilability of certain epistemological concept. and the permanent utilization of that 
concept) in a dC\·elopmcntal pcrspccthe. This tendency can be associated with ·undoing· of the 
conditional differentiation between "individuals' and ·experts· as rcOccting the two pn:supposcd levels or 
exchange of cxpcnisc in modernity. In this sense, the technique of ·pair problem sol,·ing·. which 
Lochhcad is Uying to promote. is a remarkable e=ple of the way in which the scientific prescription for 
o,·crcoming cognitive problems aucmpt.s to undo this differentiation. 
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aL"quisition of knowledge for observable problems, but not always desirable in the 
application of this knowledge in solving these problems (as in the case of 
juggling). His concept is supported by the constructivist theory of conceptual 
growth whose requirement for a necessary concept for any possible perception 
represents a deve/opmema/ constraint in the growth of knowledge in general and 
in the exercise of communicable mental procedures as a matter of verbalization in 
particular. For its overcoming, Lochhead recommends the adoption of both active 
learning strategies supported by careful verbalization which would keep students 
aware of the specific peculiarities of their thinking and techniques which change 
the traditional student-teacher roles in the educational environment 
By contrast, the view that conforms to the copy theory ofleaming 
discourages students from developing their own concepts, i.e. , from 'discovering 
the material for themselves' since it presupposes that there is one exclusively 
correct point of view which only needs to be attained for gaining an insight into the 
material to be learned . In this sense, he contends that when "their views are al 
odds with the 11a111ral fi111c1io11i11g of the mind, as they often are, students persist in 
ineffective strategies" (italicss added) (p. 109). For Lochhead, the necessity of 
appropriate concepts of cog11ilio11 specified in terms of an epistemological 
relationship between language and thought becomes crucial in the development of 
studcr.ts' mct:icognitivc thinking, especially in the late stage of their conceptual 
development when they adopt a more relativistic framework of understanding in 
which every newly acquired concept is to find its place in relation with the others. 
Like Covington's recommendation for a more sophisticated understanding 
of how intelligence works, Lochhead's concept contains the metacognitive 
requirement for an 'awareness' of the peculiarities of individuals' thinking which 
takes the form of the metacognitive use of epistemological cam:ept. In both cases, 
these concepts are prescriptions for overcoming of the cognitive problems which I 
interpret as problems of mediation on the level of everyday L"omm1111icalio11. The 
difference between the two authors appears to be in the degree of analysis which 
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backs up their expla11atio11s of the problems of mediation at the level of e:rpert 
c11/t11re: while Covington generally relates students' cognitive problems to their 
inadequate learning values, Lochhead further specifies how values come into being 
in a developmental perspective and how they can be corrected by the mediation of 
a careful verbalization. For Lochhead, knowledge acquisition is a gradual process 
which is mediated by language and the cognitive problems which impede it are 
ultimately related to a "failure to coordinate language and thought" (p. 125). 
Paul's Notion of Conceptualization and the Elements ofThought 18 
Like Covington and Lochhead, Paul is interested in the epistemological 
aspects of educational learning problems. In his concept of critical and creative 
thinking he regards thinking as a trainable and widely applicable problem solving 
tool. Insofar as it is trainable, thinking has the potential to become good thinking 
which, as such, is conceived of as susceptible to standardization. In his view, one 
can also distinguish an explanation of cognitive problems in the form of an 
epistemologic:al com:ept and a prescription for their overcoming which essentially 
involves a 111ili:alio11 of this concept itself. For the purpose of this paper, I will 
limit my consideration of his ·expl:mation' to the notion of com:i:pt11ali=atio11 and 
of his ·prescription' to the notion of the elemellls of thought. 
Because Paul's concept appears to be more universalistic than the 
specifically educational ones previously examined, he subjects it to a more 
sophisticated philosophical erplanation in which his notion of concep111aJi:atio11 is 
supplied with a notion of rational reasoning and, similarly to Lochhead, with the 
constructivist notion of conceptual growth, and with a notion of the 
epistemological interdependence between language and thinking. Paul contends 
that "there is order, regularity, and potential intelligibility in everything" (p. 201), 
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and that whatever the goal of our intellectual activity, all the things that are 
potentially intelligible can be "rationally analyzed and assessed," if we only "order 
our meanings into a .\ystem of meanings that make sense to 11s, and so, in that 
re.\pect, have a logic" (italics added) (p. 199). He conceives of "logic" as a "basic 
structure" that is being figured out in the precess of"assessment" through 
"reasoning"; while, he conceives of"reasoning" as being both "drawing 
conclusions on the basis of reasons" and " the total process of figuring things out" 
(p. 199). 
However, Paul notices that "there is much more that is implicit in reasoning 
than is explicit, there are more components, more "logical structures" that we do 
not express than those we do" and that, as a result, " in most circumstances in 
which we are 11.fing logic we are creatinK it simultaneously" (pp. 199-200). 19 In a 
taxonomy oflogic he proposes, three logics are involved: I) the logic to be figured 
out, 2) the logic that we use to do the figuring out, and 3) the logic that we make 
out at the end of the figuring out. According to Paul, "what we discover about the 
logic of the things" is not a form of"Absolute Truth", nor is it an exhaustive 
knowledge of the "ultimate nature of the things" (because ··we are limited, not 
18 
All lhc references to Paul in this paper arc from Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to S11rv1ve 
in a Rapid~~-Changing World. Rohner Park CA: Sonoma State University. l'.1\IO. 
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P~111' , diffcrcntiHlion bclwccn ·c,plicit" and ·implicit' in reasoning al'° can be rnllcd. re~pcctivcly , 
"discursive· and · non-discursi,·e · aspects of a concept" s acquisition. II SQ:ms thal only lhc tenns · implici1' 
and ·non-discursive· could be adcqualcly applied 10 the specific acti,·i1y by which the child overcomes the 
developmental paradox of the constructivist theory of concep111al growth (and wh.ich Lochhead signifies 
with the verb ·mess with"). While. the tenns ·c:1."Plicit ' and 'discur.;ivc· can be applied to the la1er stages 
of hwnan cogniti\·c dcvclopmcnl when a satisfactory degree of language acquisition is present. Paul· s 
diffen:ntialion of ·e:1.1>licil' and 'implicit' can be considered as accounting for the same or similar parado.x 
of 'discursi,·e · knowledge acquisition as that one present in !he consuue1ivis1 accowll of the · non-
discursive · knowledge acquisilion. II may be worthwhile to note that tltis paradox becomes apparent when 
an e:rplana1ian (of !he knowledge acquisition and application) in the fonn of some sort of epistemological 
concept is related 10 !he empirical facts of tlLC process which is being explained. Such a relation seems 10 
fonn something like a ·me1a-cxplanation · which takes into consideration both the concept of e:1.11lanation 
and its subject of e:-.11lanation altogetlier (i.e .. it puts them in a perspective). It is this met1-e:1.11lanation 
which I here call a ' philosophical justification· ofan cpi5'emological concept In my view. if such a point 
is not present in someone ·s metacag11ition, any explanation (epistemalogical concept) appears to him or 
her as being ·sufficien1·. or highly plausible. Accordingly. the epistemotvgical poinr.,· in problem solvers· 
,-icws need to be · philosophically justifi.:d'. (It is important to nole that in scientific and meraphysical 
frameworks this ·mcta-e:1."Planation' is necessarily incomplete. since it gains dimensions of 'sufficiency· 
which is precisely whal condi1ioll, epi5'emological points). 
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infinite, creatures; humans, not gods"), but still "to say that something has a logic 
is to say that it can be understood by use of our reason, that we can form concepts 
that accurately-though not necessarily thoroughly--<:haracterize the nature of 
that thing"' (p. 20i). in this way, his notion ofiogicai reasoning couid be aiready 
understood in a very ordinary sense: what he calls ' logic' , ·concepts ' , 'reasoning' , 
and 'accurate characterization of the nature of the things' can be categorized as 
easily understandable thought entities, tools, or modes which do not necessarily 
explicitly exhaust the phenomenon they characterize or belong to, but which still 
form the most acceptable points for its understanding. Thus, Paul's notion of 
rational reasoning becomes an atomic point in the characterization of the nature of 
thinking in terms of his notion of 'conceptualization as a way of understanding': 
Only when we have conceptualized a thing in some way, and only then, can 
we reason through it . Since nature does not tell us how to conceptualize it, we 
must create conceptualization, individually or socially. Once conceptualized, a 
thing is integrated in a network of ideas (since no concept ever stands alone) 
and, as such, becomes the subject of many possible inferences. (pp. 201-2) 
It seems that the 'conceptualization' forms the coherency of the three 
logics above mentioned, while the ·concepts' become the means and ends of the 
conceptualization itself. In what Paul calls the 'logic of concepts ' , the word 
'concept' means "a generalized idea of a class of things" and 'conceptualization' is 
"a process by which the mind infers a !hing to be of a certain kind, to belong 
properly to some given class of things·· (p . 203). Like Lochhead, Paul adheres to 
the constructivist notion of c:oncept11a/ growth and claims that "our minds 
understand any particular aspect of things in relation to generalized ideas that 
highlight perceived similarities and differences in our experience" (p. 203). The 
learning of concepts is a process that starts with learning of natural la11g11age 
through "creating of facsimiles of the concepts implicit in the language use" and 
later on continues in the academic disciplines through "creating specialized 
concepts" (pp.203-4) (these terms correspond to the terms 'mess with' and 
'verbalization' used by Lochhead, p. 126). 
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Further, Paul argues that in the process of conceptualization we use 
"critical judgment" which in his view includes the two senses in which the term 
metacognition was above specified. and which he conceives of as essential to all 
acts of creating because ··we not oniy assess wh<1t we cn:aie," hui ··we <1ssess <1s we 
create" (p. 204 ). In this sense, one learns the logic of a discipline through creating 
it in one's mind: 
... if a student reads a text within a discipline well, that is critically, the logic 
he or she creates through reading matches the logic of the text well. (p. 204) 
Thus, the learning of concepts becomes most of all a personal task and only 
the individual alone can re-create in her or his mind the concepts of, for example, 
Freudian, Adlerian, and Jungian theories (p. 205). For Paul, it is language that 
provides the terms of the creating of concepts in learning, and those are the terms 
in which one exercises her or his thinking: 
Many of our ideas or concepts come from the languages we have learned to 
speak (and in which as a matter of course we do our thinking). (p. 205) 
In this way, a notion of /a111(110ge, as an abstracted concept of a starting 
point for further concept acquisition, gains a very significant role in what thinking 
is supposed to be, namely. the role of an epistemo/ogim/ c:011c:ept. In Paul's view, 
while thinking in terms of language, we connect the words in a certain "logic of 
language" which d::pcnds to some extent upon the ·'established logic" and meaning 
of words and to some extent upon language use: 
Though each word has an established logic, we still have to recreate that logic 
in our thinking, and we must base that creation on meanings we have 
previously created. (p. 206) 
In his consideration of the role oflanguage in thinking, Paul notices that 
the "creation of meaning" cannot "without confusion or error" completely ignore 
the established meaning of the words being used and that such an ignoring "in the 
context of learning the logic of language is nothing more nor less than the mis-
learning of that logic" (p. 206). This is why he pleads for an "educated use" of 
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language and warns about the potential 'misunderstandings' which the logic of 
language may lead to: 
It is important to recognize that in a literal sense there is no necessary virtue in 
"creating" meaning. Prejudices. self-delusions. distortions. misconceptions. 
and caricatures are all products of the mind as maker and creator. (p. 207) 
According to Paul, "good thinking" needs to "move from thought which is 
purely associational and undisciplined, to thought which is conceptual and 
inferential," for "without a guiding logic, thinking is aimless and random" (p. 208) 
In this respect, he prescribes a "set of conditions," or "elements of thought," that 
can hopefully "shape and organize our thinking": l) Purpose, Goal, or End in 
View, 2) Question at issue (or Problem to be solved), 3) Point of View or Frame 
of Reference, 4) The empirical dimensions, the phenomena about which we are 
reasoning, 5) the Conceptual Dimensions (including principles, theories, axioms, or 
rules), 6) Assumptions - starting points of reasoning, 7) Inferences (the steps of 
reasoning). 8) Implications and Consequences ("The implications of our reasoning 
are an implicit creation of our reasoning.") (pp. 208-210). This set of conditions 
can be understood as what corresponds to the epistemological co11cl!pts to be 
aware of and to be metacognitively utilized in the prl!scriptions of Covington and 
Lochhead. However, in Paul ' s view, the 'awareness' of how one's cognitive 
abilities work takes the fonn of a philosophically justified understanding of the 
conditions under which conceptualization is to be properly exercised in terms of 
thinking, language, and logic of language:20 
Critical th.inkers, on this view, attempt to heighten their awareness of the 
co11ditio11s under which their self-created co11cep111ali:aticms- a11d i11/ere11ces 
from them-are rationally justified. (italics added) (Paul, p. 205) 
/11 .mmmary, in the explanation of h.is concept of critical and creative 
thinking, Paul develops a notion of the role of cuncep111ali:atio11 in thinking which 
is supported by a concept of rational reasoning, a concept of language, and the 
20 Apparcnlly. Paul sets up his understanding of the ·c1cmen1s of thought' in Kantian perspccti,·c: they arc 
only conditions for a possible ·good thinking ·. Sec Kant, I.. Critique of Pure Reason. trans. N.K. Smith. 
Macmillan and Co .. Ltd .. London. 1929. 
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constructivist notion of conceptual growth. His concept of rational reasoning is 
based on the assumption that there is an order, regularity and intelligibility in 
everything which basically implies that there is something like a ' logic of the 
things '. There is also a logic that we use to figure out the logic of the things which 
consists of creating meaningful connections through reasoning. FinaUy, there is a 
logic that we create at the end of figuring out the logic of the things. According 
to Paul, although the final result of our logical activity may not be characterized as 
a form of an · Absolute Truth' (for there is ·more implicit than explicit ' in 
reasoning), it still characterizes the 'nature of the things'. His concept of rational 
reasoning underlies the adoption of the constructivist theory of conceplual growlh 
which explains the accumulation of knowledge as subsumption of a certain thing to 
a certain concept signifying a class of things. Finally, Paul's notion of 
conceptualization is backed up with a co11c:ep1 of language which is conceived of 
as providing the basic concepts and terms in which thinking is exercised. Like 
Lochhead, Paul contends that the basic concepts we need are those that we learn 
from our natural language, while the specialized ones are those that we learn in 
academic disciplines. 
The detailed exposition of this view involves many philosophical 
j11s1ijicalio11s which project well-known philosophical notions. For example, we 
elaborate logical connections through a ' conceptualization' which ends in the 
creation of new concepts by ' highlighting some sets of similarities and differences' 
that we have been given in the concepts we already know. (This is a variant of 
Wittgenstein's late concept of family rest!mblam:es which will be discussed in 
chapter two). Similarly, in the process of conceptualization, the 'logic of 
language' is being actively created by every individual, but it also depends upon 
the established logic and meanings of the words (including grammar rules) being 
used . (This can be associated with the distinction of 'intentional' and 
·conventional' aspects of meaning in Searle's concept of 'speech acts' which will 
be discussed in cJ,apJer two also). At the same time, like the early Wittgenstein 
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( 1922/ 1963; 3 .321-3 .325 ). Paul relates the errors and confusions in thinking to a 
'misunderstanding' or 'mis-learning' of the 'logic of language' which can create 
inadequate meanings. 
Un the other hand, Paul argues that disciplined thinking is the productive 
thinking we need and sets down the necessary conditions (elements of thought) for 
its performance. This set of conditions is in essence his prescriplion for · shaping 
and organizing of our thinking ' , and is a utilization of his systematized, 
epistemological notion of' good thinking'. Like the epistemological concepts 
prescribed for metacognitive utilization by Covington and Lochhead, Paul's 
prescription involves also an epistemological concept which is standardized and 
developed tltrough a more sophisticated philosophical justification. 
In the broader context of my argument, Paul faces the 'problems of 
mediation' 011 the level of experl c.11lt11n: when in explaining how human cognition 
practically accumulates he uses philosophical justifications. He prescribes a set of 
conditions which fonn an episfemologica/ co11cepf available for individuals' 
personal acq11h.-i1io11 and app&·a1io11 in overcoming their cognitive problems 
which are here conceived of as problems of mediation on the level of everyday 
comm1111i<.:a1io11. One may note that such a prescription still takes place on the 
level of expert culture and that the actual overcoming of the problems of mediation 
on the level of Cl'cryday communication \.Viii finally depend upon individuals ' 
appropriate acq11isi1ion and applicalion of that prescriprio11. 
Lipman's Notion of the Role of Philosophy in Children's Early 
Developmeot21 
In comparison with the above summarized notions, M. Lipman' s concept 
most directly addresses individuals' cognitive problems as problems of mediation 
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in Habermas' sense which I discussed in the introduction. He intentionally employs 
the term ' philosophy' as standing for what, in the concrete problem solving 
situations in an educational environment, is not accounted for by science. His 
notion funher impiies that if scientific accounts are insufficient, following cenain 
standards or any other well-established formalism does not necessaril)' help but 
rather impedes our reliable understanding and practical solving of individuals' 
cognitive problems. Like Covington, Lochhead, and Paul, Lipman also explains 
cognitive problems in terms of both inadequate views of cognition and peculiarities 
of the educational environment, but unlike them, he emphasizes the latter rather 
than the former. The change of emphasis reflects the different stage of individual 
cognitive development which he addresses, and implies a specific modification of 
the procedure of metacognition which he pre.n:rihes. 
In his expla11a1io11 of cognitive problems, Lipman draws attention to the 
broad definition of the educational goal of cultivating good "thinking skills" which 
practically involve the whole "inventory of the intellectual powers of mankind" : 
To dream of constructing a curriculum that would nurture and sharpen 
such an array of skills must cenainly be considered quixotic; to have an impact 
on no more than a token selection of such skills is something we may aspire to 
without realistically hoping ever to achieve. (p. 83) 
According to him, no emphasis on just one set of "favorable thinking 
skills" will replace the need for others in problematic situations "tar more complex 
and mysterious than we had anticipated" but rather "an educational process in 
which a wide spectrum of thinking skills is sharpened" could possibly "help 
children discover their intellectual capabilities" (p. 84). 
To respond to the need above outlined, Lipman prescribes the so-called 
philu.mphyfur children program which is based on the principle that "children's 
social impulses" can be reliably redirected to purposeful "cognitive impulses." 
This assumption is supponed by research which accounts for children's better 
21 All 1hc references 10 Lipman in this paper arc from .. Thinking Skills Fostered by Philosophy for 
Ch.ildren:· Thinking ancl Leaming Skill,·. Ed Segal. Chipman. and Glaser.Hillside NJ: L. Erlbaum. 1985. 
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perfonnance in "collaborative and cooperative situations" (p. 84), and contrasts 
with the well-established assessment practice which individuates them by means of 
tests for individual perfonnance so that they cannot display their full capacity of 
k11owic:ug1;:. Thus, Lipmiill argU\!S that ih\! i:111piuy111c::11i or i::hi:dt"c::rl',; basic 
communal impulses for the purposes of a "community of inquiry" is possible b;, 
media1io11 of a "common commitment to a method of inquiry". He conceives of 
this method as a "collection of rational procedures through which individuals can 
identify where they may have gone wrong in their th.inking" and calls it "the 
method of systematic self-correction" (p. 85). 
For Lipman, the introduction of th.is method in the early stage of 
individuals' cognitive development (midle school, Grades 4 to 8) is not supposed 
to be reduced simply to its explanation to the children, for "even if they could 
understand it in outline, they would hardly grasp its relevance to themselves" (p. 
85 ). Instead, he argues that the task of cultivating effective thinking skills should 
find its relevant means and ends in the values of the children's community. In his 
view, children are better prepared for a specific collaborative discussion in which 
their cognitive impulses can be challenged by means of a novel whose unfolding 
would reveal the same environments, situations, or problems as theirs (p . 85). 
Thus, since "matters like truth and friendship, personal identity and fairness, 
goodness and freedom" are of greatest importance to them, the best introductory 
means of such a method could take, for example, a "fictional form" rather than a 
theoretical concept. Further, Lipman notes that children prefer to discuss their 
own ideas and are unwilling to accept immediately secondary sources of ideas. 
Like the adults, they would discuss topics ··regarding truth or fiiendship or justice" 
rather than "thoughts of the Pyramids or the Counter-Reformation": 
In short, we prefer our own, immedialely presented thoughts lo /hose /hat are 
re-presentational. This is a major reason for the warm response that children 
give to philosophy and poetry, for philosophical and poetic ideas are directly 
available to us in their original form and are not copies of things in a world 
beyond our immediate knowledge or experience. (italics added) (p. 86) 
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Lipman contends that the initial learning impulses subsequently need to 
concentrate in a well-expressed children's thinking which is supposed to ··utilize 
the rules of logic as criteria oflegitimate inference" (p. 86). However, he points 
uui ihai <.:hiicin:n·s thinking aiso needs io remain beyond ihe formaiism which iogi<.: 
could impart in educational practice, but to keep in touch with the 'important' 
matters discussed, for otherwise they "will jabber about trivia. or lapse into silence 
and apathy" (p.86). The preference for philosophy, as a carrierofthe common 
commitment to the method of inquiry, is because it has the capacity to employ and 
thus to foster the mind's non-formal problem solving acts which remain beyond the 
scope of active exploration by science. (Lipman points out a long list of such 
skills (pp. 88-96).) Supporting his point, evaluation research shows that the 
philosophy fur children prow-am generally improves students' educational 
outcomes (pp. 101-6). 
Further, Lipman explains the "frequent disparagement of philosophy" from 
the curricula because of its "manifest lack of answers" that are required by social 
practices (p. 98). However, he relates another reason for its devaluation to the 
usurpatory role of science: 
Philosophy seems to disallow decision procedures, keeping its dialogue open-
ended, and indeed, were a decision procedure to be discovered for a particular 
issue, that issue would quickly be banished from philosophy and assigned to 
science (p 98) 
In this way, Lipman directly addresses the question of the relationship and 
possible cooperation between science and philosophy as a matter of the 1ra11sition 
of ex~rtise between its two levels. In the broader context ofmy argument, the 
concept of the philosophy for children program can be considered an attempt to 
overcome the problems of mediation both on the level of c.11/t11re insofar as it is 
explained and prescribed, and on the level of everyday comm1111icatio11, insofar as 
it is being applied In this case, because of the early stage of individuals' 
intellectual development, this concept is not prescribed for direct but for indirect 
acq11isitio11 through its being impaned in the learning environment. 
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/11 summary, Lipman erplllills children 's cognitive problems as reflecting both the 
peculiarities of their intellectual development and the learning environment rather than 
children's views about intelligence. Consequently, for overcoming these problems, he 
prescribes a special educational program which is intended to help children discover their 
own intellectual capabilities by transforming their communal instincts into cognitive 
impulses. Substantially, this program conveys a nolio11 of philosophy as a means which 
can foster the mental learning dispositions that remain unaccounted for and perhaps 
unaccountable for by educational science and practice. In his view, knowing the rational 
procedures for valid reasoning conditions well-expressed children's thinking, but at the 
same time, the very stimuli for intellectual collaboration are in a learning environment 
which is freed by logical formalism, and which actualizes the values of children's 
community. The environmental condition for transforming children's communal instincts 
into cognitive impulses is seen in transforming the classroom into a 'community of 
inquiry', while the subjective condition is a 'common commitment to a method of inquiry' 
which Lipman calls the 'method of systematic self-correction '. As in the other above 
summarized studies, here the demand for 'self-correction' relates the children to a sort of 
melllc.:og11i/io11 in the fonn of a permammt 11tili;atio11 of certain knowledge about their 
own cognitive dispositions and inclinations as they are available in their 'immediately 
present thoughts'. Lipman's point is that this knowledge (epistemological concept) should 
be taught indirectly, but a self-correction which necessitates going beyond the fonna!ism 
of the established educational practice, already presupposes a cenain degree of individual 
philosophizing about that formalism. Nevertheless, in this case children are not expected 
to precisely explain to themselves and thus to understand in full the peculiarities of their 
own thinking in terms of complicated epistemological concepts, but to develop an ability 
to praclical/y acq11ire a11d apply similar concepts. 
Insofar as Lipman develops and explains the concepl of the so-called 
philosophy for children program, he may be considered as attempting to solve the 
problems of mediation on the level of expert c11/111re. His prescription for 
fostering children's cognitive dispositions is the practical reali:ation of this 
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program which is thus intended to overcome the problems of mediation on the 
level of ewryday c:omm1111icatio11. It is important to note that the way the program 
envisions the fostering of children's cognitive skills (or solving of the problems of 
media/ion on the level of everyday comm1111icalio11) includes defonnalizing the 
educational practice and taking into consideration the individuals' developmental 
peculiarities. Here, the direct relation of the cognitive peculiarities which are 
unaccounted for by science to the field that has been traditionally known as 
·philosophy' can be considered an indication of a certain ' insufficiency' of the 
scientific treatment of cognitive problems. 
The main difference between Paul's insistence that individuals' cognitive 
achievements are an exclusively personal task and Lipman's insistence that they 
require a commitment to a collaborative 'community of inquiry' could be explained 
as a matter of the different stages of cognitive development which the two authors 
examine. While Paul's concept is more universalistic and is conceived ofas 
applicable in all kinds of problematic situations, Lipman 's addresses specifically the 
learning environments of the American midle school. Similarly, the difference 
between the approaches of the three authors above summarized, on one hand, and 
that of Lipman, on the other. is that while the former explain and prescribe a 
notion about training and cultivation of cognitive skills that necessitates a thorou~h 
exp/icatio11 and an active learning attitude for its ;:uod acq11isilio11 and npproJ'riate 
applicatio11, the laner emphasizes that fostering of thinking skills that can be based 
on natural communal instincts and may 110111ecessari/y need to be well-explained 
a11d p11rposefi1/ly acquired in order to be properly applied. For. the fonner 
notions presuppose individuals being to a great extent capable ofa sufficient 
understanding of certain abstract content ( epistemological concept) in order to be 
able to acq11ire and metacognitively apply it, while the latter is related to the 
environment of cognitively less mature individuals who would acquire and apply 
certain skills during the process of practicing them rather than in advance. Indeed, 
in Lipman's concept, it is the so-called 'self-correction' that corresponds to 
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Covington's and Lochhead's metacognitive requirements for, respectively, ·more 
sophisticated understanding' and 'awareness ' of the peculiarities of one's own 
thinking. However, in his view, it is to be practiced without ascending to an 
epistemological content (though using it), but tllrough an immediate utilizing of the 
knowledge from experience. 
A General Discussion of the Scientific Concepts 
In the above summarized concepts, authors treat various educational 
learning problems such as permanent anxiety, indifference to learning, 
motivational deficit, low self-esteem, or inappropriate learning strategies which I 
categorized as cognitive problems because they concern, in one way or another, 
the ac:q11i.Iitio11 and app/icatio11 of 1.:og11itio11. I explained them as based on certain 
epistenwlogiml poi111s which persist in individuals ' personal view.~ of how 
i111elli,:e11c:e works in the form of fallible beliefs, and which result from 
inappropriate epistemolol(ical procedures by mediation uf ,·onc:epts. I accepted 
that in the above examined scientific notions, the scientists treat those problems in 
terms of the explunatiom· of their sources and the prescriptions for their 
overcoming In their e.r:planalinm·, scientists adhere to epistemological concepts 
which involve ' philosophical justifications ': Lochhead and Paul refer to the 
constructivist theory of knowledge in combination with a cer1ain understanding of 
how mind coordinates language and thought in the process of conceptual growth; 
Covington considers the question of the 'nature of intelligence', its ·mechanism' , 
and ·functions'; Lipman adheres to a notion of the relationship and possible 
cooperation between science and philosophy. 
For overcoming cognitive problems, scientists generally prescribe the 
mind's problem solving activity known as me1acog11ilio11 which involves 
individuals' a,·l(l1isilio11 and applicatio11 of certain epistemological concepts. For 
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Covington, the "more effective personal control over one's own mental 
resources" (p. 410) is backed up with a '·more sophisticated understanding" of 
how intelligence works (p. 409); for Lochhead, the individuals' "self-observation" 
(p. i23) is guide<l by "their concepts of nature of knowiedge", i.e., by .. their own 
epistemology" (p. I 09); for Paul. the metacognitive requirement of"awareness" 
which helps overcome individuals ' "prejudices. self-delusions, distortions, 
misconceptions" (p. 207) involves a utilization of a philosophically justified "set of 
conditions" which backs up the so-called "good thinking" (p. 205). For Lipman. 
the ''method of systematic self-correction" (p. 85) is the metacognitive requirement 
which involves utilization of concepts of philosophy as an alternative to the 
scientific formalism in developing good thinking skills. though. because of the early 
stages of individuals' conceptual development, he does not necessarily require a 
previously acquired epistemological concept as a condition for its successful 
application. but recommends that such a concept be imparted in the learning 
environment. 
Because in their expla11alio11s scientists rely on philosophical j11slificatio11 
and in their presaiptiu11s require acquisition and application of epistemological 
concepts, scientific accounts of the cognitive prohlt!ms can be considered to some 
extent 'insufficient ' for an 'adequate treatment' of these problems. In this way, all 
these studies can be interpreted as treating prohfem.~ of mediation in terms of 
Habermas' notion of philosophy as a mediating inlerpreter according to which 
those problems are to remain out of the scope of scientific expertise but still in the 
scope of competence of philosophy. Insofar as these authors use philosophical 
)11s1ifkatio11s to explain their conceptual points, I consider that they attempt to 
solve problem.1· of mediation on the level of expert ,:11ll11re; and insofar as they 
prescrihl! certain philosophical concepls for the overcoming of cognitive 
problems. l consider that those authors attempt to solve the problems of mediation 
on the level of everyday commu11icatio11. In my argument, these attempts are 
regarded as an emering i1110 the field of philosophy, and thus as a good reason for 
42 
considering the specific philosophers' competence in treating the traditional 
philosophical problem!i. In chapter two, I examine four philosophical concepts 
which are taken from the contemporary Western philosophy, and which could 
possib:y meet the individua:s' need of philosophical co;;1pt!it3i1Ct! or adequate 
concepts of cog11itio11 for an effective metacog11itio11. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND THE CONCEPT OF 
LANGUAGE 
There is a conception of reality. and of the relationship 
between reality on the one hand and thought and language on the 
other. that has a long history in the Western intellectual tradition. 
Indeed. this conception is so fundamental that to some c:>.1cnt it 
defines that tradition. 
John R. Searle, Postmodemi.~m and the 
Western l'hi/osophica/ Tradition 
Oven-iew 
In order to elaborate such a philosophical understanding of the 
epistemological problems that could serve problem solvers' metacognilion. in this 
chapter, I summarize a few exemplary notions coming from contemporary 
philosophy. Those include Wittgenstein 's early concept of the correct use of 
/a11g11agc , his late concept of the la11g11age games, Searle's concept ofyJCech acts, 
and Rorty' s concept of the political answer to philowphical questions. Insofar as 
those concepts are considered 'exemplary' ones, they are not closely scrutinized in 
light of most recent criticism or scholarship (this would obviously remain beyond 
the scope of the present undertaking), but rather in terms of their conceptual unity. 
The goal of these summaries is to show, on the one hand, a certain way in which 
philosophical notions under consideration can be consistently involved in a 
compositio11al philosophical concept; and on the other, that there is a substitutive 
or supplementary relationship between that concept and the compositional 
scientific concept which was formed in chapter one. Since I accepted that what is 
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in common to the two types of concepts is a 11olio11 of philosophy which they 
employ in overcoming problems that are essentially of epistemological character, 
in examining the philosophical concepts, I will draw attention generally, to the two 
notions oj phiiosophy they consider, nameiy, metaphysic:ai and therapeutic:, and 
particularly, to the two types of concepts of language they are underlain by, 
namely, ahistorical and historical. 
As already pointed out, in the broader context of my argument, the 
question of the relation between the scientific and philosophical concepts being 
examined in this paper becomes a question of the relationship and possible 
cooperation between scirnce and philosophy. This latter question is crucial for 
overcoming the major co11cept11al difficulty ofmy argument, namely, the 
justification of the use of philosophical methods in treating problems which come 
up in the scope of science, and I adopted as a working basis for its consideration 
Habermas' notion of philosophy as mediatillf( interpreter. According to my 
intefl)retation of that notion, scientists deal with what Habermas calls problems of 
mediC1tio11 on the lei·el of c11/t11re, while individuals face such problems on the level 
of everyday comm1111icatio11. In the scientific concepts, a 11otio11 of philo.mphy was 
employed in the expla11atio11 and prescription of certain concepts of how 
intelligence works, i.e., concept.5 of c:og11itio11, while individuals needed to acquire 
and apply such concepts through metacognitim1 But, insofar as the expertise of 
science turns out to be insufficient and the competence of philosophy appropriate 
for dealing with problems of mediation, in my argument the latter was promoted 
on the level of culture to serve the problem solving practices of everyday 
comm1111icatio11. Now, philosophers, in the conditional role of'experts' in dealing 
with the very epistemological problems-the traditional philosophical problems, 
wnich were shown as 'fitting' the pattern of 'problems of mediation' on the level 
of culture, are to explain and prescribe such an co11cept of cog11itio11 that would 
adequately serve individuals' metacognilio11. 
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At this point, my arg11me111 can be already recapitulated in terms of the 
working notion of philosophy as a11 a/tempt at overcomi11g problems of mediation. 
Insofar as it addresses them on the level of culture, it is the explanation that the 
way in which ph!.losophers approach traditional philosophical problems by 
mediation of an 1111derstandi11g of how mind coordinates language and thinking 
could alternatively elaborate the ways in which scientists approach i11divid11a/s' 
cognitive problems by mediation of a concept of how intelligence work:;. Insofar 
as it addresses them on everyday comm1111icatio11 it is the prescription that a 
specific extension of individuals' philosophical backgrounds would adequately 
support their need of appropriate epistemological concepts for practicing 
metac:ognilion. 22 
Now, I will represent the philosophical methodology of dissolution in the 
fonn of the scientific prescription ofmetacognition by contending that 
philosophers first explain certain epistemological concepts, in these cases concepts 
of language, and that they then apply these concepts in order to dissolve certain 
philosophical problems. z., In chapter three, I will try to illustrate how a certain 
cognitive problem could be explained as an 'epistemological problem' and then 
dissolved as a ·pseudo-problem' . 
;; This argumcnl is being pn:scnlly elucidalcd in an undenaking which I qualified as 'in1crdisciplinary· . 
and which is thus resolved in lhe broader context of undcrslanding concerning the rclalionship and 1hc 
possible cooperation between science and philosophy. So far. chis argumenl has been, so to speak. ·more 
scientific ·. and now it is to become ·more philosophical'. Indeed. its overall fonn is scientistic. too. and a 
critical reader could righ1ly insist on a justification of what could be called a 'violation of 
intcrdisciplinarity'. I can only justify this discrepancy as a matter ofpragm:uics which led me on a search 
for a fonn of communicarion credible to a scientific audience. and which thus fn:cs me of the ncccssily 10 
set down 1hc terms and conditions of what could be c:alled an ' interdisciplinal)· fonn of communica1ion 
between science and philosophy' . As would hopefully become clear aller the consideration of IJ1c 
philosophical concepts. such a ' special form of communication· is not nec:cssary. for it cannot be: 
apodictically affirmed. Yet. I insist upon the 'interdisciplinary character' of this undertaking since it 
necessarily and equally presupposes two participants in a conversation which is purpor1ed lo be fruitful. 
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In examining the philosophical notions. I will ROI use the 1enns prescription and ncqui.vition too oncn. 
for in this case !he aulhors appear to treat the so-<:alled ·problems of mediation ·. on the lc,,el of ex-pen 
culture only. The 1rcatmem of the ·problernsofmcdialion' on the level of everyday rommunication by 
mediation of ·philosophical concepts' is just a possibility under investigation in this paper. On the basis of 
this assumption. I also conditionally assume that all of the examined philosophical notions dissolve 
cenain philosophical problems. 
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Wittgenstein's Concept of the Corner Use of Language 
In his early work Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (/922- /963), 
plulosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein made an exempiary and in a sense 'expert ' 
attempt at dissolving the traditional philosophical problems in terms of his concept 
of the so-called correct use of language, For the purpose of this paper, l posit that 
he develops this concept in order to explain how the philosophical problems (such 
as ' sense of the world', 'ideal knowledge', 'good', 'sense of life') come into being 
as a result of inappropriate uses of language, and that then he applies this concept 
to those problems so that in its light those problems are already understood ( or 
dissolved) as pseudo-problems. In the overall sense ofmy argument, 
Wittgenstein's view will be an instance of 11si11g an epistemological con,-epl in 
overcoming what could be called 'problems of mediation' on the level of culture , 
Subsequently, according to the general principle for overcoming 'problems of 
mediation', the philosophical competence demonstrated in this concept would 
have to be effectively exchanged through the level of everyday commrmicatim,_ 2~ 
2
~ The precise reader of philosophical 1c~s could find lhc frequent use oflhc ci.-pressions ·conccpl 
c~-planalion , or 'conccpt applicalion ' as symptomalic of a simplistic inlerprctation, Such a simplification 
appears 10 be an unavoidable characteristic of any in1crdisciplinary undertaking which a11cmp1s 10 bridge 
rwo different rypcs or IC\'Cis of compcrcncc. The proper explanation of lhi~ phenomenon is rhar it is it~lf 
a ·problem of mediaaion· which can be hopefully m-ercome. ifahe problem sol\'er who faces ii is capable 
of resohing the two frameworks which condition ils persistence a/together into a philosophical sense 
which conditions ils disappcaranc;c, In my argument, this philosophical sense is being conveyed, in a 
broader sense. by mediation of a nolion of philosophy which conditions the exchange of e:1.'J)Crlisc between 
both expcn fields on lhe level of cu/rure and lhe cxpen fi~lds and problem solvers on the level of everyda,•· 
communication. and in a narrow sense. b~- a philosophical concept of cognition. or a concept of language, 
As already staled. this philosophical sense necessarily involves a conceplua/i:alion of both scientific and 
philosophical framework.r within a common terminology in narrow and broader rontext of understanding, 
So far, 1hc sense of the scienaific framework has been considered in a narrow sense in its own 
terminology and resolved in a broader sense into the common terminology. and now a consideration of 
WiugcnSlein's early philosophy is 10 introduce in a narrow sense the tenninology of a philosophical 
framework of understanding which is to be lhen resolved in a broader sense into the common tenns. too, 
It is imponan1 to note. that the conceptuali::alion of lhesc nm frameworks within common 1erms is 
meaningfully possible only in a broader conrcxa of understanding which concern the relationship and 
possible co-operation between science and philosophy, Thus, lhe philosophical terms, despite being 
unusual for an unprejudiced reader. should ultimately resume their meanings from the conceplS lo be now 
examined into the point being conveyed by the common terminology within this broader context of 
understanding, 
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A. The Correct Use of Language 
In my interpretation, I accept that Wittgenstein explains the so-called 
·correct use ofianguage' in three steps which convey. respectivt:iy, iis liut:t: pui11ls. 
a) omvlogical in which he explains a general notion of how the world relates to 
reality in terms of facts; b)represe11tatio11al which explains how 'reality' is being 
represented in the ·world' by mediation of pictures in tenns of the so-called 
'picture theory'; and c) epistemological which explains the pictures· 
representation of reality in terms of language and thinking Because the 
distincti0n of these points is only speculative, in my discussion l will consider each 
of them as being conditioned by the other two . Finally, I will focus on what can 
be called the scope of the ·correct use of language' as determined by these three 
points. 
a) 01110/ogical l'oinl: the Relalio11 be/ween the World and the Reality 
The beginning of the Tractatm is a manifestation of Wittgenstein's method 
which aims at simple descriptions of what is under examination. Throughout the 
text, these 'descriptions' become simply 'assertions ' in tenns of propositions, for it 
becomes clear that they 'describe' notrung. He numbers these propositions to 
indicate their "logical importance"(p. 7) which then becomes ·unimportant', since, 
on his view, the "logical forms are without number" 4.128)25 and, in this sense, 
"there are no privileged numbers in logic" (4.128; 5.552) but "all propositions are 
of equal value" (6.4). In this way, the traditional search for an apodictic starting-
point of philosophical inquiry (which is so distinctive of, for example, Descartes), 
for Wittgenstein, just conditionally ends in a proposition number 'I ': "the world is 
25 In the quotations from Trnc1<1111s. I will use Wittgenstein's numbering. In the ne~1 subsection. I "ill 
use the section numbers when I quote from the first pan and the page nwnbers when I quote from the 
second pan of his book Ph1/usoph1ca/ Investigations 
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all that is the case" . In my interpretation, I accept that the first fundamental 
differentiation which Wittgenstein poses is the one between 'world' and ·reality', 
and that it constitutes what I caJI his ontological poilll. Being gradually specified, 
it grounds, structures, anci uitimateiy determines the epistemic sense of the concepi 
of the 'correct use oflanguage' . 
Wittgenstein conceives of the world as "the totality of facts"( 1.1) that are 
in the so-called "logical space" ( 1. 13 ) . In this context, a "fact is what is the case, 
and is the existence of states of affairs" (2) which are in tum "combinations of 
objects" (2.0 I). Thus, the world, as the "totality of existing states of atfairs" 
(2.04), is ultimately composed of"combinations of objects." 
On the other hand, reality, as "the existence and non-existence of states of 
atfairs"(2.06), is independent of the world and is present in the latter only in terms 
of ' facts' which, as already pointed out, are "existence of states of affairs." 
Reality, however, involves also the "non-existence of states ofatfairs" which 
appears to be what is 1101 present in the world. Thus, the world, as "the sum-total 
of reality" (2. 063 ), can be interpreted as combinations of objects grasped in terms 
of facts, or as a represellled reality. 
The epistemolugic:al c:011ditio11 of the ontological poim, can be seen in the 
argument that "it is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of 
states of affairs" (2.011), i.e., that it is essemia/ ro things to hi! in the wnrld In 
other words, because the world ''is pervaded by logic" (5.61 ), and because in the 
logical space "nothing is accidental" (2 .012), whatever appears in it gains essence . 
Thus, it is arguable that what is called ·essence' or 'essentialness' comes into 
being in the world as a matter of' logic'. Accordingly, the representational 
co11ditio11 of the 01110/ogical point appears 10 be the possibility that the things be 
factually presented in the 'logical space'. 
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b) Represe111atio11al Poilll: the so-called 'Picture theory· 
Through what he callspiclllres, Wittgenstein explains how the 'world' 
represems ' reality', i.e. , how the things which are factually presented in the logicai 
space can be, as facts, loxically represented in the world. He conceives of a 
"picture as fact" (2. 141) which "can depict any reality whose fonn it has" (2. 171) 
and thus can "present a situation in logical space" (2.11). In other words, "we 
picture facts to ourselves" (2.1) and the ' facts' enter ' logical space' in the form of 
'pictures' which, as being "models of reality" (2. 12), constitute the ' world' as a 
'pictured reality'. Thus, in the core of Wittgenstein 's representational point is a 
peculiarity which enables pictures to be the media between the world and reality: 
2. 18 What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with 
reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any 
way at all, is logical form. that is the form of reality. (italics added) 
In this way, the connection between world and reality becomes the ' logical 
forrn' of the 'pictures' which is also a ' forrn of reality' . 
In terrns of the representational point, the 01110/ogical condition, namely, 
the differentiation between 'world ' and 'reality' can be construed as follows : 
'pictures' prese11t the 'reality', but they depict the ' world ' ; as they 'depict' the 
'world', they represem the ·reality', but while the reality's representation is either 
' correct' or ' incorrect', the world's 'depicting' is always 'logically correct ', since 
the latter appears to happen in the 'logical space' where 'nothing is accidental'. 
Thus, in Wittgenstein' s view, the 'depicted world ' is basically a logically 
represemed reality. 
On the other hand, the epistemological co11ditio11 of Wittgenstein's 
represematioflal point takes the fom1 of a condition for sense of reality 's-
representation-in-the-world. Precisely, this condition consists of the 
correspondence between the elements of the picture and the objects in the reality 
(2.13) which must be such that "what a picture represents is its sense" (2.225). 
Consequently, it is the correspondence that relates the sense of pictures 
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representation' to the epistemological terms 'truth', ' falsity' , and 'possibility' : "a 
picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false" 
(2 .21) but its truth or falsity cannot be detennined a priori (2.225). 
c) Epi.1·temol0Ki,·al Point: the /111errelatio11 hetween /..a11g11agi: and ThOllf!hl 
The epistemological poilll of the concept of the 'correct use of language', 
which is to determine a pictorial represe111atio11 in tenns of sense, is ultimately 
specified as a matter of an interrelation between lang11age and thinki11!(. For 
Wittgenstein, "a logical picture of facts is a thought" (3) which in a proposition 
"finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses"(J . I), and which is 
ultimately "a proposition with a sense"(4). Thus, as a matter of its specification in 
terms of language and thinking, any pictorial representation of reality in the world 
must be both logi,·al and sensical. It must be logical insofar as a "thought can 
never be of anything illogical" (3 .2), and it must be sensical insofar as there must 
be a correspondence of"propositional signs" and "objects of thought" (3 .2). 
These two aspects of Wittgenstein 's epistemological poi Ill are inseparable 
and can be recognized as being, respectively, its representational and 01110/o![ica/ 
co11ditio11s. Essentially, this point is a correspondence theory of meaning whose 
core is that "in a proposition a name is the representative of an object" (3 .22), 
"means an object, and the object is its meaning" (3 .203). According to its 
represe111atio11al condition, "only propositions have sense and only in the nexus of 
a proposition does a name have a meaning" (3.3); according to its ontological 
condition, the availability of corresponding 'objects ' to the 'names' of a 
proposition is the ultimate condition for its ·sense'. as well as, for the 'meanings' 
of its names. 
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d) The Scope of the '( .'orrect Use of Language· 
The three points examined above predetermine what ca11 be sensica/ly said 
in language and so constitute the scope of its correct use which must be such in 
their 1hree perspectives at the same time. In the 01110/ogica/ perspective, the 
requirement for sense, which was initially broadly defined as a presentation of 
reality in the world, is limited to a correspondence between the e/emellls of a 
proposition (name.I) and the state of affairs (object.,) it represents: 
3 .221 Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. l can only 
speak abo/11 them: I cannot plll them into words. Propositions can only 
say how the things are, not what they are. 
In other words, the objects are just not names; they can only be named and 
meant while one speaks about them. Speaking about them is just speaking about 
them, not speaking them. Accordingly, a proposition has 'sense' by speaking 
about objects, while the ·sense ' is what a proposition can say about reality, 
namely, "how things stand ifit is true" (4 .022). 
In the represelllational perspective, the 'correct use oflanguage' is limited 
not only to its agreement or disagreement with reality, but also to the ex.tent to 
which it can account for such an agreement or disagreement in terms of "its truth-
conditions" ( 4.43 I). Wittgenstein points out "two extreme cases," namely, the 
tautology and contradiction, in which propositions lack sense: in the former "the 
proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions"; in 
the latter "the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities" (4.46). Thus, just 
because "a tautology has no truth-condition, since it is unconditionally true", while 
a "contradiction is true on no condition", they both lack sense (4.461 , 5.142-3). 
They "are not pictures of the reality" and "do not represent any possible 
situations"(4.462); they are just "the limiting cases - indeed the disintegration - of 
the combination of signs" (4.466). In Wittgenstein's taxonomy, the only 
proposition that can convey sense and thus logically build up the world as a truly 
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represented reality is the one whose "truth is possible" (4.464) which is also the 
one that is important in an epistemological perspective. 
The epistemological perspective of the ·correct use of language' is already 
iimited by both ontoiogicai and representa1ionai perspedives. 11 p.-oposiiio,i whose 
truth 'is possible' must have a se11se as a matter of·agreement or disagreement 
with the reality' and must be able to convey it most obviously and least 
questionably: 
4 .21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts an 
existence of a state of affairs. 
4.25 If an elementary proposition is true, the state of affairs exists: if an 
elementary proposition is false, the state of affairs does not exist . 
For Wittgenstein, the eleme111ary proposilions cannot contradict each other 
( 4.211 ). nor can they "be deduced from one another" (5.134); instead, the 
"analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of 
names in immediate combination" ( 4 .221 ). In this way, the possible aim of any 
correct use of /a11[(ltage would be, by providing "all true elementary propositions", 
to furnish "a complete description of the world" (4.26). 
However, this aim cannot be accomplished a priori, and so it ca11n0f 
become an 'epistemological aim' . For, if "rhe limits of my la11[(11age mean the 
limits ofmy world" (5 6), "the only necessity" that could possibly build up the 
world is a merely "logical necessity" (6.375) which can in 110 way logically 
transcend the world (i .e., the limits ofmy language) in order to necessarily "assert 
an existence of a state of affairs" in reality (4.21 ). 
5. 5 5 71 If I cannot give a priori a list of elementary propositions, then the 
attempt to give one must lead to obvious nonsense. 
In other words, the correct use of language takes place only where 
·reality' is grasped by the 'world' in terms of propositions whose 11ames have 
mea11i11gs or coffespo11di11g objects, namely, in terms of the elementary 
proposi1io11s. But, because the 'elementary propositions' in no way can be given a 
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priori, they cannot be the propositions of philosophy but must be ones of natural 
science (6.53) 
B. The 'Correct Use of Language' and 'Philosophical Problems' 
Having his concept of language thus erplained, Wittgenstein applies it to 
traditio11a/ philosophical proh/ems. In this subsection, I will consider this 
applkatio11 in terms of two points: the demonstration of the di.I.1-ulution of these 
problems, and the notion of philosophy which underlies this dissolution . 
a) /he J)issolutio11 of !'hilosophica/ Problems 
For the early Wittgenstein, the philosophical problems come into being as a 
result of philosophers ' being 1111aware of the peculiarities of the logico-pictorial 
interplay in language. In the broader sense of my argument, this means that 
philosophers have used language in a way that produces fundamental confusions 
on the levr:/ of ,·11h1m: and that, similarly, individuals' have used ·fallible beliefs' in 
a way thl\t produces their cognitive confusions in everyday comm1micalio11· 
4.002 Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of 
expressing any sense, without having any idea how eac:h word ha.I 
meaning or what its meaning is - just as people speak without 
knowing how the individual sounds are produced. 
1~-..,eryday lang11age is a part of the human organism and is no less 
complicated than it. 
fl is not humanly possible to gather immediately from what the 
logic of language is. 
Language disg11ises thought. So much so, that from the 011/Ward 
form of the clothing ii is impossible to infer the form of the tho11ght 
beneath ii, because the owward form of the clothing is not designed to 
reveal the form of the body but for elltirely different purposes. 
(italics added) 
54 
In other words, because the linguistic representations in the world are 011ly 
logical representations in the logic of language, i.e., representations which can be 
drawn even from false propositions (4 .023), thinking, which is linguistically trying 
to represent a iogicaiiy true worid, musi correct itseifthruugh whc:llic:.- o, 11ul ii , 
propositions agree with reality. It is in this sense that .. most of the propositions 
and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical" 
(4.003 ); they are not false insofar as they are penetrated by and justified through 
the logic of language which ascribes some sort of' essentialness' to whatever 
enters ' logical space ', but they are 11ome11sica/ insofar as their names have no 
corresponding objects in reality. For Wittgenstein, the philosophical questions 
"arise from our failure to u11dersta11d the logic of la11g11age" (italics added), and 
only an appropriate understanding of this logic uncovers that "the deepest 
problems are in fact 1101 problems at all'' (4 .003) but need to be understood and 
thus dissolved as pseudo-problems. 
Wittgenstein himself il/w;/rate.~ how his concept dissolves some 1radi1io11a/ 
philo.1ophical prohlem.1·. The question about the immortalily of the h11ma11 soul 
cannot be solved by finding out that we eventually can "survive for ever," but 
rather disappears when we find out that the "eternal life" is "as much of a riddle as 
our present life" (6.4312). Further, the so-called .m,se of lhe world must lie 
outside the world and so cannot be expressed in language, because in the world 
everything is "accidental" and if this "sense" appears in it, it would be accidental 
itself ( 6 . 41 ) which would thus contradict the presumably unconditional, or 'non-
accidental' character of what is meant by ' the sense of the world' . Similarly, the 
good "cannot be put into words"(6.421) and still remain ·unconditional ', for if"all 
propositions are of equal value"(6. 41 ), they "can express nothing that is higher" 
(6.420) but any eventual expression of such a ' higher value' would have no value 
at all (6.41). Likewise, the lheory of knowledge turns out to be "philosophy of 
psychology" (4.1121) since there can be no theory of causality that would underlie 
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its 11ecessary explanation, i.e., since "the only necessity that exists is logical 
necessity" (6.37) which cannot transcend the world. 
In other words, in light of the concept of the collect use of language, the 
philosophical problems tum out to be unreal probiems, for the names of the 
propositions that formulate them have no corresponding objects in reality. The 
philosophical problems remain in the 'limits of the world' and result from an 
'incorrect use ' of language which represents the 'reality' in a logically necessary 
way, but cannot convey sense epistemologically. 
b) The Role and Pur,x,se of Philo.~ophy 
For the early Wittgenstein, the di.~sol111io11 of philosophical problems 
implies a 11otio11 of philosophy whose role and purpose would arise from taking 
into consideration the possibility for 'incorrect uses' of language; it must give up 
any epistemological attainments and limit its role to the 'clarification of thoughts': 
4.1 12 Philosophy aims at the logical clariftcatio11 of thoughts. 
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. 
A philosophical work consists essentially of e/11cidatio11s. 
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions ' , but rather 
in the clariftcatio11 of propositions. 
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy anci indistinct: its 
task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. 
(italics added) 
Thus, though the role of philosophy is to clarify thoughts, which are 
basically propositions with a sense, by means of the logic of language, which is 
inevitably embedded in those propositions, it must also pull away from this logic. 
For it cannot end in the elementary philosophical propositions as it does not have 
its own subject of investigation within reality and so ca1111ot become a metaphysics 
which would have been the science that is in a position to provide all elementary 
propositions a priori. There appears to be a paradox in the role of ph.ilosophy 
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which tries to rebut itself as a metaphysics in an obviously metaphysical manner 
(promoting the 'only strictly correct method'). On this point. it is as if 
Wittgenstein looks at his method from the point of view of the natural sciences, 
but then his point becomes a paradox, for none of the natural sciences is a 
philosophy, nor can a philosophy become one of the natural sciences in order to 
legitimately proclaim such a method. Only philosophy, and only in the role of a 
'clarifying activity', can point such a method out; but it must go through the 
awareness that it is an 'activity' which is exercised in nonsensical propositions and 
as such cannot provide solutions to its traditional problems. Rather, these 
problems cannot and need not be a subject of the co"ect use of language, but 
need to be understood and thus dissolwd as 'pseudo-problems'. For. philosophy 
cannot go beyond the limits oflanguage by means of language, and therefore, it 
cannot go any further in its consideration, nor be any clearer in its explanation of 
these problems. For Wittgenstein, what is beyond "my world" ("the limits of my 
language") is just not expressible in language; it remains for "me" as what is 
"mystical", i.e., as what simply cannot he a subject of any evaluative 
determinations: 
7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 
/11 summary, for the early Wittgenstein, the traditional philosophical 
prnhfems, including those related to what is known as 'cognition'. the so-called 
epistemolugi,·al problems, stem from one's ·failure to understand the logic of 
language' and in light of a good 11ndersta11di11g of the 'correct use of language' 
tum out to be just 'pseudo problems' . To convey this point, he e:,;plainedthe 
concept of the correct use of language which delineated the scope of its 
employment in terms of sense, and then he applied that concept to the traditional 
philosophical problems and dissolved them as problems being formulated in 
nonsensical propositions. According to him, the co"ect use of language takes 
place only in the propositions which have corresponding objects in reality, which 
can logically express a possible truth, and which are thus in the position to convey 
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·sense' that can meaningfully build up a world as a truly represented reality. For 
the early Wittgenstein, only the elementary propositions of natural science can 
build up meanini,,..fully the world since their names have corresponding objects in 
reaiity. By contrast, ph.iiosophy ca111101 amouni to ' eiemeniary philusophkal 
propositions' since the names of its propositions have 110 corresponding objects in 
reality; rather, its mere al/empts to provide such propositions have created its 
traditional problems. 
Consequently, Wittgenstein adheres to a notion of philosophy as a11 
activity which logically clarifies thoughts without ending in elementary 
philosophical propositions, i.e. , without becoming a metaphysics. Indeed, his early 
concept has been criticized as attaining metaphysical dimensions because it 
promoted one ' only strictly correct method ' in philosophy. However, it is also a 
well-known example of an attempt at breaking with the notion of philosophy a.s 
metaphysic.\· which came close to the notion of philosophy ma therapy that he 
himself will develop later on. In my argument. the former notion is conceived of as 
underlying the epistemological uses of language which amount to philosophical 
problems, while the latter as conditioning a possible 'undoing' of those uses and 
thus overcoming of these problems. 
Wittgenstein's Concept or Language Games 
As Wittgenstein 's early work lrac:tat11s promoted the concept of the 
,·orrec/ 11se of lanl(Uage which dissolved the 1raditio11al philosophical problems, 
so his late work Philosophical lnves1iga1io11s promoted a notion of the so-called 
language game.f which dissolved the 110/ion of co"ectness that had seemingly 
become a ·new' problem of philosophy. On his late view, language cannot be 
conceptualized in terms of its ' correct use' , but rather, its 'correctness' is to be 
resolved in the multiplicity of its 'uses'. 
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In the broader context of my argument. I will consider that Wittgenstein 
thus tried to overcome the ~·el}' last 'problem of mediation' on the level of c11l111re, 
namely, the possibility ofone ·onJy strictly correct method' in philosophy. He 
,:xp/ui11s ii1is pruulc:m in inc: 1;oncc:pt of iunguuge gumes, iillli ihiii ihtm he: t1ppiies 
this concept to dissolve this problem. Consequently, Wittgenstein elaborates both 
a specific notion of philosophy a~ a therapy which I conceive of as underlying the 
overcoming of the problem.~ of mediation on the level of c11//11re and an alternative 
understanding of 1eachi11g-leami11g practice which l regard as his most direct 
addressing of the problems of mediation on the level of everyday comm11nicatio11. 
A. The Language Games 
I argue that Wittgenstein's explanation of the notion of la11g11al(e games is 
substantially representable in the following points: a consideration of some 
traditional norions of language in which he points out their inadequacy with 
respect to cenain language uses; the concept of the multipli<:ity of /a11g11age uses 
on the basis of which he develops the notion of 'language games'; and finally, the 
concept of the so-called.family resemblances in which he explains how the 
' multiplicity of language uses ' is possible in the 'same language' 
a) The Traditional Notions of La11g11age 
Wittgenstein's explanation of the concept of la11g,1age games begins with a 
consideration of a few popular concepts of language which he represents as being 
'inadequate explanations' of certain language uses. In Augustine's Confessions 
(1,8), he finds an example of an ostensive way of language acquisition where the 
student is supposed to "grasp" that "a thing is called by an uttered sound", or a 
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"name··. Wittgenstein's objection here is that "the names of cenain actions", the 
.. difference between kinds of words", and the use of words like "five" or "red" 
remain out of the scope of validity of this concept (I). 
Simiiariy, in ?iato's Theae1e111s (46), Wingenstein focuses on a notion of 
language which consists of names that name what Socrates calls "primary 
elements" so that the latter need no other definitions than their "names" 
themselves. On this view, the · primary elements ' are conceived of as composing 
"complexes" whose names in tum are to result from the ' names ' of the primary 
elements which are for this purpose "being compounded together" in the form of a 
"descriptive language" . Thus. what Socrates understands as the "essence of 
speech" is the mere "composition of names" (46) which implies that ''any 
complexity is essentially composite" . Here, Wittgenstein ' s objection is that a 
fun her analysis of the word "composite" would uncover the pans of a certain 
"complexity" as being just other "complexities", and that to be able to make sense 
of calling a certain complexity "composite" we somehow must already know what 
is meant by "composite"(47) 
Ultimately, Wittgenstein's point is that Plato and Augustine adhere to the 
same principle of corre.1po11de11ce between names and objects that he himself 
promoted in Tractatus to be applied for determining the co"ecmess of the use of 
language (46). In 'determining this correctness' these concepts tum out to be 
themselves •incorrect' uses of language, since they c:011/d 1101 explain the language 
use in its multiplicity. Thus, what can be concluded is that for the late 
Wittgenstein the epistemological use of language ca1111ot and ought not to be 
rejected by means of another epistemological use. 
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b) 7he Multiplicity of Language Use and its Co11ceptua/i:atio11 
In his late concept oflanguage, Wittgenstein conveys the point that ifan 
explanatory concept is to take into consideration the multiplicity of language uses, 
it faces the impossibility of an 'essential ' explanation. For, the notion of an 
"essence" already presupposes a general characteristic that could be found in any 
possible language use, while at the same time any attempts for its 'description ' 
pose it as "appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region" (3). In his 
view, the notion of"essence" oflanguage is based on a "philosophical concept of 
meaning" which ultimately underlies a "language more primitive than ours" (2). 
Thus, any account of the 'complexity' of language which is to take into 
consideration the whole multiplicity of language uses ought to simply dissoJ,,e the 
notion of'essence' since the latter cannot explain these uses. Rather, what 
remains in its place is a redefined problem ("explanations come to an end 
somewhere" ) which is already ''How a word is used?" (I). 
For Wittgenstein, this problem could only be considered in a terminolo[!Y 
that would enable what could be called a 'non-essential explanation'. This 
tenninology should be flexible enough to explain something like a 'conditional 
essence' of language such that, while encompassing the ' multiplicity' of the 
'ordinary language' , it has lost its metaphysical characteristics (like pretensions for 
absoluteness). This tenninology should also come from our ordinary language 
where the words we use do not require any special, complicated, or abstract 
definitions which condition misunderstanding, but where the comprehensiveness 
comes as a result of common references to these words' ordinary meanings. ln 
this ordinary sense, any 'processes resembling language' and meeting the 'non-
essentialist' requirements are eligible to take the role of explanatory metaphors; 
consequently, Wittgenstein sees such a resemblance in what in ordinary language is 
known as a game. 
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Since any possible definition of· game' which is to meet the ' non-
essentialist' or 'anti-metaphysical' explanatory condition would encounter the 
' multiplicity' problem, too, Wittgenstein's 'game' cannot be a 'certain game' 
defined in 'certain terms', for it would thus exclude certain language uses from its 
'definition': 
lt is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about 
on a surface according to certain rules .. . " - and we replied: You seem to be 
thinking of board games, but there are others. You ca11 make your defi11itio11 
corre,·t by expre.~sly restricting it to those game.~. (italics added) (3) 
We can also think of the whole process of using words ... as one of those 
games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these 
games "language games" and I will sometimes speak ofa primitive language 
as a language game. And the process of naming the stones and repeating 
words after someone might also be called language games .... I shall also call 
the whole, consisting of language and the action into which it is woven. the 
"language-games. (7) 
Thus, the term 'language games ' comes to explain the multipJicity of la11gua~e 
uses in a way that is, so to spealL, 'least metaphysical', for it has resolved Wittgenstein's 
early t!ssentialist notion of meaning in the particular language uses and so has di.•,so/ved 
this notion as a phi/osophkal problem. As a result, the u~ of language is correctly 
present only in terms of the particular /a11g11age game; for the language games have 110 
constant rules for sense to be followed in order to become 'language games' but rather 
their co11ditio11a/ rules are being constituted simultaneously with the game itself: 
Here the term "language games" is meant to bring into prominence the 
fact that the speaking oflanguage is pan of an activity, or of a form of 
life.(23) 
Thus, a possible ·explanation' of what a la11g11age game is becomes itself a 
particular 'language game' which is to reach clarity in terms of the ordinary 
references in which one simultaneously involves the words being used in this 
particular 'language game'. Because the ordinary references are not usually 
objects of explanation, this concept should not apodictcally determine the 
·correctness' of the language game of this explanation. Rather, its co"ecmess is 
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to be detennined by its use itself In this way, Tractatus' notion of 
'correspondence', as a condition for ' sense', is no longer a requirement which is 
itself difficult for verification; in the J11vestigatio11S, its metaphysical dimension has 
been resolved, and thus dissolved, into the panicuiar ianguage uses. 
<-~ The 'Family Resemblances · 
The concept of language games explains language use as 'part of an 
activity', but in the activities that are quite different and define quite different 
contexts of understanding, the ordinary references of the words involved would 
not be possible without a way of maintaining this recurrent referentiality. Some 
relationships among the different contexts are necessary to ensure the particular 
exercises of the same words in different language games, and yet for the late 
Wittgenstein even such an assumption already sounds metaphysical: 
Don't say: "There must be something common or they would not be called 
'games'" ... for you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. (66) 
Such a specification also needs to be named at least in the ·language game' 
of a verbal explanation, though, in the sense of the concept, it should not be 
;mimed out, but just sem; thus Wittgenstein calls those relationships of similarity 
family re.Iemhla11ce.~: 
I can think no better expression to characterize these similarities than 
"family resemblances" ; for the various resemblances of a family: build, 
features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in 
the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' fonn a family. (67) 
The maintenance of a panicular ' language-game' that exercises the same 
words in different ways for the purpose of an always different 'use' is possible by 
means of these 'family resemblances' . In the language game of a verbal expla11atio11 
which involves just 011e particular 11se of certain terms, the anti-metaphysical condition 
requires that references being used do not go beyond their just being references. That 
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they give the meanings of the words exercised does not mean that they can give the 
rules of giving meaning or of what a ' correct' language game is supposed to be. The 
use of references does not lead toward certain definitions, nor is such a ' referential' 
explanation itself a ·definitive ' one, respectiveiy, nor is the understanding itseif an 
understanding of a definition: 
And this is just how one might explain to someone what a game is. One gives 
examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. - I do not, 
however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples the 
common thing which I - for some reason - was unable to express; but that he 
is now to employ those examples in a particular way. (71) 
But, "here giving of examples is not an indirect means of explaining - in 
default of a better" because, if it were, it might have been inappropriately used for 
accomplishing a ··general definition" which as such "can be misunderstood" (71) 
Only could " .m!i11g what is in common" accompany any explanation which, as a 
matter of a particular language use, is what an already understood definition is 
(72). In this way, here ' definition' is such in a conditional sense only, and is 
certainly not a · general definition' insofar as what ca111101 he poimed to for the 
purpose of its ·general explanation'. To put it in another way, that ·explanations 
come to an end somewhere' does not mean that this is the end, nor that this is the 
only end they should come to. This is why a ·general definition ' of a 'language 
game' is not possible and so here Wittgenstein's "point" is just· 
.. this is how we play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word 
"game" ). (71) 
B. 'Language Games' and ' Epistemological Questions' 
ln this subsection, I will consider what can be called Wittgenstein's 
application of the concept of language games in dissolving, so to speak, the 'last 
philosophical problem', namely, the co11cept11ali::atio11 of language ill terms of its 
correct use. Generally, I will represent it in terms ofa certain interpretation of the 
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so-called 'duck-rabbit illustration' which must shed light on both how 
epistemoloKical poillls come into being in the interactions between language and 
thinking, and how they can disappear in light of a good philosophical 1111derstanding 
of how the mind deais with ianguagt:. Tht:11, i wili focus uim;tiy un his nutiu11 u[ 
philosophy as a therapy which in my argument is conceived of as underlying the 
overcoming of the problt1ms of mediation on the level of culture (i.e., the concept of 
the co"ect use of language which was conceived of as the only strictly correct 
method of philosophy av clarifying activity). And finally, I will focus on his 
alternative understanding of teaching-learning practice which can be considered an 
adaptation of his late notion of philosophy for overcoming the problem.1· of mediation 
in everyday communic:ation (i .e. , individuals' cognitive problems). 
a) The 'Duck-rahhit Illustration· 
In examining the so-called 'duck-rabbit ' example, Wittgenstein puts the 
concept of language game.~ in the perspective of a specific theory of i11terprelatio11 
which explains the details of how epi.1·temological points appear in the actual 
interplay between language and thinking, as well as, of how they can disappear in 
light of an appropriate philosophical understanding of how the mind deals with 
language. In my examination of Wittgenstein's theory of interpretation, I will 
emphasize his distinction between both the co11ti11uo11s OSJH!CI (the " continuous 
seeing" of an aspect) and the constam cha11ge of aspe,·1s ( or "dawning of an 
aspect") (p.194). 
The 'duck-rabbit illustration' represents a figure which "can be seen as a 
rabbit's or as duck's head"; on the question "What do you see here?", 
Wittgenstein points out two types of answers, acceptable and unacceptable. His 
acceptable answer is: 
"A picture-rabbit". lf I had further been asked what it is, I should have 
explained by pointing to all sons of pictures of rabbits, should perhaps have 
pointed to real rabbits, or given an imitation of them. (p. 194) 
65 
On the other hand, an unacceptable answer is "Now I am seeing it as a 
picture-rabbit" (p. 194). The difference is that in the first case a ·continuous' 
aspect is reported which is most likely to be related to a particular language use, 
whiie in tile second a ·dawning ' aspect is reponed which is most iiiceiy to he 
related to a philosophi:in,: over la11g11a,:e 11se . As a pan of any particular 
language use, an involved aspect which plays a particular role associated with a 
particular meaning is seen as a ' continuous' one. For the sake of philosophy, 
however, "we can also see the illustration now as one thing now as another"; in 
other words, "'we interpret it, and see it as we illterpret it'' (p. 193). 
In a certain sense, a good answer, which does not compromise the 
ambiguity of the figure, would be just "It's a duck-rabbit" (p. 195). This would be 
a "report of perception" as the answer "It's a rabbit" would be such, too, though 
both reports and both perceptions are different. However, the answer 'Wow it ' s a 
rabbit" would not be a report of perception (p. 195), for it does not escape the 
ambiguity of the figure in an authentic manner; it "has the form of a report of a new 
perception"(p. 196 ), but is rather a ' report of an altemation'(italics added). The 
report of alternation ( or of ·dawning aspect') conveys the possibilities of other 
reports of perception (or of 'continuous aspects ' ) in a way which is quite the same 
and quite definite in terms ofa linguistic expression (as a 'report'). In my 
interpretation, this is only to say the distinction between the two types of reports is 
very subtle, that any use qf language also promotes aspects other than the ones 
which it 'grasps' in itself. and that the former aspects project a possible language 
use which already 'misfits' the particular use constituted by the latter aspects. In 
other words, the propositions of the particular language uses grasp only certain 
aspects, not the constallf change of aspects though they convey such a possibility. 
That is why an 'exact explanation' is actually never an 'exact' one; it only promotes 
the possibility for such an ·exact explanation' in an epistemological form: 
My visual impression has changed; - what was it like before and what is it like 
now? • If I represent it by means of an exact copy - and is11 't that a good 
representation of it? - 110 change is shewn. (italics added) (p. 196) 
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Such a point can be interpreted on behalf of Habermas' notion. since it 
shows both that the linguistic practices are in a certain sense limited to particular 
language uses and that whenever they try to transcend these uses they become to a 
great extent 'philosophical practices' . Supposedly, in these cases they face the 
problems of mediation and both the 'expertise' of science and the individuals 'own 
epistemology' appear to be inadequate for their overcoming. Assuming that in 
these very cases scientific ·expertise' is considered 'adequate' for the treatment of 
these problems, it would attain the dimensions of what in the Western 
philosophical tradition has been known as 'metaphysics'. for the problems of 
mediation as such remain 0111 of the scope of the 'expert fields ' but are only 
problems of the exchange of expertise by means of concepts. At the same time, 
this point does not necessarily imply that the solutions of those problems of the use 
of expert knowledge are some sort of · philosophical solutions' . For a 
philosophical treatment would make relative any ' particular organization' or 
crmti1111011s a.1pec1 and focus on a co11sra111 change of mpects which, in problem 
solving, is simply no/ relevant because then one uses a particular or co11li1ruos 
aspect only. This is why the specific 'philosophical treatment ' rather results in 
1111doi11g of 'philosophy as a clarifying activity' which is to give up its role of 
distributing 'correctness' to the particular language uses and to disappear illlo a 
parlirnlar use of col1fi1111011s aspects: 
It is necessary to get down to the application, and then the concept finds a 
different place, one which, so to speak, one never dreamed of. (p. 201) 
In other words, while the practice dissolves the epistemological aspects of 
the perception in certain applicable definitnesses, including linguistic ones, 
philosophizing specifies them in terms of language and thinking and dissolves their 
metaphysical dimensions by mediation of an appropriate understanding of how 
mind deals with language. In the subtle interactions between language and 
thinking, the "looking at" through "expression" becomes a "thinking out", while 
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the "expression" itself is an already thought 0111 expression which is either used or 
interpreted: 
If you are looking at the object, you need not think; but if you are having the 
visual experience expressed hy the exclamatic:m, yo1.1 are thinking of what yo11 
see.(p.197) 
Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I 
see in a different way? I am inclined to say the fonner. But why? - To 
mterprel is lo think, to do something; seeing is a state. (p. 213) 
For the late Wittgenstein, the possible confusions in language use appear in 
the very transition from 'seeing' to 'interpreting', i.e., from, so to speak, apre-
thi11ki11g to a Ji11guistical/y treated and later so expressed thinking. This is a 
transition which turns out to be intangible and as such unaccountable. Even if it is 
believed that it is ·accountable' and so at some point becomes 'believably' 
accounted, it would be again in tenns of language. In all events the 'philosophical 
treatment' must dismlve this account, e.g., in terms of Wittgenstein's early view, it 
will be categorized under ·what cannot be said', while in terms of his late view, 
which does not point to what 'cannot be said', it will be required to stop the 
philosophizing that fallaciously reduces one tenn to another for the sake of a 
useless explanation: 
Now it is easy to recognize cases in which we are imerpreting When we 
interpret we form hypotheses, which may prove false (p 211) 
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing 
philosophy when l want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is 
no longer tonnented by questions which bring itself in question. ( 133) 
To sum up, in his two concepts, Wittgenstein ultimately specifies the 
philosophical questions in tenns of concepts of the interrelation between language 
and thinking which pose the 'thought' as finally being shaped by its linguistic 
expression; but while in 7'rac/atus this expression is either 'true' or 'false', in the 
/11vestiga1io11s it is either practically used or epistemologically fallible. ln his late 
view, the epistemological points ought to completely disappear from the use of 
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language; respectively, the notion of 'correctness' ought to be resolved in the 
multiplicity of ordinary uses of language: 
Only do not think you knew in advance what the "state of seeing" means here! 
I .et the use leach you the meaning. (p. 213) 
As pointed in the J11trod11ctio11, the dissolution of the philosophical 
problems is to come as a matter of an application of a concept of cognition which 
essentially involves how lhey come into bei11g and how they disappear. In terrns 
of my interpretation of the · duck-rabbit illustration', the dissoi11tio11 of the 
epistemological points in any language use is to come through focusing on its 
co111i111w11s aspect, and that any out-of-use conceptualization of language (such as 
the notion of its correc:I use) would be an attempt for representing a possible 
c:011sta11t cha118e of a!ipects. 
bJ The Role of Philosophy 
Because Wittgenstein himself suggests that his late view "could be seen in 
the right light only by contrast with and against the background of his old way of 
thinking" (1953/1958, vi), now I proceed with a comparative analysis which poses 
his late notion of philosophy as evolving trom the perspective ofh.is early one. 
Thus, l accept that, in his late thought, he considers two types of philosophizing; 
metaphysical and therapeutic, of which the former, as relating to his early view of 
philosophy, is to help explain the latter as constituting his late view of philosophy. 
Hereafter, I will interpret his late notion of philosophy in terms of this analytic 
distinction and argue that Wittgenstein uses metaphysical phi/osophi:i11g to 
explain how epistemological problems come into being in language, while he uses 
the therapeutic one as a prescription for how they can be dissolved. 
Consequently, his metaphysical philosophi:ing focuses on the epistemological 
( constant change of) aspects of the language use and problemati:es it in terms of 
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a 11otion of correctness, while his therapeutic philosophi:ing focuses on its 
practical (or continuous) aspects and dissolves the 'notion of correctness' in terms 
of the use. The result is that the metaphysical philosophizing in fact ca1111ot 
expiai11 the ianguage in its m11iiipii1:iiy bt:\;i!USt: it ca,1 o;;/y a,noulli to a,1 
explanation of its 'correct use'; while, the therapeutic philosophizing in fact is 1101 
a philosophi:ing in a traditional sense at all because it appears to prescribe a good 
understanding of language without, so to speak, making the 'prescription' ( which 
would have been then a prescription for its ·correct use', too). Ultimately, 
Wittgenstein adheres to the therapeutic philosophizing because, in the specific 
sense of his concept, the explanation has been somehow accomplished (though it 
has been only attempted), and thus what remains is just the application to be 
performed. The conclusion is that philosophy as a therapy cannot be sufficiently 
explained but rather sufficiently applied. Accordingly, in this subsection I focus, 
on one hand, on what his late view has in common with his l!arly one, i.e., the 
rejectio11 of philosophy as metaphy.~ics, and on the other hand, on what his late 
view has in distinction from his early one. i.e., therapeutic rejection of the 
metaphysical rejection of the metaphysics. 
Thus, in Wittgenstein's early view, the metaphysics results from misusing 
the logic of language in such a way that it produces 11onsemical propositions 
which have no corresponding objects in reality , while in his late view, the 
multiplicity of concrete language uses disallows such a language use that would 
constitute the metaphysical explanation of its correctness as validly applying to the 
whole of this ·multiplicity'. As a result, in the two concepts, philosopl,y as a 
metaphysics has been proved impossible, but in terms of the late one, it cannot be 
even a particular language game that takes a part in the multiplicity of other 
language games since it cannot point out or refer to something that "is common to 
all games" (66) and so cannot ensure an understanding in such a game. ln 
contrast. the very awareness of the multiplicity of language uses is the necessary 
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condition that can prevent us from getting involved in such a language game, i.e., 
from getting involved in a metaphysical erp/a11alio11 of how language works: 
lfyou do not keep multiplicity of language games in view you will perhaps 
be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?". (24) 
Thus, as the author of Tractat11s saw the role of philosophy in its being a 
'clarifying activity' which 'does not result in philosophical propositions' , but rather 
in dissolving of all philosophical problems; so the author of the /11vestiga1io11s 
conceived of philosophy as a ' therapy' which treats the particular language uses by 
undoing their pre-established 'correctness'. Consequently, because philosophy can 
be in neither case a metaphysics, it cannot legitimately prescribe any 'correct' rules 
for its own practice, for they would thus form a metaphysical prescription. This is 
why, in 'frac:tatus, a metaphysical way of explaining the · only strictly correct 
method' of philosophy ended with a paradoxical self-repudiation of the 
'explanation' (6.54), while in the Investigations, the philosophical treatment denied 
the metaphysical concepts even as indirect or guiding notions in the use of 
language: 
. in philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and calculi 
which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone that is using language m11s1 
play such a game. - But if you say that our languages only approximate to such 
calculi you are standing on the very brink of misunderstanding. For then it may 
look as if what we were talking about were an ideal language. As if our logic 
were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum. • Whereas logic does not treat of 
language - or of thought in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural 
phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we construct ideal languages. 
But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages 
were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the 
logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looks like. (81) 
For the late Wittgenstein, philosophy as therapy avoids the employment of 
'ideal' properties for purposes of its own because they can be justified only 
psychologically: 
As ifwe were talking about shades of meaning and all that were in question 
were to find words to hit the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy 
only where we have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation 
to use a particular kind of expression. (254) 
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In other words, philosophy cannot take on the means of investigation or 
expression of the natural sciences, nor can it become a specialized activity which 
accompanies the sciences, for if it does, it would thus attain metaphysical 
dimensions (254). What philosophy does is just a 'treatment· which is in no way 
identical with any scientific one, which exercises itself while refining any possible 
metaphysical aspects in the questions under investigation, and which is thus an 
undoing of itself as a treatment: 
The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. 
(255) 
Here, 'treatment' is not a directing (or 'correcting') of the natural sciences, 
as the physician's treatment is not just a directing of the patient. Rather, the 
physician vinually L11res an illness through, in a certain sense, ' undoing of:he 
directing ' which is useless when the patient is already sick; 1101 defining or re-
defining the illness, but the very therapy would cure the patient : 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. - Since ewrythi11g lies open to view there is 1101hi11g to 
explain. (italics added)( 126) 
For Wittgenstein, what remains for philosophy to 'treat' are any possible 
attempts to impose pre-established, 'correct' meanings in the language use that 
would only 'disguise' what 'lies open to view' and so would complicate the 
particular language uses. This is why he declares that "our clear and simple 
language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regulariz.ation of 
language" ( 130), nor is "our aim to refine a complete system of rules for the use of 
our words in unheard-of ways" (133). Rather, 
We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use oflanguage: an 
order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the 
order. (132) 
. . . we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples 
can be broken off-Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single 
problem. There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed 
methods, like different therapies. (133) 
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On Wittgenstein's late view, the problems that are being solved are after all the 
practical problems, not the single problem of philosophy which would have thus been a 
metaphysics. In conirast, philosophy as a therapy has neither a certain problem, nor even 
a certain method; for if there were oniy one philosophicai merhori or rherapy, as ihe author 
of Tractaflls thought, it would have become philosophy's only problem. 
Thus, in relation to his early view of philosophy, it is as if Wittgenstein just 
'changed the aspect' and looked at the 'same thing' from a different perspective in 
which it is ' seen in a new way': 
. not only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the 
second figure is a new visual experience. (p. 199) 
The new l!Xperience of the same thinK indicates a family rl!sembla11ce in 
the roles which philosophy plays in his two concepts; the early one denied 
philosophy as a metaphysics by means of a metaphysical method, the late one not 
only denied philosophy as a metaphysics but also the metaphysical method of 
denying metaphysics. Indeed, the · change of aspects ' does not necessarily imply 
any sort of subordination between the two experiences in the perception of the 
same thing, nor does it suggest that the very practice of 'changing of aspects ' is to 
be a prescription for a proper examination of the issues under search; however, for 
Wittgenstein himself such a practice resulted in reconsidering his old view on 
language and elaborating a new one. What he did in both cases was philosophy. 
and indeed, on his view, the 'change of aspects ' is a phenomenon that one notices 
only when she or he is doing philosophy. But, though it is the work of philosophy 
to discover the complex situation of the epistemological interactions between 
language and thought, ultimately it is to adhere to a good, therapeutic: 
understanding about their possible uses. Generally, this is an understanding of how 
philosophy would prevent itself from dealing with language in the manner in which 
sciences do, i.e., epistemologically. ln the broader context ofmy argument, it is 
precisely this understanding which is to compensate the scientific i11sufjic:ienc.y for 
dealing with problems of mediation on the level of expert a1//11re; it is this 
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understanding which is to be unproblematically exchanged through everyday 
c:ommu11ica1io11 to treat individuals' naive be/1ejf that practical problems can be 
solved metaphysically. For, a grasped 'aspect', as a thought expressed in 
ianguage, conveys aiso the poss1b1i1ty for grasping the 'constant change of aspects· 
which, when altered, could be realized as a fallible use of language, if one does not 
realize that by its 'altering' she or he is just doing philosophy. By contrast, this 
fallibilism only disappears when language grasps the 'aspects' as a part of a cenain 
·use' in which the grasping of the ·constant change of aspects' is simply irrelevant. 
To repeat, in the former case the philosophizing is metaphysical, while in the 
latter therapeutic. 
c) 'Leami11g' and 'Teaching· 
In my argument. Wittgenstein's concept of language games has been 
promoted on the level of culture to respond to the scientific i11sufficie11cy for 
dealing with problems that can be represented as problems of ml!diatio11, as well as 
to individuals' need for adequate epistemological concepts for effective 
111etacognitio11, i.e., for overcoming !>11''h problems on the level of everyday 
cnmmtmicatinn So far , his late philosophy has been considered as addressing 
problems of mediation exclusively on the level of culture ( which is generally true 
of all the philosophical concepts examined in this paper); now, I argue that in his 
specific concept of leaching-learning practictt (which is based on his notion of 
philosophy) Wittgenstein most directly addresses the problems of medialio11 on the 
level of everyday comm1111icatio11. It could be noticed that the notion of 
philosophy as a therapy which is to treat the epistemological confusions through a 
permanent utili:ation of the 'awareness of the multiplicity of language uses' 
resembles very much the educational researchers' prescription of metacog11i1io11 
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which is to treat individuals ' cognitive problems through a permanelll Uli/i:ation 
of individuals ' ' awareness of how their intelligence works': 
All this, howe1•er, can only appear in the right light when one hm 
attained greater clarity aho111 the conc:eots of 111uiersta11dinI!. meaning, and 
thinking ·For it will then also become ciear ·what can lead ·us (and did lead 
me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is 
operating a calculus according to definite rules. (italics added) (81 )26 
For Wittgenstein, the 'greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, 
meaning and thinking ' does not take the form of a certain or indispensable 
epi.wemological concept, but rather, it takes the form of an appropriate 
philosophical 1111dersta11di11g of the use of language . In this sense, its acquisition 
is to go through the awarimess of one's predispositions to put a certain concept 
(of ' definite rules' ) of knowledge acquisition into a metaphysical form, and so to 
understand it as the very concept (of the very rules) of knowledge acquisition. At 
the same time, the genuine application of such an understanding in dissolving 
certain · epistemological problems' turns out to be just an aspect of solving the 
practical problems, i.e., it is 11eitht:r an application of a notion of the ,:orrect 11se of 
language, nor an 'operating a calculus according to definite rules' . Nevertheless, 
Wittgenstein affirms a qualitative interdependence between both knowledge 
acquisition and its applicalio11, respectively, the importance of an effective 
exchange of expertise between the levels of culture and everyday communication 
But, if am not mistaken, his point is that the problem solvers are 1101 to concentrate 
on the ideal means for dealing with the problems of'knowledge acquisition and 
application ', but rather 011 solving the practical problems to be solved. ln my view, 
this means that the very overcoming of the problt:ms of mediation is 1101 to take 
place on the level of culture but on the level of ewryclay comm1111ic:alion: 
Correct prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of those with 
bener knowledge of mankind. 
Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a 
course in it, but through ·experience' . - Can someone else be a man's teacher 
26 In the original passage only the words means and understands (in the second sentence) arc italicsizcd. 
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in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip. - This is what 
'learning' and 'teaching' are like here. - What one acquires is 1101 a technique; 
one teams collect judgmems. There are also rules, but they do not fonn a 
system, and 011/y experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-
rules. (italics added) (p. 227)27 
Thus, for Wittgenstein., purposeful learning appears to be a process of 
knowledge acquisition, which does nut end in grasping of an 'ideal system of 
knowledge' or an ' ideal way of learning'; for such things do not exist, but are only 
forms of possible contents. Rather, learning begins with such a 'good 
understanding' of how one deals with words, rules, meaning, thinking, and 
knowledge that undoes itself in the continuous learning from experience. In this 
sense, 'learning' cannot have a particular end but can only start . In the primordial 
learning phenomena, the illlerpretations of aspects in experience, one subjects 
one 's own knowledge acquisition to the mediation of the interplay between 
language and thought and, in lack ofa 'good understanding' of the possible 
outcomes of this interplay, one could grasp a constam change of aspects and so 
arrive at a 'correct epistemological concept' which as such is a condition for its 
future fallible applica1io11s. Indeed, a 'good knowledge' is a condition for a 'right 
application ' , but neither ' knowledge acquisition' nor 'knowledge application' 
operates according to 'calculating rules'. This is why 'knowledge acquisition· 
cannot rely exclusively on ' teaching'. but is to be mediated 'by experience' which 
is an immediate knowledge, i.e., a knowledge which is not preselll (or mediated) 
lystematical/y. For the late Wittgenstein., there are no 'ideal systems' of 
knowledge, nor are there 'ideal methods' of knowledge acquisition (learning) and 
application (e.g., teaching, or problem solving). There is only an interdependence 
between 'better knowledge' and 'right application' which is in no way 
epistemologically mediated, but is rather immediate. As such, this interdependence 
is to be 'mediated' at most by a mind's philosophical effort which is supplied with 
27 
In the original passage only the words experience (in the fourth sentence) and lip (in the SC\'enlh 
sentence) arc italicsizcd. 
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a good philosophical 11ndersta11di11g of the use of language, and which somehow 
paradoxically, while mediating. undoes the mediation itself 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language. ( I 09) 
/11 .mmmary, I accepted that the late Wittgenstein explained what can be 
called the 'only undissolved problem of philosophy', the possibility of a methoci of 
the correct use of language, in tenns of the concept of language games, and that 
then he applied this concept in dissolving this problem. In the explanation of the 
concept of language games, he specified the 'correctness' of language uses in 
terms of their particular contexts, and regarded the confusions in them as 
stemming from the linguistic transfer of epistemological aspects from one language 
use to another, i.e., as stemming from the attempts for grasping and making use of 
the 'constant change of aspects' in the interpretation of the 'same thing' . As a 
matter of application of his concept, he elaborated a 11011-explic:it notion of 
philosophy as a therapy according to which philosophy is to treat the metaphysical 
residues of any particular language use. [n a subsequent application of the notion 
of philosophy to 1eachi11g-learni11g practice, Wittgenstein suppons the 
interdependence between the 'good knowledge' and its 'right application ' , but 
suggests that they are more properly mediated by experience than by systematic 
methods. 
In light of the concept of language games, the problem:;· of mediation do 
not tum out to be ' real problems'; they come into being only when one makes a 
reference to the level of expert c11//11re, while failing to undo it as a metaphysical 
philosophi::i11g. In this sense, the very overcoming of the problems of mediation is 
to take place on the level of everyday comm1111icatio11, and is to come through a 
1herape111ic rmdoing of the expertise in the mere solving of the concrete problems 
(" .. . .1peaki11g of language is part of an activity, or of a form oflife. " (24)). 
Because the problems of mediation are 1101 certain, or 'special problems', they 
cannot be overcome by mediation of a 'specialized', or 'expert' treatment which 
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has clearly determinate dimensions on the differelll stages of the exchange of 
expertise, but only by mediation of the non-expert competence of philosophy. In 
light of Wittgenstein's view, this means that the ' mediating function' of philosophy 
can be only co11ditionaliy systematized in the form of an expia11at1on and 
prescription of an epistemologi,·al ,·011cept to be acquired and applied, and that 
this concept can at mo.,·t take the form of what can be called a · good philosophical 
understanding of the use of language' which in his own words is a "greater darity 
about the co11,·epts of understanding, meaning, and thi11ki11,l('(italics added) (81 ). 
By contrast, if the mediati11gfimction of philosophy were systematized even to 
some degree 1111conditio11ally,2s it would have taken the form of a 'correct 
explanation', 'correct prescription ' , 'correct acquisition', and ' correct application' 
of a concept of the only strictly correct method of the use of la11f:11age. But, had 
philosophy had such a method, it would have qualified as a ' specialized field' 
which has its own, certain, or 'special' portion in the ' compartmentalization of 
modemity' 29 (the expert culture or everyday communication), and would have thus 
contributed to the creating rather than to the overcoming of the problems of 
2
M Even if an uncondirinnnl .,ysremnliznlion were such lo .mme degree on(~·. ii still would have remained 
an nh.wil111e~v unconditiunal one since we cannut clelermine its "degree· in order 10 make use ofi1. For. in 
this context ·degree ' stands for nothing; it is on~v a fonn of a possible content. And. though one may 
object that in an ordinary use of language its sense is perfectly possible. he or she will h:J,·c troubles in 
jUS1ifying that ·philosophizing· is such an ordinary use of language. 
29 The compamnen1nlizalion uf mrulern,ry mus! be distinguished from ils inslilulionnl 
departmentalizalwn; the former is an abstract 1erm which relates 10 a theoretical argumentation on the 
level of c11/1Ure. while the Ian er has concrete dimensions which relate 10 a practical rcalizalion on 
everyday communication. In this sense. R. ROl'l)' S leaving of the department of philosophy has bc:cn a 
practical reoliw1ion of a theoretical arg11mema1ion. while his still being known as a ·philosopher' only 
indicalcs thal, unlike the other fields. the mslilutional deparlmentnlization of philosophy neither projects. 
nor ensures ils specialized compartmemal1:a1ion. Rather. the relation of philosophy 10 these two forms uf 
mudernily only shows how unes1ablished its role in the exchange of expertise is: and yel. the former 
relates ii 10 the level of ever\'dav communication. while the latter - lo the level of cullure . 
ThU5. lhc fact 1ha1 ·so~ ·qualified" philosophers leach in other than ·departments ofphilosoph}° 
only proves the cross-c11//11ral role of the field known as ·philosophy" and indicates for the persistence of 
prublems of mediation as well as for the insufficiency of the spcciali7..cd expenise to deal with tllcrn. As 
already pointed out these problems arc not ·rca1 problems· and do nor require a ·specialized' approach for 
their ·sotu1ions·. they just disappear in light ofa ·good philosophical understanding' oft.he mediwn of 
the exchange ofe:rpertise . It is precisely this ' understanding" which is the fonn of philosophy that the 
C.XJlCrl fields and C\'er)·day communication practices have a need of; and it is precisely the non-erperl field 
of philosophy which has the com~1ence (not the 'expertise' ) to prO\idc them 11ith such an understanding. 
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mediation. Instead, in light of Wittgenstein's late concept, the problems of 
mediation can be explained only as 'still undissolved epistemological problems', 
while the mediating junction of ph.ilosophy is to be applied to the phenomena of 
philosophizing in such a selt~retlective way that undoes its metaphysical aspects in 
the particular language uses and transforms it into a successful therapy. 
Seam's Concept of Speech Acts 
In relation to Wittgenstein's later view, John Searle's concept of speech 
acts can be considered a specification of a partic11lar language 11se in terms of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for its performance. In this case, it is entirely 
conditional to talk about dissolving of certain philosophical problems since the 'last 
one' , the conceptualization of the 'correct use of language', can be considered 
already dissolved. But, because Wittgenstein, so to speak, 'distributed' the notion 
of correctness in the multiplicity of everyday language uses, Searle found it 
necessary to investigate how any concrete language use becomes sufficient, or 
correct by itself To follow the common terminology ofmy argument, now I 
accept that Searle first explains the concept of speech acts as a concept of 
cognition and that then he applies this concept in setting down the semanrical 
mies which constitute a partic11/ar type of language use, the speech a,·t of 
promising. Here, the concept of speech act can be considered an epistemological 
one since the terms of its explanation are in essence fonnal conditions of any act of 
linguistic communication, while selling down the semamical niles for the use of a 
partiC11lar speech act can be regarded as a dissolving of the conditional 
philosophical problem 'What is a speech act?' since they basically constitute its 
conceptualization in non-philosophical terms. 
In his exp/a11atio11 of the concept of speech acts, Searle attempts to 
.. provide a basis for definition" of the "basic unit oflinguistic communication" 
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which he refers to as what "in a typical speech situation involving a speaker, a 
hearer, and an utterance", J.L. Austin calls an il/oc11tio11ary act: 
It is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol or word or sentence, or 
even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of 
linguistic communication, but rather it is the production of the token in the 
performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit oflinguistic 
communication .. . more precisely, the production of the sentence token under 
certain conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the 
minimal unit of linguistic communication. (p. 60) 
Thus, for Searle, not only the explication of the notion of an · illocutionary 
act· is el·semial for the explanation of his philosophical concept of speech acts, 
but it becomes possible by "stating of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions" 
for its performance. These conditions are conceived of as a basis for extracting "a 
set of semantical rules" for its use which in turn will "mark the utterance as an 
illocutionary act of that kind" (p. 61 ). Searle identifies the semantical features of 
an illocutionary act in terms of its rules, propositions, cmd meaning (pp. 60-1) 
which are usually attributable to the language uses. 
He conceives of the n,/es as principles of explication and emphasizes as 
imponant the distinction between two types: the regulative ones which regulate 
forms of behavior existing independently from these rules themselves, and 
co11s1il111ive ones which not only ·'regulate but also create or define new forms of 
behavior"(p. 61 ). In his view, a failure to understand this difference may lead 
philosophers to ask questions like: "How can a promise create obligation?" and 
"How can a touchdown create six points?" which arise when one's understanding 
of the rules is limited to their being regulative ones only. Searle argues that 
although constitutive rules "are almost tautological in character" (because they 
sometimes appear as ' rules' and sometimes as 'analytical truths' which stem from 
the very fact of"their being constitutive rules"), rather they are those which 
underlie the ·'speech acts" (p. 62) given that "to perform illocutionary act is to 
engage in a rule-governed fonn of behavior" (p. 61). In this sense, he believes that 
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a possible formulating of "a set of constitutive rules for a cellain kind of speech 
act" can be considered a "test" of this "hypothesis" (p. 62). 
On the other hand, what Searle calls a proposition is the common content 
which a few difierem iiiocu1ionary acts marked by diiferem sentences have whiie 
referring to the same subject and predicating the same act of this subject (pp. 62-
3 ). On this point. he appears to make the distinction between a "sentence" and a 
"proposition" which is that "in the utterance of the sentences the speaker expresses 
a proposition" which is thus different from its "assertion or statement" (p. 63). 
This is a distinction between an "illocutionary act" and its "propositional content" 
which, in semantical tenns, becomes a distinction between what Searle calls a 
"function-indicating device" (showing "how a proposition is to be taken, or what 
an illocutionary force the utterance is to have") and a "proposition-indicating 
element"(p. 63) . Thus, an illocutionary act is detennined, generally, through the 
way in which a cellain proposition is exercised, and more specifically, (i .e., in 
terms of semantics) through the specific 'illocutionary force ' that a certain 
' propositional indicator' gains in such an exercise. In addition. Searle (perhaps 
altering a notion of the interdependence between semantics and syntax:) notes that 
"recent developments in transformational grammar" support similar distinctions in 
terms of syntax, too (p. 63 ). 
In much the same way, in tem,s of characteristic distinctions, Searle 
approaches the question of meaning: there is an impollant difference between just 
uttering sounds or making marks and perfonning a speech act. On the one hand, 
"the sounds or marks one makes in the performance of the speech act are 
characteristically said to hQ\J(! meaning'' , and on other hand, "one is 
characteristically said to mean something by those sounds or marks" (p. 64). 
Thus, in his concept of speech acts Searle adopts the notion of meaning as 
characteristically having a twofold sense. In clarifying this sense, he points out 
counter-examples to the view that relates the notion of meaning exclusively to a 
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"speaker's intention'' which is to be recognized by the hearer and argues that there 
are some limits in what one can mean by cenain words because, 
... what we can mean is a function of what we are saying. Meaning is more than 
a matter of intention. it is also a matter of convention (pp. 64-5). 
He concludes accordingly that a possible analysis of an illocutionary act 
would have to take into consideration the combination of these two components of 
meaning (p. 65). 
Given this understanding of the constitutive rules, proposition, and 
meaning in the formation of a general concept oflanguage, Searle undenakes its 
applicalion in stating the necessary and sufficient conditions of the speech act q( 
promising. In his view, the 'answer' of the question How to promise must take the 
fonn ofa "set of propositions such that the conjunction of the members of the set 
entails the proposition that a speaker made a promise, and the proposition that the 
speaker made a promise entails this conjunction" (p. 65). However, he stipulates 
that it is not possible to exhaust such a set of conditions "that will exactly mirror 
the ordinary use of the word 'promise'" and that a good end will be a grasping of 
"the center of the concept and ignoring the fringe, borderline and partially 
defective cases" (p. 66). 
As stated in terms of propositions, the set of conditions which ' entails' the 
'conjunction' of 'promising' became a basis for extracting its respective set of 
comti/11/ive rules which Searle subsequently determines as propositional-colllent 
nile, preparatory mies, sincerity nile, and esse/1/ial rule (p. 69). A similar extract 
avoids the verification principle because the set of propositions, in which the 
conditions of the speech act are stated, is not necessarily connected with a certain 
illocutionary act (p. 66), and thus is not to be supported by any concrete examples 
(though it possibly entails some illocutionary acts). For, in his view, a proposition 
alone is not a concrete content (though it may have such), but an exercised-i11-
i/loc11tio11ary-act content. To put it in terms of truth, a proposition is assumed not 
as something that expresses a concrete truth, but rather as something that 
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expresses an exercised or exercisable truth. In this way, in his understanding and 
use of the term 'proposition'. Searle combines elements of Wittgenstein's two 
concepts: on the one hand, the verifiability of the propositions which are conceived 
of as constitutive rules of a cenain speech act cannot be anticipated because the 
question of their truthfulness cannot be raised out of their use; and on the other, 
the sense of a proposition, as related to sentence, comes essentially from 
Wittgenstein's frac:tallls : 
3 3 18 Like F rege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the 
expressions contained in it. 
Eventually, the 'assertion' ofa proposition in a sentence as participating in 
an illocutionary act could be in some way verified since in this way the proposition 
appears to be involved in a certain use which takes the form of a certain spoken or 
written sentence. 
Thus, Searle' s notion of speech acts becomes an example of a 
.111ppleme11tary employment of both Wittgenstein 's early and late concept of 
language. However, by figuring out the constitutive rules of a particular speech 
act as a way of explanation of that speech act, despite all the stipulations in 
advance, Searle goes beyond the frames of Wittgenstein's two concepts. The 
specific understanding of the rules as being co11stitutive ones still conveys the 
metaphysical sense of a notion of the 'correct use of language' For, despite the 
conditionality of their propositional statement, these rules may be interpreted as a 
directing, or guiding formalism to the ordinary language which, after all, is very 
much independent. Indeed, Searle qualifies them as "semantical rules for the use 
of any function-indicating device" for a certain "speech act" (p . 69), and in this 
way, he ascribes them to the 11011-philosophicalfie/d of linguistics. But, similar 
rules are supposed to form explicitly and exclusively such a backgro1111d for 
constitution of meaning that is most likely tangible (to the degree that is possible) 
in a concrete illocutionary siruation but that is hardly reflexively extractable 
without fallacy out of such a situation. This is the background of hidden 
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interactions between language and thought which may result in the expression of a 
thought in terms of language, and which Searle specified in terms of semantics and 
grammar (syntax). 
111 .11,mmary, Searle regards his concept of the so-called 'speech acts' as an 
attempt to provide a basis for definition of the basic unit of linguistic 
communication. In my argument, I accepted that first he explained this concept in 
terms of the preliminary notions of n,/es. proposition, and meaning, and that then 
he applied it in setting down what he calls the necessary and sufficie111 c:011di1iuns 
of the speech act of promising. On the basis of those conditions, he extracted the 
rules which he conceives of as being constitutive for the performance of that 
speech act. 
In my argument, I regard the explication of a parti,·11/ar spee,·h act in 
terms of the ~pedt1/i:edjield of linguistics (semantics and grammar) as a 
'conditional dissolving' of the conditional philosophical problem Whal is a ~peech 
ad>. In this sense, insofar as Searle exp/aim and applies a cenain organized 
concept of knowledge to a cenain problem, setting down the 'constitutive rules' of 
the 'speech act of promising', he may be considered as attempting to solve some 
prohlems of mediation on the level of expert cull/Ire. However, as he confesses, 
this set of rules for the use of a particular speech act cannot exhaust the variety of 
its ordinary uses, and so it cannot be immediately 'prescribed' for acquisition and 
applic:atio11 on the level of everyday comm1111ic:ation. Rather, Searle's view can be 
properly understood as indicating the persistence of some problems of mediation 
between these two levels, and so its permanent utilization is to be mediated by a 
'good' philosophical understanding of its being only a co11ditio11a/ set of 
constitutive rules. 
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Rorty's Political Answer to the Traditional Philosophical Questions 
In relation to the late Wittgenstein, who dissolved the last philosophical 
iUusions tor an ahistorical concept of language and promoted a notion of 
philosophy m· therapy with practically no epistemological functions, Rorty can be 
regarded as attempting to alternatively conceptualize the therapeutic role of 
philosophy in historical terms. In his view, if all the philosophical problems have 
been dissolved, the question that gains significance is "how we should conceive of 
our relation to Western philosophical tradition" (p . 9). Consequently, he 
elaborates the concept of the so-called political amwer whose main point is that 
philosophers need to redirect their efforts toward the realization of values which 
are historically proven and which as such are opposed to those that are 
ahistorically proven. 
For the purpose of this paper, I will accept that Rorty's concept of the 
'political answer' consists of both an expla11atio11 of what has still remained to be 
the concern of the philosophical tradition-the "availability of an adequate 
language" , i.e., a concept oflanguage, and an application of this concept in 
elaborating a particular notion of the role of philosophy in the modern world . But 
since the common terminology of my argument, because of its ahistorical 
character, could only very conditionally convey the historical sense of this 
philosophical notion, prior to the examination of Rorty' s concept of language, I 
will try to set up the metaphilosophical perspective of what can be called the 
'historical background' against which his view would have been properly 
understood in its entirety. And, since he himself finds it necessary to introduce 
such a perspective, now I will brietly consider it in his own terms. 
Thus, Rorty argues that the philosophical tradition itself has by now given 
"three answers" to the above pointed question: sciemistic (Husserlian}, poetic 
(Heideggerian), and political (pragmatist). According to him, the so-called 
scielllistic answer shares "the traditional Platonic hope to ascend to a point of view 
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from which the interconnections between everything can be seen" clearly. and 
proclaims that "the aim of philosophy is to develop a formal scheme within which 
every area of culture can be placed" (p. I I). On the other hand, the so-called 
poelic am.wer results from the Heideggerian criticism of this type of phiiosopilicai 
foundationalism (i .e., the scientistic answer), and contends that not only the "roots 
of the crisis" are "in a misguided rationalism" (as it is in the Husserlian notion), but 
also that the very "demand for foundations" appears to be a "symptom" of this 
"misguided rationalism" itself (p. I I). Finally, according to the polilical answer 
which Rorty himself supports, "the task of philosophy is to break the crust of 
convention" in a way that can "help achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number by facilitating the rep/acemelll of lanKUaKe, ,11sloms, and im·/ihllions 
which impede that happiness" (italics added) (p. 11; p. 20). In my view, the 
political answer concept can be interpreted as pleading, in a narrowly intellectual 
sense, for an understanding of the flexible use oflanguage and, in a broadly social 
sense, for the realization of certain humanistic ideals. 30 Respectively, those are the 
two aspects which I will consider under the conditional terms expla11atio11 and 
applic:a1io11 of a concept of language. 
Like Wittgenstein and Searle, Rorty bases his philosophical views on a 
co11cep1 of language (which appears to be very basic for contemporary 
philosophy). He explains language as ··cur way of dividing up !he realm of 
possibility" which is, in this sense, an epistemological phenomenon that has the 
potential to "reweave the fabric of our beliefs and desires" (p. 12). For him. this 
"reweaving" appears to be the most important function of language and he argues 
that "there are three ways in which a new belief can be added to our previous 
beliefs •• perception, inference and metaphor" (p. 12). Perception and inference 
can only "alter the truth-values of sentences, but not the repertoire of sentences" 
and thus cannot change the language, but can only "map out all possible logical 
30 One may notice that this anal)tic distinction in Rorty's view rcprcsc:nts ,·cry well the goals of what 
Habcnnas diffcrcmialcs as the levels of. respectively. expert culture and everyday communication. 
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space" and linguistically register the possibilities contained in it (p . 12). Regarding 
this point, Rorty 's concern is that an unchanged and unreplaced language may 
enhance the fallible beliefofits own 'adequacy' which would make its use depend 
upon its 'correct' exercise and thus iimit the reweaving function ofianguage. in 
his view, the ' scientistic answer' (Husserlian phenomenology and analytic 
philosophy) dwells within the limits set up by such a concept oflanguage, and thus 
cannot go beyond the early Wittgenstein's notion that "philosophizing consists in 
clarification of thoughts" (p. 12). 
To go beyond early Wittgenstein's point that 'the limits of the language are 
the limits of the world', Rorty introduces in his concept of language some of the 
points of the so-called 'poetic answer '. Specifically, he elaborates a notion of the 
role of metaphor in language which can be in no way compensated by perception 
and inference : 
. to think of metaphor as a third source of beliefs, and thus a third motive 
for reweaving our networks of beliefs and desires. is to think of language, 
logical space, and the realm of possibility, as open-ended. lt is to abandon the 
idea that the aim of thought is the atlainment of a God 's eye view. (p. 12) 
Indeed, early Wittgenstein also denied such an aim of the use of language 
by way of repudiating as 'nonsensical' the propositions of the metaphysical 
philosophy, but Rorty 's concern here is that the very method of this denying 
presupposes a 'God's eye standpoint ' and that this denying itself still has been 
exercised in terms of that 'logical space' of that language which in this sense has 
remained unchanged. In his view, this is the metaphor that could ensure the 
necessary 'change' and 'open-endedness' because it would undermine the 
dependence oflanguage use upon the logic of language: 
A metaphor is, so to speak, a voice outside of logical space, rather than an 
empirical filling-up of a portion of that space, or a logico-philosophical 
clarification of the structure of that space. It is a call to change one's language 
and one's life, rather than a proposal about how to systematize either. (p. 13) 
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For Rorty, the metaphor becomes a "growing point oflanguage" (p. 12) which 
as such should find its place in the linguistic practices, along with perception and 
inference. Its function in language is in no way privileged, nor is it merely "heuristic" 
or "omamentai." Rather, metaphors are "forerunners of new uses of language, which 
may eclipse and erase old uses" (p. 14), and which thus not only ensure a self-
generating and self-replacing capacity of language from inside, but also undermine the 
notion of language as ' the limits of my world' which he conceives of as 'scientistic ' . 
In his view, if language sustained its metaphorical uses, it could eventually regain its 
historical dimension which, according to the 'poetic answer', already has been lost. 
For Rorty, the promotion of metaphors as "growing points of language" to an 
equal linguistic exchange along with perception and inference, which are ' ahistorical 
points' in lanb'Uage, also means a promotion of the 'historical aspect' of language on a par 
with its ' ahistorical aspect ' . Thus, by undermining any relationship of priority between the 
ahi.vtorica/ uses of perceptions and inferences and the historical exchange of metaphors 
in language, his concept unproblematically adopts the early Heideggerian aim in 
philosophy which is "to remind us" that any philosophy is to take into account its 
hislurical contingency (p. 16). But, while Heidegger thinks that philosophers should 
remind us of!he "historical contingency" by recovering the lost force of the metaphors 
which "had been leveled down into literal truths", and in this sense, by neglecting the new 
metaphors, Rorty assigns a different task to the philosophers aware of the "historical 
contingency" : 
... whereas Heidegger thinks that the task of exploring these newly suggested 
paths of thought is banausic. something which can be left to hacks, the 
pragmatist thinks that such exploration is the pay-otffrom the philosopher' s 
work. He thinks of the thinker as serving the community, and of his thinking 
as futile unless it is followed up by a reweaving of the community's web of 
beliefs. That reweaving will assimilate, by gradually literalizing, the new 
metaphors which the thinker has provided. The proper honor to pay to new, 
vibrantly alive metaphors, is to help them become dead metaphors as quickly 
as possible, to rapidly reduce them to the status of tools of social progress. 
The glory of philosopher's thought is not that it initially makes everything 
more difficult (though that is, of course, true), but that in the end it makes 
things easier for everybody. (p. 17) 
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Thus, Rorty 's concept of language, as it can be seen through the role which 
Rorty assigns to the philosophers, involves a redistribution of"truth-values among 
familiar sentences", invention of"further unfamiliar sentences" (p. 14), and a 
specific .. heiping" of every .. chaiienging metaphor" to become graduaiiy a '·dead 
metaphor"(p. 18). This last feature characterizes its historical dimension and 
makes it go beyond its being merely an ahistorical concept; so to speak, it leaves 
'logical space' and enters ' social space' where it needs some sort of historical 
rather than logical or ahistorical justification. In this sense, his 'hope' for 
'literalizing' ' every new metaphor' in language ultimately becomes a 'social hope' 
whose sense Rorty adopts from the philosophy of the classic prabrmatist John 
Dewey (p. 18). 
In my argument, I accept that Rorty applies his concept oflanguage in 
elaborating a specific notion of the role of philosophy in modernity. This notion 
has been already suggested by the role of philosopher in the historical exchange of 
metaphors in language but is to be shaped finally by his specific understanding of 
the term politk·al. The sense in which Rorty uses the term ·political' is based on 
the way he views Western democratic societies. On one hand, he regards them as 
"already organized around the need" of a permanent criticism and thus as not 
needing a "radical criticism·• (p. 25), and on other hand, he argues that 
a democratic society can get along without the sort of reassurance 
provided by the thought that it has "adequate philosophical foundations" or 
that it is "grounded" in "human reason." (pp. 18-19). 
In this way, though Western political systems are somehow and to some 
degree ( eventually 'historically') justified, they still should not be conceived of as 
being already rationally Justified; for then, this would have been an ahistorical 
justification which would be, so to speak., 'historically fallible '. Perhaps for this 
reason, when explaining his 'political answer' , Rorty uses negative rather than 
ahistorical terms: it is not justified through its eventual "penetrating to" and testing 
by a socially available "reality behind contemporary appearances", nor does its 
meaning come from the sense of socially justified political practice . His 
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··conception of language and inquiry" excludes the possibility that "someday we 
shell penetrate to the true, natural, ahistorical matrix of all possible language and 
knowledge" (p. 25). Indeed, he conceives of language as having the potential to 
"reweave the community's fabric ofbeliets", but, according to him, this reweaving 
cannot "be done systematically", nor can it come as a matter of a "research 
program" (p. 18 ). Rather, the overcoming of the fallibilism of any ahistorical 
justification is to come as some sort of 'historical justification' which is based on 
'historical' rather than on 'logical clarification'. In this sense, the term 'political' is 
intended, on one hand, to limit the radicalism of a 'logically justified' critical 
attitude toward a society that is to some degree adequately organized, and on the 
other, to protect an alternative, 'historical' criticism which would help accomplish 
what still needs to be done. To summarize this point, the political role of the 
philosopher in this historirnl j11stificatio11 becomes to uncover those historical 
ar1(11mimt:; and values which are historically nec:e.',sary in the historical solving of 
the historical problems. Yet, this statement, even though it mentions 'historical' 
six times, is itself an ahistorical one and somehow misrepresents Rorty's view. 
For. he argues that the philosopher, while 'reweaving community's fabric of 
beliefs', should deny any point which centers on language uses in an ahistorical 
fashion. Instead, the philosopher should rehear language's 'growing points' as a 
matter of their 'historical contingency' in order to pnliticaf(y actualize their 
'historical greatness' and thus help or enable their historical self-sacrifice. 
Very much as for Heidegger, for Rorty such a 'rehearing' appeals for an 
actualizing of the "ideals of the French Revolution" whose "historical voice", he 
contends, already has become "clearly visible in the course of the last two 
centuries' attempt to realize" them (p. 25): 
For Dewey as for Hegel, the point of individual human greatness is its 
contribution to social freedom, where this is conceived of in the terms we 
inherit from the French Revolution. (p. 18) 
For Rorty, the 'historical voice' of the ideas of the French Revolution 
reveals another "relevant 'reality' -human suffering and oppression" which., in 
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tum, sets forward another task for the philosopher, namely, to expose them (p. 
25) Thus, Rorty argues that only some of the metaphors which Heidegger 
pronounced 'dead ' are really historically dead in language, while others still need 
to die: 
... "progress, the happiness of the greatest number, culture, civilization" do 
not belong to the same list as "the suprasensory world, the Ideas, God, the 
moral law, the authority of reason." The latter are dead metaphors which 
prai,'Tllatists can no longer find uses for. The former still have a point. (p. 20) 
As already pointed out, in order to die, to be replaced in language, the former 
metaphors need to be politically actualized as a matter of their 'historical contingency' 
so that they reveal their 'historical greatness' and find their 'historical death' in 
language. The task of the philosopher to 'expose' them aims 011/y at a 'reweaving of 
the community's web of beliefs' which would 1/111.1· help literalize them in language. 
Rorty conceives of this "literalizing" as a "gradual", "histo.ical" process which 
practically comes after solutions have been made with the help of"the poets and the 
engineers, the people who produce startling new projects for achieving the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number" (p. 26 ). This is the way in which philosophers help 
the solutions of the problems of the new ·relevant reality', and this is the sense in which 
those metaphors' deaths are to be 'historical ' , and not 'scientific' or 'logical' . 
Thus, with respect to the philosophical question of language, Rorty's 
concept of the political answer pleads for 'literalizing' the meanings of the newly 
born metaphors against the priority of ahistorical language uses, while with 
respect to the role of philosophy in modernity, it stands behind Dewey's 'social 
hope ' for exposing and vindicating 'human suffering and oppression' . So 
interpreted, his view 'fits' the role which Habermas envisions for philosophy on the 
two levels of expert c11/111re and everyday comm1mic:afio11. And yet, as for 
Habermas, so for Rorty, philosophy is 1101 one of the expert cultures, nor does it 
exchange any expert authority in the problem solving practices of everyday 
communication. Rather, while being neither an 'expert field', nor a 'specialized 
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practice', its role is only to condition (by 'mediating' or ' exposing ') the exchange 
of expertise between the assumed two levels of modernity. 
/11 summary, in what can be called the conditional explanation of the 
i.:oncepl ofihe ' political answer ' . Rorty synthesizes wha! he cails 'scieniislic' ami 
·poetic' answers to the question of our relation to Western philosophical tradition 
and elaborates a concept oflanguage in historical tenns as opposed to ahistorical 
ones. By introducing the 'poetic ' notion of ' metaphor' into the ' scientistic' notion 
of language he actualizes language's 'historical ' dimension which is conceived of 
as preventing the flexibility oflanguage from the logic of language. In this way, 
Rorty demeans ahistorical uses of language on behalfof its historical exchange of 
metaphors. Consequently, his historical point uncovers the historical significance 
of certain humanistic ideals which clearly have become articulate in the 'voice of 
history' and which he ' rehears' as the 'ideas of the French Revolution' . 
Rorty applies his concept oflanguage in elaborating a specific notion of the 
role of philosophy in the modem world which he sees in exposing the different 
fonns of' human suffering and oppression' and thus in helping achieve their 
' historical ' rather than ' logical' death. For him, this 'exposing' is the wry w~ in 
which philosophers help 'literalize the new metaphors' in language and thus realize 
the 'historical ideals' of the French Revolution. 
In Rorty's concept, the involvement of the historical dimension of language 
in conceptualization of the problems. role, and purpose of philosophy is not 
intended to produce just another conceptualization, but to actualize them on a 
theoretical level in a way that would produce an effective utilization on a social 
level. In this way, it comes to an agreement with Habennas' concept in which 
philosophy is also seen to 'mediate' the culture's "rarefied, esoteric fonns" so that 
they "stay in touch with everyday communication" ( 1990, pp. 17-8). ln both 
cases, the philosopher, as 'exposer' or ' mediating interpreter', is to help 'vindicate' 
the different forms of 'human suffering and oppression' which come into being in 
the ' social space' , and which also qualify as different 'problems of mediation' on 
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the differeni levels of exchange of expertise. Indeed, on Habennas' view, 
philosophy is to find its place in the 'compartmentalization' of human reason along 
with the different ahislorical fonns of expertise, while in Rony's version, 
phiiosophy cannoi have such a piace in chis ' companmemaiizacion·" buc is 10 
focus on any historically significant trend which has become 'clearly visible' in the 
'historical exchange of metaphors' in language. However, Habennas also rejects 
the scientistic variant of philosophy and contends that philosophy is to specialize 
somehow paradoxically in a ·non-special' field where it is an ·expertise' rather in 
the conditional sense of'competence' . Likewise, the two notions are consistent 
and supplementary in supporting a utilized form of philosophy which would 
reconcile expert theory and social practice in such a way that through overcoming 
the various problems of mediation it can help achieving 'the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number' . 
A General Discussion or Philosophical Concepts 
These philosophical notions are conceived of as dissolving the traditional 
problems of philosophy, and thus as solving some authentic, purely epistemological 
variants of the so-called ·problems of mediation' on a level ofcultllre In their 
examination, I accepted that philosophers first explain certain concepts which 
concern the epistemological aspects of the relationship between language and 
'
1 Thal philO!illphy canno1 luwc a certain place in thl: compartmcntali1.11ion of human reason somehow 
coheres wi1h the view 1ha1 it cannot have such a place in an institutional dcpanmcntaliallion. either. In 
this sense. Ron)· · s ,iew adequately rcOects his decision to leave the department of philosophy aud to c111er 
the department of humanities. For. as a mancr of inslitutional departmentalization , the sense of 
'humanity' is ·1css specialized' than the one of · ph.ilosophy' insofar as the Janer is a subdivision of the 
former: while. as a mailer of a speciali;ed compar1111enta/ization. tbe sens.: of 'humanity' is somehow 
·more s~'Ciali:a:d' l1lan the one of 'philosophy' insofar as the Jancr has not always been restricted within 
the former onli·. For example. while ·hwnanities' arc typically distinguished fr<llll 'sciences·. philosoph)· 
has emerged and developed as a field in relation lo the possibility of its being a · science ' . Besides. though 
the majority of philosophers nowadays agree that philosophy is not one of the 'sciences·. there arc still 
some. as Rorty 's mctaphilosophical account suggests. wh<l reluctantly concede !.his view. 
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thought, and that they upply those concepts in order to show how the 
philosophical problems are to be overcome. Early Wittgenstein explained the 
epistemological interactions between language and thinking in terms of the concept 
of the correct 11.m of language, and then he applied that concept to dissolve the 
'traditional philosophical problems' as pseudo-problems which stem from a 
misunderstanding of the ' logic of language' . Late Wittgenstein explained the 
epistemological aspects of language in terms of the concept of language games, 
and then he applied that concept to dissolve the concept of the 'correct use of 
language' which seemingly became the only undissolved problem of philosophy. 
Searle explained the particular language uses in terms of his concept of speech 
acls, and then he applied this concept in defining the speech act of promising in 
non-philosophical terms (which is basically a dissolving of the conditional 
epistemological problem What is a speech act?). Rorty explained his concept of 
language in terms of an understanding of the · historical exchange of metaphors', 
and then he applied this concept in developing a historical notion of the role of 
philosophy in the form of a specific political amwer to the philosophical questions 
(which is basically a dissolving the ahistorical notions ofphilosophy). 32 While the 
32 
Herc is lhe place to explain. to the degree ii is possible. why my argument as being exercised in 
ahislorical 1enns, somehow misrepresents Rony's view. One may note tliat the term of its conditional 
title 'polilica.1 answer' becomes clear after (and is in fact a title of the conceptual outcomes of) the 
appi,cation of his concept of language. while the conditional titles of the p~ng three concepts become 
clear after (and arc in fact titles of the conceptual outcomes of) the itxplanarions of their concepts of 
language. To fit the pancm of the three preceding concepts, I could have examined Rony·s view under 
the title -Rony"s concept of the historical exchange of metaphors in language ... However. I would have 
thllS inappropriately put the stress in his view on the concept of language rather than on his notion of 
philosophy. and so. I would have given a bcuer c:wnplc of how an a historical representation 
misrepresents the historical tendency (which Rony is trying to draw allention to) of cienying philosophy 
any ahiSlorical means and ends. Y ct. my ahiSlorica.l representation of this concept can be panly 
compensated for by emphasizing (as he docs) the outcomes of the ·application· (the role of philosophy) 
rather than of the ·explanation' (his mere concept of language) which is precisely why my ahistorical 
rcprcsenwlion is more properly given its present title. 
On the other hand. if I examined Wittgenstein' s views under the titles. respectively, ''Wittgenstein's 
concept of the philosophy as a clarifying activity" and "Wittgenstein's concept of the philosophy as a 
therapy" . then Searle ·s view would not be fitting the new pattern since it docs not offer an explicit notion 
of philosophy. but emphasizes the concept of language. However. in this second pattern. I would have 
missed tl1e emphasis on the very (episremologica/) relationship (which is after all substantial for my 
argument) between the two types of problems as well as between the proa:dw-es for their overcoming since 
I would have thus taken a metaphi/osophical point of\~ew from which the detailed explication of this 
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two conceptual frameworks offered by Wittgenstein can be considered as 
dissolving all the problems of philosophy, Searle and Rorty can be considered as 
offering two alternative approaches to the work that eventually remains for 
philosophers to do. Thus, Searle developed an ahistorical conceptualization of 
language in which he used the tenns of the non-philosophical fields of semantics 
and grammar, and thus he actually left the traditional field of philosophy and 
entered science; while, Rorty developed a historical concept in which he used the 
non-scientific terms of the metaphors and thus remained in philosophy but pleads 
for an end to philosophizing from ahistorical points ofview.33 These four 
philosophical notions are consistent in that they deny the existence of any concrete 
philosophical problems, as well as the possibility of philosophy as an ·expertise' to 
epistemologically attribute 'correctness' from one language use to another. They 
seem to dissolve any possible philosophical problems in tenns of certain concepts 
of the relationship between language and thinking, and they also can be interpreted 
as forming a compmitional philosophical c:oncepl which represents a synthesized 
variant of the philosophical methodology of dissol111io11, and which poses two 
alternative developments of the role of philosophy-scientistic and non-scientistic. 
Here, the terms ' scientistic' and ·non-scientistic' should be understood as such 
only conditionally, for, like the early Wittgenstein, the two ·alternatives' reject the 
scientistic model of philosophy as a mr:taphysfr:s; while, like the late Wittgenstein, 
relationship would ha\'e been disregarded as unimportant. By contrast, the scientific concepts take a 
metaphysical point from which they do not go on explicating the details of Ilic relation of the cogn.iti\'e 
problems to a more sophisticated ph.ilosophical understanding of cognition since. in a scientific 
framework. an e:rplanalion by means of philosophical justificalians and a prescription of epistenmlogtcal 
concepts seem 10 be sclf-sufficienL though it only conveys the illusion !bat the problems of mediation on 
the le\'el of culture as if ha\·c been solved. Th.is is why I take an interdisciplinary point which is no way 
pri\·ilegcd one but at least has the advantage lo g.i\'e a dct.i.ilcd account of the relalionship under 
investigalion, while denying any notion of self-sufficiency. In this sense. the change of emphasis from the 
concept of language 10 the not.ion of ph.ilosophy not only mirrors the inadequate representing a historical 
tendency in an ahistorical fonn but also makes my ahistorical argument somehow less self-sufficient 
" In my argument. Rorty's •qualification' as philosopher is as a mailer of a specialized 
companmcntalization rather than as a mailer ofan institutional departmentalization. while. Scarle·s is as 
a mailer of an institutional departmen!aliz.ation rather than as a mailer of a specialized 
comparuncntali;r.ation. 
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they still leave some 'work' for philosophy to do: in Searle's model, this is a 
· conditional' way of explanation, in Rorty ' s, this is a ·political' way of utilization 
of similar 'explanations' . It is precisely the awareness of this conditionality on 
which I ground the generalization that the role which these notions assign to 
philosophy is a therape11tic one which is to be distinguished from a metaphysical 
one.34 
The general co11c:/11sion that I draw from the examination of these 
philosophical notions is that philosophical problems can be explained as coming 
into br.ing as a result of inappropriate epistemological attributions of· correctness' 
from one language use to another, and that a 'good understanding' of how the 
mind produces 'beliefs' by coordinating language and thought can be applied in 
helping the mind overcome these problems. ln this way, the compositional 
philosophical concept is shown to project the main points of the composilional 
sciefllijic: c:oncepl: an ·epistemological concept ' and a 'permanent utilization' of 
that concept . Eventually, such a philosophical concept could be a,·q11ired and 
applied by the problem solvers in overcoming their cognitive problems on the level 
of everyday comm1111icatio11 since it is basically a philosophically more 
sophisticated variant of the epislemological concepts which educational scientists 
explain and prescribe as metacognition on the level of c11/t11re . 
It may be worthwhile to note that all philosophers discussed (though Searle 
less directly) find it necessary, as a part of the application of their concepts of 
language, to address a notion of the specific: role of philosophy - 'mediating', 
·clarifying·. ·therapeutic'. · conditionally explaining·, · politically exposing'. 
Reciprocally, all scientists discussed (though Lipman more directly) find it 
necessary, as a part of their prescriptions, to address a utilized role of philosophy 
30 Otte may object that this generalization applies with a different degree of validity to the four different 
philosophical concepts. Indeed. early Wingenstein·s and Seartc·s concepts. though thC)· reject 
metaphysical content of philosophy, still share its metaphysical form. Yet, I will not go on a funhcr 
discussion of the diffcrcnlialion between form and coment in philosophy, for what I draw attention in my 
argument to is rather the tendency of rejecting~· metaphysical entities in philosoph~· wb.ich (tendency) 
is reflected dilTerenlly in U1e different concepts in which it is actualized 
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in the form of metacugnition. One could easily imagine all tenns which signify 
philosophers' views of the role of philosophy, which essentially represent the 
philosophical methodology of disso/11tio11, as signifying the scientific prescription 
of metaCOK1Ii1io11 which essentiaiiy represents scientists' view of the roie of 
philosophy, too. 
97 
l,t1AJ' I t::K I Ntu:.t:. 
MET ACOGNITION IN TERMS OF A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF 
COGNITION 
What is your a.im in philosophy'I -
To shew Ilic Oy the way out of the fly-bonlc. 
Wingenstcin. Philosophical /nl'csligations 
Overview 
My goal is to show that individuals' c:ognitiw problems are based on 
philosophically unjustified beliefs about the work of intelligence and that they can 
be adequately treated as philosophical problems with the help of a pllifo.wphica/ 
concept of cognition. In the framework of my argument this means to show that 
scientific prescription of metacognition, as it consists of an expla11atio11 and 
application ofan epistemofo,&cal concept, can be substituted or supplied with the 
philosophical methodology of dissolution as applied to the traditional philosophical 
problems. In the /111rod11ctim1. I conceptuafi:ed the cognitive and traditional 
philosophical problems both as being 11pistemological in character insofar as they 
result from the transfer of knowledge by mediation of concepts and as being 
treated by mediation of procedures which are essentially the same insofar as the 
philosophical methodology of dissol11tio11 could be convincingly represented in 
terms of an explanation and application of a concept of cognition or 
epistemological co11cep1, too. At the same time, I justified the specific 
methodology of transfer of a 'philosophical prescription' for treating of problems 
which come up in the scope of science by means of an interpretation of Haberrnas' 
notion of philosophy in terms of which the cognitive problems were qualified as 
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problems of mediation that remain out of the scope of the specialized fields, but in 
the one of 'philosophy in the role of a mediating interpreter '. Subsequently, I 
proposed a scheme of the distribution of the problems of mediation in which they 
were specifiecl as pmhlems nf explanation and prescription of certain .lalO!!'ledg~ 
011 the level of expert rnlture, and as problems of individuals' acquisition and 
app/icatio11 of expert knowledge on tire level of everyday communication. 
In chapter one, I showed that scientists' use of philosophical justifications 
in the explanations and of epistemological co11cepr.s in the prescriptions for 
treating cognitive problems indicated a certain insufficiency of the scientific 
expertise to deal with these problems. Then, in chapter two. I showed that the 
philosophical methodology of tire dissolutio11 is appropriate for dealing with 
cognitive problems. insofar as, like the scientific prescription of metacognitio11. it 
was represented in terms of both an explanmion of the traditional plrilo.wplrirnl 
problems in tenns of certain concepts of cng11itio11 or philosophical co11cepts of 
language and an application of these concepts in dissolvi11g these problems as 
pseudo-problems. In my argument, this became a reason that the competence of 
philosophy is promoted on the level of culture in order to be, according to what I 
called the general principle for overcoming any possible problems of mediation, 
unproblematically exchanged through the level of everyday co111m111zicatio11. Thus. 
the philosophical problems were given status of problems of mediation on the 
former level. while the cognitive problems-of s11ch problems on the latter level 
which means that they are both eligible to be overcome by mediation of what can 
be conditionally called a 'philosophical prescription'. 
At chis point, it must have already become clear that insofar as scientists 
explain cognitive problems by means of philosophical justifications, they try to 
overcome problems of mediation on the level of culture; while insofar as they 
prescribe epistemological co11cepts to be acquired and applied, they address mch 
problems on the level of everyday co1111111micatio11 . Now. since my argument is 
intended to respond to the scientific insufficiency, in what follows, I will first 
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consider the possibility that the cognitive problems can be overcome by mediation 
of the philosophical methodoloKJ! of di.l".l'ol11tio11 which will be the way I will 
address the problems of mediation on the level of everyday c:umm1111ic:atio11. Then, 
i wiii discuss the reiationship and possible cooperation between science and 
philosophy in the broader context of my argument in which I will address the 
problems of mediation on the level of culture. 
Cognitive Problems and a Philosophical Understanding of Language 
In this subsection, I will try to provide a conceptual framework for a 
possible overcoming of individuals' negative cognitive dispositions by mediation 
ofa philosophical understanding of how the mind produces 'beliefs' through 
coordinating language and thought. More specifically, I will try to show how the 
scientific prescription of 111etm:og11itio11 can be exercised in terms of the 
philosophical me1hodolo;zy of tli.l'.ml111io11, namely, in the sequence of an 
expla11atio11 of a COJ:llitive Jiroblem in terms of a philo.\·ophical c_·,mcept of 
C( ':{11itio11 and an applicatio11 of this concept in di.\·.wlvi11K the epistemological 
pail/ls which entail this problem. 
As already pointed out. I consider that what scientific and philosophical 
concepts have in common is a 11otio11 of philosophy which they employ in one way 
or another in overcoming problems that are essentially the same, and that in 
everyday communication practices individuals also employ such notions in a way 
that amounts to their cognitive problems. Likewise, I argue that it is the 11otio11 of 
philosophy which is supposed to be exchanged by mediation of epi.1·1e1110/ogic.1/ 
co111.:epl.\' or co11cepts of cog11itio11 from the level of culture through the level of 
everyday communication, and that it is in this exchange where it takes the form of 
epi~·temological concept.\· which are explained, presc_·rihecl, ac_·quired, or applied. 
Thus, before I undertake an illustration of the overcoming of a cognith'e problem 
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in terms of the philosophical methodology of dis:10/11tio11, I will briefly consider the 
sense of the thi:rapeutic: 11otio11 of philosophy which is conceived of as underlying 
chapter two. I argue that it is the therapelllic: notion of philosophy which 
conditions the overcoming of the c:ugnitive and any other pruhlems of mediatio11, 
while it is the metaphysical one which conditions their persistence. 
A The Therapeutic Notion of Philosophy 
In chapter two, I synthesized an understanding of the 1herape11/ic: 11otio11 of 
philosophy which is based in the most part on Wittgenstein's late concept of 
language game.~. As he himself recommends ( 1953, p. vi), I approached his late 
philosophical views in relation to his early concept of the mrrecl use of l,111g,wge. 
In addition, I also included two more recent concepts of language which, I 
believe, further develop certain aspects of Wittgenstein's late view: Searle's 
concept of the speech acts, and Rorty ' s notion of the political ci11.11vi:r to 
philosophical questions. As already pointed out. l conceive of this philosophical 
understanding as involving the above mentioned philosophical notions (however 
different they are) in a way in which they are compatible. I regard Wittgenstein ' s 
concept of language games as a general concept for dealing with epistemological 
problems which further develop from his early notion of the correct use of 
language, while I regard Searle's and Rorty's concepts as specifying this 'dealing' 
in two alternative ways, respectively, in ahistc1ric:al and in historical terms. Since 
the philosophical notions involved in this compositional concept were examined as 
a matter of their being possible ' prescriptions ' (which consist ofan 'explanation' 
and ·application ' of certain concepts of cognition that are in this case concepts of 
language), all of them can be independently used for overcoming any 
epistemological problems. Yet, the specific philosophical sense which 1 am trying 
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to convey as important here is not that one can chose u11e of these concepts in 
order to have taken care of her or his metacognition. but that one gets some sense 
about the mu!t!p!icity cf ph:!cscph!ca! thought as opposed to the presence cf any 
notion of'correctness' in it. 
The employment of Wittgenstein's early and late concepts can be 
considered as relevant because in both cases he attempted in-depth examinations of 
the traditional philosophical problems (the proh/ems uf medial ion on the level of 
culture): in his early work, he explained a concept of the 'correct use of language', 
and then he applied this concept in order to di.\·.wlve the traditional epistemological 
problems as pseudo-problems stemming from a misunderstanding of the 'logic of 
language'; in his late period. he explained the so-called 'language games' concept, 
and then he applied this concept in dissolving any possible notion of ·correct use 
of language'. which seemingly became a newly promoted problem of philosophy. 
In his late view, the epistemological phenomenon-la11.1,'l1a,[,'e cannot be 
conceptualized in terms of its • correct use', but rather its •correctness' is to be 
sought in terms of its 'use'. In this case. the reference to his view as a 'concept of 
language games' is entirely conditional, for it leaves no room for such a 'game' as 
an out-of-use, or an ahistorical conceptualization oflanguage. For the late 
Wittgenstein, there can be no .\·i11Kle problem in philosophy, nor can there be a 
single conception of the correct use oflanguage, but only a treatment of differrml 
problems in terms of different language uses. Philosophy is no longer a certain 
' activity' which results in the 'clarification of thoughts', for it does not even have a 
'correct method' to follow. Rather, philosophy is a 1herapy which is directed 
toward undoing of any residues of metaphysical si11gle11e.,:\· which come into being 
in the multiplicity of language uses (133). Here. 'therapy' is conceived ofas a 
particular therapy which is directed to any particular problem as the physician's 
therapy is directed to any particular patient. 
I interpret Searle's concept of speech acts as consistent with Wittgenstein's 
late concept insofar as Searle attempts to propositionally set down the explanatory 
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'conditions' and 'rules' which. so to speak. 'constitute' a panicular language use 
as self-sufficient and correct in itself Although Searle's 'explanation' is basically 
an ahistorical erpla11atio11 nf wh;it he c.;ill~ the 'b;i~i., 11ni1 of lin~11is1ir. 
communication', he conceives ofit as a 'conditional explanation' whose 
applica1io11 as an ' epistemological concept' does not necessarily exhaust the 
variety of ordinary language uses of a cenain type of speech act. To avoid the 
epistemological fallibilism of his ahistorical conceptualization, Searle used the 
terms of semantics and grammar and thus, practically left the field of philosophy. 
Having no more philosophical problems to dissolve, he developed a concept whose 
value can be considered practical rather than epistemological: he conceives ofit as 
enabling a good understanding of a particular language use without attributing 
'correctness' to any other such uses. 
On the other hand, Rorty's concept reflects the therapeutic sense of 
Wittgenstein's late view in hisloric:al terms which are conceived ofas an 
alternative to the ahistorical ones insofar as the latter potentially convey 
epistemologically fallible uses of language. Like late Wittgenstein. Rorty explains 
the epistemological uses of language as resulting from inappropriate attributions of 
correctness from one language use to another. However, Rorty finds it necessary 
to actualize such a dimension of language which is not only ahistorically 
conditional upon its particular uses but is also contingent upon its 'historical 
exchange of metaphors' . In his view, those are the 'newly introduced metaphors' 
which. as 'voices from outside logical space' . could possibly undermine the 
ahistorical points being produced by the 'logic oflanguage' ; while, it is the 
'metaphorical change of language' rather than its ahistorical change which 
becomes a sign for a · historical change in life ·. Applying his concept of language. 
Rorty elaborates a specitic notion of the ·political role of philosophy' which aims 
at ·exposing' and thus at helping overcome the problems to be solved; for. the 
latter are ultimately 'historical problems' which need to be solved 'historically' and 
in accordance with 'historical standards' rather than ahistorically and in accordance 
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with 'ahistorical standards'. ln this way, Rorty extended Wittgenstein's contextual 
specification of the 'correctness' of the use of language to what can be called its 
,1 · - • - . • . • t - . •r .' l I• 1 I • , I I" , • • I I I"' r, 1 1 
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ahistorical specification. 
In light of this rnmpositiwwl philo.mphiml 1111ders1,111Ji11g, which is 
intended to offer a complex, synthesized reflection of the way thephilo.wphical 
methodology of dis,\'{)l11tiu11 exercises the therape11tic.: notion of philo.wphy, any 
problem which can be represented as an epi.,·tenwlogical prohlc!m (such as a 
cognitive or traditional p.'1i/osophic:a/ one) also must be eligible to be dissolved as 
a variant of'pseudo-problem'. Accordingly, I will try to illustrate the overcoming 
of the cognitive pmhlem.1· by mediation of this philosophic.:al 1111c.ier.,·1a11Ji11g of 
cog11itio11. ln a narrow sense, it will take the form of a philosophical c.:oncept of 
/a11g11age that treats these problems as epi.1·tenwlogical ,u,e.1·, while in a broader 
sense, it will take the form of a notion uf philosophy that treats them as problems 
of meJialim, on the level of everyday c.:om1111111icC11io11 . If I accomplish this task 
convincingly, I will have conveyed the argument that such a philosophical c:onc:ept 
of cognition possibly could be pr<.!sc:ribed and ac,111irecl in order to be 
metacognitivdy lllili=ecl in overcoming these types of problems. 
B. Cognitive Problems as Epistemological Problems 
Now, since the philosophical methodology of dism/11tio11 was construed in 
the form of the scientific concept of metacognition, what follows is an illustration 
of both an explanation of a cognitiv<.! pmhlem in terms of the philosophical 
concepl of cog11i1io11 and an applica1io11 of this concept in clissolvi11~ the 
epislemologi,:c,/ poinls which entail this problem. However, I will be able to 
illustrate the 'overcoming of the cognitive problems' in terms of this notion at best 
within the level of culture and thus its eventual use on the level of everyday 
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communication will at this point remain simply hypothesis. Yet, though this 
indicates the limitations of my argument, it should be more properly understood as 
an indication, 011 um; itaru.i , uf iht: int:viiabie pt:rsisteni;e of somt: prohlems uf 
mediation in the exchange of expc:rlise. and on other hand. of the indi.1pensabili1y 
of an appropriate philosophical background for the overcoming of these 
problems. 
a) An 'Explanation' of a 'Co).f1titive l'rohlem · in lem1.1· of a 'l'hilo.\'Ophica/ 
Co11c:ept of La11g11age ' 
The cognitive problem 'low self-esteem' can be explained as based on a 
certain 'belief in the degree of one's ability or inability to do something. 
According to Covington. such a 'belief has come into being in a learning 
environment in which the situations of"success and failure become psychologically 
remote from one another" and thus form a basis for an "exaggerated importance" 
of their "semantic distinction" (p. 391 ). In the alternative view, this 'belief has 
come into being by way of accumulation of certain epistemological points in the 
form ofa philosophically na'iVe argument which inappropriately attributes 
'correctness' from one problematic situation to another, or from one language use 
to another. 
To put it in another way, when one conceives ofa certain ·set of beliefs' , 
as a ·sufficient ' . 'ahistorical', or in a sense 'ideal knowledge'. he or she may 
neglect its epistemological fallibilism with respect to its practical uses. 
Consequently, he or she can continuously reproduce and persistently adhere to 
certain 'beliefs ' which may seem 'reasonable', 'logical'. or 'clear', but which are 
backed up with irrelevant arguments or inappropriate reasons which can only 
amount to philosophical pseudo-problems that in turn entail cognitive problems. 
For, the 'relevance' of the argumentation is to be ultimately determined by the 
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particularity of any problematic situation. and so. is not to be epistemologically 
subordinated lo any pre-established uses of language . 
This is why a necessary part of such an argumentation is an 'awareness' of 
ihe epi:.-iemuiogic:ai faiiibiiism of any ' set of beiiefs · which is being reproduced by 
mediation oflanguage. Only could such an 'awareness' enable a problem solver to 
overcome this fallibilism that is supplied with a 'good or appropriate philosophical 
understanding ' (I cannot find a better term) of the possible epistemological 
relations which his or her knowledge capacity may amount to. The ahistorical 
application of ·our sets of beliefs' needs to be 'well-understood', when it 'goes 
beyond' or epistemologically transcends any particular problematic situation or 
language use. Any panicular language use could be 'well-understood' in terms of 
the specific conditions under which it has been performed. while the understanding 
of the epistemological 'insufficiency' of any conditionally explained language use 
could be also extended to an understanding of its ' historical contingency' . 
b) All 'Applic:atio11' uf the '/'hilo.wphicul ( 'om:epl of Lall}f/1'1};1!' in <Jvercoming 
Cognitive Problems 
'One' s belief in his or her own inability ' can be dissolved by mediation of 
an understanding that one cannot philosophically justify as 'necessary' any 
epistemological relation of one langua!!e use to another, respectively, of one's 
'real results' to one's 'real abilities', or of any current results to eventual future 
performances. Even if a 'philosophical justification ' of the 'reasonableness' of 
such a relation has been somehow made, it could not be verified until one 'fails 
again ' and, as such, it would have been paradoxically an ·unjustified justification' . 
For, one can make 'valid' episremologiml allrih111io11s no further than the context 
of their origin, no further than any particular language use, i.e, 011e c:an1101 muke 
valid episti;m()/ugicul c,1trih11ti()fl.l'. 
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What this means is that ifa problem solver propositionally sets down the 
conditions under which this 'belief has come into being in his or her mind in order 
to extract the ' ruies ' which ' vaiidiy ' or ·sufficientiy' constitute its ' truthfuiness', he 
or she also must be aware, first, that knowing a set of rules and conditions does 
not necessarily authorize imposing truth-values to contexts other thar, the one of 
origin of this particular belief, and second. that insofar as knowing the conditions 
and rules under which certain 'beliefs' have come into the being is worthwhile, its 
value must be properly understood as a practical rather than as an epistemological 
one. This is the sense in which Searle points out that setting down the conditions 
of an illocutionary act cannot exhaust the variety of ordinary language uses of a 
certain speech act, but rather provides information about the "centre of the 
concept" of that speech act (p . 66). That is, one cannot immediately relate certain 
'good explanations' to certain 'good applications'; rather, one needs to 
'understand well' these explanations in order to apply them 'well ' . This is why 
any 'good understanding' of the conditions which 'entail' one's ' low selt: 
esteem'(as an epistemological belief in the degree of one's abilities) involves also 
the 'conditionality' of this understanding upon any particular, say, ' act of 
prediction' or 'act of reference' . In other words, a necessary part of this 
understanding is an awareness that the semantical and svntactical rules for 
constituting 'beliefs' (to which one can turn when analyzing the conditions) are 1101 
epistemological niles for transcending beliefs in language. 
Rather, a problem solver needs to 'understand well ' his or her current ·set 
of beliefs' as ahistorical points which are based on particular ac:t.1· of knowledge 
acq11il"itio11 that are in an epi.1·temolo~ically fallible relation to any act of this 
k11owledge'sapplicatio11. In this way, she or he would also understand the 'set of 
beliefs' which 'entails' her or his 'low self-esteem' as a set of epistemologically 
fallible beliefs. The function of the 'philosophical understanding ' is to cum1a111/y 
remind one about this fallibilism and thus to keep one capable of 'appropriately 
mediating' or 'reweaving the fabric of one's beliefs ' in any new problematic 
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situation . This is an understanding of how this 'reweaving' or 'mediating' is 
possible by mediation of the epistemological phenomenon lall};ltaKe. In terms of 
Rorty' s cunccpi. urn:'s bc::iicf l:Oau . .:c111i11g i1c:1 u1 his aUilitic:; wuu :J fC:ii"1dir1 ur. th~ 
level of simple 'perception' and 'inference ' that could exhaust the ' logical space ' 
without 'changing language or life' which, in this specific sense, is the condition 
for overcoming the ahistorical points that the ' logic oflanguage' creates. For 
Rorty, such a permanent 'change' can be provided by 'new metaphors' which are 
conceived of as changing language from ' outside the logical space ' , and which 
need to become in turn ' dead metaphors'. not 'logically ' (i .e., ahistorically), but 
'historically' . What this means is that one cannot ' dissolve' the ahistorical ' set of 
beliefs' which entails his or her cognitive problems byj11.1·t redefin ing them in 
' historical' terms, for such a 'redefining' would produce another ahistorical 'set of 
beliefs '. Rather, one would 'expose' one' s beliefs not only as being contingent 
upon a certain use of language, but also as being contingent upon the historical 
exchange of metaphors in language. In this way, one would dissolve the ·set of 
beliefs' which entails his or her cognitive problems by 'historically' helping them 
become ' dead metaphors'. In the conte;,i;t ofmy argument , this means that the 
cognitive problems cannot be ' solved ahistorically', since they need to be 'solved 
historically', or (in more commonsensical terms) practically. 
There is a sense in which the 'conditionality ' of Searle's concept can be 
interpreted as conforming to the ' historical contingency' of Rorty 's concept . On 
one hand, one cannot infallibly contend ahistorical, or epistemological beliefs. 
insofar as the meanings of the terms she or he current ly employs in the language 
use of establishing those ' beliefs' as epistemological phenomena ( or some sort of 
'absolute truths') are just conditional upon this language use, and are thus in 
epistemologically fallible relation to any other language use. In this way, the 
fallibilism appears to be a phenomenon of the 111ili::atio11 of ahislurical, or 
epistemological ideals. On the other hand, for overi·o111i11g this fallibilism, Rorty 
recommends, or prescribes the applirnlio11 of his/Orirnl idrnls which would finally 
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mark the 'historical' rather than ' logical death' of the cognitive problems. Thus, 
the dissolving of individuals' cognitive problems is not a verbal, or a speculative 
solving, but the very solving of those problems. In this sense, Rony's 'historical 
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concept of teaching-learning practice according to which learning is ultimately a 
learning by experience, i.e., learning which is least mediated by the systematic 
function of language. 
c) A Discussicm of IJeli11ealio11 o/ ihl! Concept of 'Me1acog11ilio11' 
in terms o/ lhe 'Philo.1·ophh'al Methodology uf dissolution' 
It may seem that something is missing in this problem solving process as 
interpreted in terms ofWiugenstein ' s, Searle's and Rony's concepts, something 
that is supposed to mediate between the knowledge of the problem solver and the 
overcoming of the cognitive problem. I tried to refer to it as explanation and 
application of certain concepts of cognition, but it does not seem that any further 
terminological chains, which could be attached lo these terms eventually to make 
them clearer or more comprehensive, would compensate for what is missing. In 
my view, if there is no such thing, the explanatory chains are also unnecessary; 
they would only complicate and thus hinder the problem solving process as in 
Lochhead's example with juggling. Rather, I consider that individuals' cognitive 
problems are in their essence based on such explanatory chains whose therapeutic 
undoing will result in overcoming these problems. 
If l have succeeded in relating a philosophical understanding of cognition 
to the overcoming of individuals' cognitive problems on the level of c11lt11re. 
individuals could also relate such an understanding to their metacognition on the 
level of everyday ,·omm1111i,·atio11. In this sense, such a 'good philosophical 
understanding' could be prescribed and acq11ir,:J in order to be applied in 
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overcoming any cognitive problems which, after the dissolut ion of the 
epistemological points which entail them, appear to be just pseudo-problems. 
Indeed. a certain aspect ofmy argument may improperly suggest that inrlivichmls ' 
philosophical 1111dersta11di11g would be in anyway a 'less expert ' , or more precisely 
'less competent' understanding insofar as it may not involve such a complicated 
exercise of concepts in dealing with all the problems of mediation which persist 
between explanation and prescription, prescription and acquisition, acquisition and 
application of a concept of cognition. But, what is more important than this mere 
dogmatic point is that individuals would be capable of what can be called 'more 
expert' applicalio11 of such an understanding, insofar as they are in a better 
position to overcome the cognitive problems they personally face, i.e., insofar as 
the epistemological fallibilism of such an understanding disappears in the 'historical 
solution' (or therapeutic dissolution) of these problems. In the next subsection. I 
will discuss this dogmatic aspect ofmy argument in the broader context of 
understanding in which the cognitive problems were qualified as pmhlems of 
mediation on the level of e11e1}•day i·om1111111ic:a1ir,11. 
C. Cognitive Problems as Problems of Mediation 
In the preceding subsection, the cognitive prohlems were dissolved as 
epistemological problems in the narrow context of my argument. In this 
subsection, I will discuss them in a broader context which concerns the relationship 
and possible cooperation between science and philosophy. In my argument. this 
latter context reflected the overcoming of the cognitive problems by mediation of 
the philosophical compete11t·e in terms of two major difficulties. What l called the 
major co11cept11al difficulty resulted from the need for justification of the use of 
philosophical methods for treating problems which come up in the scope of science 
and was initially resolved through the qualification of the cognitive problems as 
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problems of mediation on the level of everyday comm1111ication. At the same time. 
the resolution of the 'major conceptual difficulty ' resulted in what was termed the 
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promotion of the philosophy on the level of c:ulture to treat the problems of 
mediation in everyday comm11nicatio11 actually afiirmed the conditions for their 
persistence. In my view, the proper understanding of these two diffic11/ties is that 
they are themselves problems of mediation which I faced on the level of culture 
while investigating the possibility for overcoming the c:ognitive problems by 
mediation of an exchange of a philosophia1/ c:ompetenc:e. They are implied, 
respectively, by the illlerdi.1-c:iplinwy cham,:ler of my argument whose adequate 
accomplishment needed an appropriate , ·ommrm termi11ol0Jzy and by the limited 
standpoilll of the level of culture from which I attempt to represent but am in the 
position at best to explain the possible exchange of this competence through the 
level of everyday communication. Thus, in this broader context of understanding, 
my discussion on the overcoming of c:ognitiw problems as prohlem.1· of mediation 
011 the level of everyday c:omn11111ic:ation necessarily becomes an illustration of the 
overcoming of these two difficultie.1· as pmhlems of mediation 011 the le vel r!f 
c:11/t11re . 
On the other hand, since I already illustrated the overcoming of c:og11iti1•e problems 
by mediation of the philo.rnphical metlwdoluKJ of dis.ml11tirm in a narrow sense, my 
argument must have somehow displayed the 'two difiiculties ', so to speak, 'in practice' . 
This is why, in this broader context of understanding, the discussion on the overcoming of 
the c:ognitive problem.~ as problems of mediation 011 the level of e11eryday c:omm1111icatio11 
must also shed light on how they have re11ected on the perception of my argument as it 
was already accomplished in its narrow context. 
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a) A Disc.11ssion of the Reflection and Overcoming of 1he 'Major Co11'·eptual Difficulty' 
i11 my A rg11me11r 5 
This 'difficulty' stems from the i11lerdiscip/i11ary character of my argument 
and is itself a problem of mediation which, as coming up in the broader context of 
understanding, must be dissolved in terms of an appropriate 1111Jerslandi11g of 1he 
rela1io11ship and possible cooperalio11 between science and philosophy. This is 
why its dissolution must essentially illustrate, on one hand, how the scientific 
framework conditions its persistence and displays it. and. on the other hand, how 
the philosophical framework conditions its disappearance and undoes it. In other 
words, this discussion must show how the co111111m1 1enninolozy of my argument 
mediates between the scientific and philo.mphic.:al termi110/ogie.\· of representation 
of the two types of problems in order to relate the phi/o.wphica/ compe1e11ce for 
treating the cognitive problems in this broader context of understanding. 
ln this context, the ,·omnum lerminoloKY initially represented the 
cognitive problems as ' problems-of-exchange-of-expertise-in-modernity' which as 
such remain out of the scope of science but in the scope of philosophy . As already 
pointed out, the terms of representation of the exchange of expel'lise, namely, 
experts' expla11atio11 and prl!scriplion of certain concepts on the level culture and 
of individuals' acq11isilio11 and applica1io11 of these concepts on the level of 
everyday communication are only conditional ones and stand for its perma11,m1 
111ili:atio11 on the different stages of its exchange. In this sense, l also noted that 
these terms can be interpreted as interchangeable and that their distinction serves 
35 Ah hough the nm major di.f]icu/tie,· were recognized as problems ofmeclialion. in my discussion. I will 
not use the tenns ·explanation' and ·applicati(ln' as signifying the conditional stages of their dissolution . 
T11is is because in this broader context they will be at the same time put in the perspective of my 
investigation which may thus become very difficult to follow. Howc\'er. the reader will be able to 
recognize them in (lhe stages ol) my approach to these panicular ·problems of mediation' which 
themselYCS will be dissolved in 1cn11s of the broader sense of my argument (a.s it is itself a ·concept of 
cognition ' ). The discussion on the ' difficulties ' must also clarify why this ' inconsistency' in my argument 
is unimportant by way of showing how 1cn11s s11cl1 as ·explanation '. ·application ' . ·metacognition '. 
' science· , 'philosophy ·. ·metaphysics', and 'therapy' arc interrelated. 
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explanatory purposes 011/y. Now, I argue that this lack of a constant ' conceptual 
content' in my wmnum termi110/ogy reflects differently in scientific and 
disappearance of what was called the major w11cep111al Jiffic11/1y of my argument . 
In a .w:ientific:framewurk, it must have 111ade ditlicult, so to speak, 'keeping 
the same meanings of the same terms', and thus the establishing of comprehensive, 
or ' logically clear', connections between the termi11ulugies of representation of 
both the cognitive and traditional philosophical problems. In this way, it must have 
also made difficult the following of the very illustration or e:rplc111atio11 of the 
adequacy ofa 'philosophical prescription' for the treatment of the cognitive 
problems . For, if the different terminologies of representation of the 'two types of 
problems', at least seemingly, stand for their customary, or constant 'conceptual 
contents', they 'necessarily' make these problems different and eventually their 
representation in the common terminology somehow ' inadequate '. 
By contrast. in a philosuphic:al framework. these w111111011 terms are only 
'forms' of possible ·conceptual contents' which could be different in different 
conceptual frameworks . Thus. a philosophically competent problem solver ca111w1 
say that the wgnilil'e prohlem.,·, which were initially represented as based on ' sets 
of beliefs' that individuals spontaneously form by combining certain 
epistemological points in their views of intelligence, are ' better represented' as 
epistemolvgical prohlems which result from inappropriate attributions of 
'correctness' from one 'language use' to another or from one problematic situation 
to another. Obviously, such a representation would have been as philosophically 
inadequate as the one that would say that individuals have not known that they 
have been using language to get into their cognitive confusions and that what they 
need now is just to learn to use it ·correctly' . (This would contradict the 
1herape11tic notion of philo.mphy which I am trying to convey by mediation of the 
compositional philosophical understanding oflanguage, and which dissolves as 
philosophically unjustified or as metaphysic.:al any form of attributing 'correctness' 
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from one language use to another) .36 Rather, if the representation of the cognitive 
problems in the philosophical tenninology has been somehow · at odds', it must 
have been properly understood as indicating some unavoidable pmhlems of 
mediation which have come into being as a result of transferring of concepts 
( ' competence') from one problematic situation to another. from one field of 
knowledge to another. From a philosophical point of view, it is the wmmu11 
epislemolugii:al ,·harui:ler of these problems rather than their 'authentic' 
terminology of representation which is at stake in the investigation, and it is 
precisely the lack of a philosophical compelence which leaves this character 
unnoticed and makes them seemingly ciifferelll prohlem.1· on the different stages of 
the exchange of expertise. 
Accordingly, the major c:011c:ep111al cliffirnl1y of my argument can be 
explained, on one hand, as appearing insofar as the problems of meciia1iu11 and the 
pruceci11re.~for their 1re£11111e11t are represented as being (to use Searle's 
terminology) co11ve111io11ally cliffere111 but i111e11/io11ally !he same. and on other 
hand, as disappearing insofar as they are represented as being essefllially the .1w11e. 
In my argument, it is an appropriate phifo.mphiail 1111Jer.1'/w1Ji11g which in a 
broader sense. as an understanding of the relationship and possible cooperat ion 
between science and philosophy, would uncover them as pmhlems ri meJia1io11 
that remain in the scope of philosophy, and which in a narrow sense, as an 
understanding of how the mind produces beliefs by coordinating language and 
thought, would uncover them as epislenwlogic:a/ pmhlcms and dissolve them as 
pseudo-problems. 
'
6 One may object: ··sut if Wiugcnstein 's concept of 1hc ·correct use of lauguagc ' takes a pan in the 
compositional philosophical understauding that is supposed 10 convey the therapeutic notion of 
philosophy. how can it be therapeutic and 111ctaphysicnl at the same time'/" . This question is a good 
ex.1mplc of how an a historical approach to the use of l.tnguagc creates epistemological problems. In my 
argument. the 'therapeutic sense· ofWillgcnsteiu 's early view is. on one hand. contextua/(v (i.e .. as a 
mailer of a panicnlar language use) defiucd. and on other hand. it is historical~v defiued (i.e., as a matler 
of its historic.11 signilic.1nce) . Similarly. the qualification of Searle's ,·icw a.~ ' therapeutic' is exclusively 
coniextual and historic.11 : for. from an ahislorical point of \'icw. ii qualifies quite well as au example of 
what Habcnnas calls a ·mm to metaphysics' iu con1c111porni:· philosoph~·. 
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b) A Discussion of lhl! Rejlec/ion and Overcoming of the 'Major Me1hodological 
Dijftcully' in my Arg11me111 
can, according to the general principll! for overcoming of problems of mediation, 
be unproblematically exchanged through the level of everyday comm1111ica1io11, 
given that the promotion of philosophy on the level of cullure actually affirms the 
conditions for persistence of these problems which in this broader context can be 
seen in the existence of these two ll!wls themselws. In other words, not only 
must this discussion uncover how paradoxical the role of philosophy in the 
exchange of expertise is. but also how indispensable its competence is in 
modernity. 
As already shown, the 'major methodological difficulty' stems from the 
limiled slandpoilll of the level of culture and is itself also a prohlem of mediation 
which, as corning up in the broader context ofrny argument. must be dissolved in 
terms of an understanding of the rdationship and po.1:1·ihle c:oupl!rulion between 
sciencl! and philosophy, too. However, since it results from the promotion of 
philosophy on the level of culture to treat the prohlems of mec.liatiu11 on evr:ryday 
comm11nicatio11, its dissolution must consider both the possihi/i1y and impo.1·.1·ihility 
of philosophy's becoming one of the expert cultures. In my argument, the former 
reflects a possibility of its becoming a metaphysic.1·, while the latter-· a possibility 
of its being a 1hr:rapy for these problems. Since I already pointed out that it is the 
metaphysical notion of philosophy which contributes to the persistence of 
problems of mediation and that it is the 1herape111ic: u11e which conditions their 
overcoming, what follows is an illustration of how the former creates the 
conditions for these problems and is not in a position to solve them, and how the 
latter undoes these conditions and dissolves these problems as pseudo-problems. 
In my argument, the ml!taphysic:al approa,·h can be illustrated with the 
scheme of the distribution of the problems of media/ion which relates the 
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expla11alio11 and applicalio11 of a concept of cognition to the levels of. 
respectively, expert culture and everyday curnn11111ica1io11. In this scheme, the 
'two levels' must be mediated by the philosophical 1111Jer.,·1w1cii11g of cognilicm 
which, as represented in the form of the scientific prescription of me1acug11ilio11, 
becomes a philusophirnl methoclology of ciisso/111io11 that essentially involves a 
sequence of its expla11alio11 and applicalion. From a metaphysical point of view, 
given the ' scheme of distribution', the 'general principle' for overcoming problems 
of mediation, and the 'limited standpoints' of the 'two levels', we can conclude 
that the experts are in a better position to illustrate an explana1io11 of the problems 
of mediation in terms of a philo.\'(}phi,:al L'OIIL'l!fll of cog11ilio11 on the level of 
cu/Jure, while they could illustrate an application of this concept as a matter of 
melacoJ;11ilic111 which dissolves the epistemological points of a ~·og11itive prohlem 
al most on a pre.1·11ppused level of ewryJay L·o1111111111icalion By the same token, 
individuals are in a better position to exemplify an a11plicatio11 of a philosophical 
concept for overcoming problems of mediation on the level of everyday 
co111m1111ica1im1, while they could exemplify an explww1iu11 of those problems as a 
matter of philo.mphical c,,mpt!le11ce in terms of this concept al mos/ on a 
preJ.11pposed level of expert c11/t11re . And since, in both cases the sequence of 
'explanation' and 'application' of a 'philosophical concept' as a ma lier of 
e.Y-chm,ge of ex1wrri.,·t! necessarily involves these two diffi'rt'III levels , while trying 
to transcend their /imitecl stw1dpcn111s, both experts and individuals embark on 
those points of deficit which potentially condition the emergence of prohlems of 
mediation, which no ·expertise' can account for. and which they try to compensate 
for by mediation of concepts of melc,cog11itiu11. Coincidentally, it is the 
philosophical compelen~·e in the form of me1acc1g11iliu11 which stands for what 
both experts and individuals cannot account for but have a need of in order to 
'bridge' the two 'levels' and ensure the exchange of expertise. Accordingly. the 
metaphy.\'ic:al approaL-h poses the philosophical compete11ce, melac:og11ilio11, as 
standing for both an expla11alio11 of a C<JIIL'epl of cog11iliu11 u11 a presupposed level 
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of expert mlture and application of this c:01u:ept 011 a premppo.,·ecl level of 
everyday c:omm1111ic.:atio11. 
Hereafter. from a metaphysical point of view. I must have illustrated the 
overcoming of a c.:og11itil't.! pruhlt.!m by mediation of a philosophica/ 1111der.vta11di11g ,if 
cog11ilio11 as a matter of m<!lamg11itim1 on both a pr1ts11pposed level of expert culture and 
a pre.mpposcd level of everyday communication at the same time. For the metaphysical 
standpoint pr<!.rnppo.1·<!s that the way in which certain problems are being overcome on an 
expert level is the way they should be overcome on a practical level. Indeed, if that were 
so, then what is necessary for the overcoming of these problems can be 'simply' identified 
in terms of the explanation, prescription, acquisition, and application of this 'way of 
overcoming' . But, this is precisely how the metaphysical differentiation of the 'two levels ' 
suggests that as if there is such an 'expertise' which is 'philosophical', and which only 
needs to be explained and prescribed in order to be acquired and ' correctly' applied in 
overcoming all problems of mediation. While, a reference to this ·eventual expertise· 
(such as the one made in chapter two of this paper) uncovers it as contradicting itself, 
insofar as it denies philosophy any possibility of associating itself with some sort of 
' expenise' . Accordingly, in my illustration of the overcoming of the pmhlems of 
mecliatio11 on the level of eve,yclay c:om1111111ic:atio11, I must have amrmed the existence of 
tne 'two levels'. which as a 111a11.:r <if f(l(:t condition the persistence of these problems. 
since I have thus posed their 11c:c.:.:s.w11y 1rn11.1·c.:c:11denc:e as being such only in a pos.,·ihi/ity 
which I ultimately deny. In other words, not only is the metaphysirnl "l'Proa,·h unable to 
effectively treat the pmhlems of mediation because it does not have an 'adequate 
expertise', but also, by promoting philosophy to status of <txpert rnlture, it actually creates 
the cu11di1iu11s for their persistence. 
On the other hand, the therapeutic approach uncovers and undoes the 
distinction between the two specified levels of the exchange of expertise. as well as 
between e:r:perts and i11divicl11als, as conditioning the persistence of the so-called 
problems of mediation. as being an entirely speculative one, and as being justified 
through an overemphasized interdependence between a 'good knowledge' and a 
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'right application'. In a therapeutic philosophical framework, there is a stipulation 
that the capability ofa problem solver to differentiate the 'two levels' within her or 
his own philosophical hackgru1111d puts her or him in a position not only to 
V',/Cicowc the cpi3tcmv:ogica: fnllibili5m vf hci or his kr.v"n·!cdgc ·n·:th ;c:;pc~t :c its 
permanent utilization, but also to amount somehow ·sufficiently' and 'unnoticedly' 
to philosophically unjustified beliefs which entail cognitiw problems. I contend 
that it is the metaphysical philo.mphical background against which this 
differentiation would have conditioned the persistence of problems of mediation, 
while it is the therapeutic philosophical hackgru1111d which would have 
conditioned the 'undoing' of this differentiation and so the overcoming of these 
problems. 
ln my view, one could say that by ·undoing the differentiation' between the 
two presupposed levels of exchange of expertise. a problem solver could take the 
position of an expert capable of both a 'more sophisticated understanding' of his or 
her cognitive abilities and of its representing in the form of an expla11atio11 and 
application of a philosophical concept rf cog11itio11 011 a pn:.,uppm·eci level of 
c11/t11re . At the same time. one could say that she or he could also take the 
position of an i11divid1ml capable of an effective 'permanent utilization' of this 
understanding in the form of an expla11atio11 w,J applirntio11 011 a presupposed 
level of everyday comm1111icatio11. One could also say that in the former case the 
problem solver would be attaining points of view similar to those examined in the 
philosophical concepts, while in the latter case, points of view similar to those 
which scientists associated with 'metacognitively more sophisticated individuals' . 
However, one would also need to realize that this would have been a merely 
speculative attempt for an illustration of the 'thernpeutic undoing of the two levels' 
which a 11otio11 of philosophy could condition . For, the therapeutic 11otio11 of 
philosophy itself excludes such an explanation but only suggests that both 
philosophers and individuals somehow have the same type uf cor,1petem:e which 
only has been exercised in different terminologies perhaps because it has been 
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needed under different conditions, i.e., in different problematic situations. Further, 
this notion suggests that because this 'competence' has been acquired in different 
problematic situations, it ca111101 be immediately, i.e., 1111problematica//y 
exchanged between them. Instead, it ca11 be 1111probematica/ly exchanged 011/y by 
mediation ofitsperma11e111111i/iza1io11 which in this sense is opposed to and so 
undoes the dogmatic stages of explanation, prescription, acquisition, and 
application which in a metaphysical sense stand for different problematic situations. 
This is why the therapeutic undoing of the differe111ialio11 between the 
'two levels ' is to come through the understanding that philosophers are 1101 
experts in any sense and that the ·expertise' to be utilized in the case of 
overcoming the cognitive problems is al most a philo.mphirnl competence where 
'competence ' is not the ·very term' for substituting ' expertise ' . but is only the term 
which, while conceived of as being in its opposition, is to signify its ·undoing' in 
the ~pecific coll/ext of my arJ,'11me111. However. in this context, thls is 1101 to say 
that because we do not have a ·sutlicient expertise' for treating the cognitive 
problems, they are always very hard to overcome: rather, this is to say that because 
of their epfa·t.:mu/ogical characta, we can overcome these problems only by 
mediation of an "P/Jf0f)ri'11e philosophical co111pete11~·e . 
Thus, what I called major m.:thodo/ogica/ diffic11/1y can be explained as 
appearing insofar as the therafll!lltic and m.:1aphy.~irnl 11otio11s of philosophy are 
conceived ofas co11ve11tio11al/y the .l'ame but illle11tio11a/ly different, and as 
disappearing insofar as they are shown to be es.wntia/ly different. Now, though 
the de/i11eatio11 of the concept of metm:og11itio11 in terms of a f1hi/o.l"ophical 
1111dersta11di11g of IC111J.'1Wge was intended to promote the therapeutic methodology 
of the disso/11tio11 for dealing with cognitive problems, its 'better understanding' on 
a 'presupposed level of expert culture' must pose its representation here as still 
being a 'metaphysical delineation' as far as the distinction between the two levels 
of modernity is taken for granted. Thus, only can the therapeutic undoing of this 
disti11clio11 (in the specific sense which I tried to convey in this paper) condition 
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the overcoming of the problems of metiialio11, not 'better explanations', nor 'better 
abilities'; only can a/I 'individuals' be 'experts', not 'chosen individuals', nor 
'more capable individuals' . Virtually, all the problems of the ·exchange of 
expertise' (not only the philosophical ones) would have disappeared after the 
therapeutic undoing' of this distinction, but indeed this is only a possibility. 
A General Discussion of the Relationship and Possible Cooperation between 
Science and Philosophy 
ln the previous section, I examined the prohlems of mediation on the level 
of everyday comm1111icatio11 in the narrow and broader contexts of their 
dissolution . In this section, I will discuss the prohlem.1· of metiia1io11 on the level of 
c11/111re but 011/y in the broader context of my argument. for in a narrow sense, they 
have been already examined in chapter two . As in the case of the problems of 
mediation on everyday communication, in this broader context. I will put these 
problems and the procedures for their overcoming in such a perspective that not 
only ensures their appropriate 'philosophical understanding' but also 
therapeutically undoes them. More specifically, I will discuss them in a 
metaphilosophical perspective which actualizes the question of the relationship and 
possible cooperation between science and philosophy with respect to the issues 
that appear in the scopes of both of them. 
a) The Notions of Tr111h, Ratio11a/i1y, ,mti La11~7wge 
Traditionally, science and philosophy have been considered different forms 
of knowledge. But, because philosophy, in its long tradition, has denied the 
exclusive rights of any possible subject-matter, method, or goal in the scope of its 
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occupations, the characterization of the two fields can point out positively what 
science is, but only negatively what philosophy ' is not ' And yet, what science is 
could be a basis for considering what philosophy 'is not ' insofar as the view that 
the two fields are clearly distinguishable already presupposes a certain kind of 
relationship as a basis for their differentiation. 
According to Richard Paul, the scientific fields realize "the possibility of 
specialization and joint work within a highly defined shared frame of reference". 
while philosophy remains "an individualistic venture wherein participants agree 
only in the broadest sense on the range and the nature of issues they will consider" 
(p. 436) . More specifically, the characteristic features of science involve a strong 
demand for empirical justification and a widespread use of experimental methods, 
while philosophy does not necessarily justify its products empirically and not only 
does not use experimental methods, but even rejects the possibility of its own 
method . A further analysis of the sciences ' ·common frame of reference' shows 
that the commo11 poi/II on which they all convene is a 11otio11 cif truth which is 
classical for the Western philosophical tradition and which as such could eventually 
become a basis for consideration of the question of the relationship and possible 
cooperation between science and philosophy with respect to the issues that appear 
in the scopes of both of them. As Searle points out. the 'notion of truth ' is at 
present taken for granted by scientists and is justified through the principle of 
correspondence with reality: 
In the simplest conception of science, the aim of the science is to get a set 
of true sentences, ideally in the form of precise theories, that are true because 
they correspond, at least approximately. to an independently existing reality. 
(1995, p. 29) 
At the same time, contemporary philosophy adopts the 'notion of truth' in 
terms of the 11utio11 of ralio11ali1y which, according to him. integrates two essential 
points for science: 
. . . the presupposition ofan independently existing reality, and the 
presupposition that language, at least on occasion, conforms to that reality. 
(1995, p. 30) 
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Likewise. Habermas contends that "examples of a successful cooperative 
integration of philosophy and science can be seen in the development of a theory of 
rationality" ( 1990, p. 16). Nevertheless. the two tields appear to adopt this 
common point with different degrees of reluctance. In modern sciences the 
exercise of the 11uliu11 of truth. as justified through the · principle of 
correspondence', has become 'sufficient ' for their self-justification and self-
assertion. By contrast. in modern philosophy. this notion. as resolved in the 
'concept of rationality', has become a point of an inexhaustivc controversy. One 
reflection of this differentiation of human reason can be found in the ac/11ali:a1io11 
of the rwliom of lmlh and ralio11C1/i1y in terms of the issue of the lw1i:11age of 
modernity. According to Habermas. this very characteristic trend in the discourse 
of modernity. on the one hand. places the "notion of truth" in the "linguistic 
medium of reason", and on the other, redefines the differentiation between science 
and philosophy on the basis of the way in which they use this "common medium" 
(1992, pp. 134-5). Thus, the 'linguistic medium' ensures the compatibility 
between science and philosophy through a necessary employment of human 
'reason' in their self-identification and self-justification. but a necessary 
conditionality persists in the way in which either of them employs. so to speak, the 
'same reason': 
... nothing would stand in the way of the concept of 011e reason today if 
philosophy and science were able to reach through the thicket of natural 
languages to the logical grammar of a single language that describes the 
world, or could at least come close to this ideal in a promising way. In 
contrast, if even the reflexive activity of mind always remained caught in the 
grammatical limits of various panicular worlds that were linguistically 
constituted, reason would necessarily disintegrate kaleidoscopically into a 
multiplicity of incommensurable embodiments (Habermas 1992, pp. 134-5) 
This conditionality ensures the independence of science and philosophy which 
appears to be the condition that prevents either of them from appropriating the 
characteristic features of the other. For, such an appropriation would resemble what, in 
the philosophical tradition, has been known as 'metaphysics'. This conditionality also 
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implies, on one hand, that although scientific and philosophical inquiries overlap in certain 
points, they should not necessarily coincide, and on the other hand, that the very notion of 
their 'distinction' is not supplied with a 'certain border' which would, so to speak, 
'legitimize' this distinction. For Habermas, even ifa relatively clear and widely accepted 
border between the two fields would impose characteristically different and thus fairly 
distinguishable mental practices and procedures, there still would be some remaining 
problems which concern these fields ' rights to employ the 'linguistic medium of reason' in 
the ways they do for accomplishing their goals. As already pointed out, he calls them 
problem!>· of mediation and assigns them to philosophy in the role of mediating illlerpreter 
(1990, pp. 17-19; 1992, p. 39). It seems that sciences face those problems only when 
their accounts turn out to be 'insutlicient ' for dealing with the issues they examine. That 
is. in the cases where the experimental methods cannot provide adequate solutions, 
scientists search for reliable interpretations and thus enter the field of philosophy. In my 
argument, such a scientific 'insufficiency ' became a reason for employing a few exemplary 
notions from contemporary philosophy in the conditional role of ' expertise· for the 
overcoming of those classes of prohlems of mediation which I subsumed under c:o,;11itive 
prohlems. 
On the other hand, the view that philosophy can play such a compensatory 
role is no less problematic and could enc.:ounter late Wittgenslein 's requirement for 
a fairly exhaustive account of references in which the term 'philosophy' has been 
exercised throughout its history. To respond to such a requirement, Habermas 
examines the history of philosophical ideas as a transition from metaphysical to 
postmetaphysical thinking ( 1992, pp . 28-5 I) . In his view, this transition has been 
guided by a constantly "self-situating reason" which in the wake of metaphysics 
finds its current loci in the intersubjective linguistic practices aiming at 
participants' mutual understanding. The reason which situates itself in the 
intersubjective linguistic practices rediscovers its "medium of communication," the 
language, as opening "the horizons of the specific worlds in which socialized 
individuals" dwell ( 1992, p. 4J ). Thus, individuals "always find themselves already 
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in a linguistically structured and disclosed world; live off grammatically projected 
interconnections of meaning", while, "the linguistically disclosed and structured 
lifeworld finds its footing only in the practices of reaching understanding within a 
linguistic community"( 1992, p. 43 ). But, while metaphysical philosophical 
thinking regards language as a relativdy "glassy medium without properties" 
( 1992, p. 161) which has no significant intluence on a reason situating itself, the 
postmetaphysical thinking encounters and problematizes language as world-
disclosing and meaning-creating medium of communication. 
Likewise. contemporary science regards language as the most important 
human cognitive achievement (M. W. Matlin p. 261 ), too. but unlike 
postmetaphysical thinking and like metaphysical thinking, it uses the 'linguistic 
medium of reason' without needing to problematize it. Insofar as cognitive 
science probli>matius this 'achievement', it approaches it as some sort of a natural 
rather than epistemological phenomenon and concentrates exclusively on its 
empirical explication by means and notions which are possibly least abstract and 
ultimately conform to the methodology of natural sciences. Consequently, 
drawing on its prov\!n success in soci,d practi-:es, science somehow 'naturally' 
challenges even the traditional philosophical problems. For example, Howard 
Gardner defirn:s "cognitive science" as a ''l;ontemporary, empirically based effort 
to answer long-standing epistemological questions-particularly those concerned 
with the nature of knowledge, its components, its sources, its devdopment, and its 
deployment" (p. 6). In my view, this means that sciencejus/ uses language 
epistemologically, while this attempt to appropriate and solve philosophical 
problems can be associated with the attempt of what in the history of philosophy is 
known as 'metaphy:;ics' to provide humankind with some sort of ·universal 
knowledge': 
I am interested in whether questions that intrigued our philosophical ancestors 
can be decisively answered, instrnctively reformulated, or permanently 
scutted. Today cognitive science holds the key to whether they can be. 
(Gardner p. 6) 
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Thus, while in contemporary philosophy the metaphysical problems of 
philosophy have been dissolved as problems that come into being as a matter of an 
incorrect use of language, contemporary science, which does not problematize 
language epistemologically, seems to revitalize these problems on the basis of its 
success in the well-established social practices. Indeed, this success is remarkable, 
but in the appropriation of problems that philosophy itself has repudiated as 
pseudo-problems, science is not immune to metaphysical claims only because these 
problems have been now ' refonnulated' by mediation of its expertise which has 
been ·elsewhere' proven. To put it in another way, though expert cultures have 
attained the authority to provide with solutions any practical and expert problems, 
in the case of the problems of mediation, they tum out in the position of 
authorizing philosophically inadequate solutions. For, as already investigated, 
there is no 'tested expertise' for philosophical problems. Instead, it is arguable 
that the ' world disclosing' and ' meaning creating' function of the 'linguistic 
medium of reason' may remain unnoticed in both the paradigm of science on the 
level of culture and the subjective paradigms of individuals on everyday 
communication and may amount to some problems of mediation. Conversely, if 
noticed, the world disclosing and meaning creating function oflanguage would 
easily recognize these problems as contingent upon the "grammatical limits of the 
various particular worlds that are linguistically constituted" and "would necessarily 
disintegrate kaleidoscopically into a multiplicity of incommensurable 
embodiments" (Habennas 1992, pp. 134-5). 
To sum up, not only are there important issues that are common to both 
philosophy and science, but also there is a specific freedom within philosophy to 
cope with them in a manner that is not shared by science. Presumably, the 
outcomes of such an independent ' coping' are at the least curious, particularly with 
respect to problems which appear within the scopes of the two fields and for 
whose • adequate treatment' scientific accounts are in a certain sense 'insufficient' . 
In my view, as a non-expert field participating in a 'division oflabour' which has 
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assigned to it the so-called · problems of mediation', philosophy could respond to 
this scientific 'insufficiency' insofar as it still "keeps an eye trained on the topic of 
rationality" (Habermas 1990, p. 18 ). The necessary condition which is to 
accompany this specific role of philosophy is an awareness that the philosophical 
' expertise' is an ·expertise' in a 'non-expert' field and is an 'expertise ' in the very 
conditional and paradoxical sense of 'competence' . 
h) Philosophy and the Problems of Mediation 
In my argument, I accepted Habennas' view that the problems of 
media1io11, as problems of the exchange of expertise, are to remain in the scope of 
philosophy as a non-expert field. But, implied by the compositional philosophical 
concept is that if these problems are considered phi/o.wphical problems on the 
different levels of modernity, no certain field can ' sufficiently' account for them. 
That is to say, even philosophy does 1101 have and ca111101 have the exclusive rights 
for solving the problems of mediation, but only possesses a specific competence to 
deal with them. 
As already pointed out, this ' competence' is conceived ofas an 
understanding of how these problems come into being and how they disappear. In 
the broader context of my argument, they come into being as a matter of 
inappropriate exchange of expertise by mediation of concepts and disappear as a 
matter of a 'therapeutic undoing' the expertise to be exchanged. On the level of 
everyday communication, their solutions result from the particular applications of 
certain well-1111derstood lc11owledge in solving partie11/ar problems; on the level of 
expert culture, those solutions become we/J-1mderstoodj11stificatio11s of experts' 
own expia11atio11s and pre.scriptions. 
It is in this sense that the epistemological concepts to be applied in the 
mind's problem solving activity of metacog11itio11 can find a specification in terms 
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of some exemplary notions of contemporary philosophy. Though such a 
specification initially appears to be rather an extended and in a certain sense 
unnecessary abstraction, as philosophical knowledge, it is conceived of as fostering 
problem solvers ' 'awareness' of the dogmatic postulates in their thinking, which 
can tum out any previously acquired or spontaneously formed epistemological 
concepts that are to be applied in a certain problematic situation. This is an 
' awareness' that any specification of one's own epistemology ought not to be 
understood as 1he specification of the peculiarities of her or his mind ' s problem 
solving activity, but that the permanent rationalization of one' s own experience, 
knowledge, and capacity needs to be always a ·well-understood rationalization' , 
like a well-understood relativism, but not like a promotion of the relativism. In 
this way, one would understand that her or his belief, for instance, in her or his 
already proven inabilily is just a fallible belief insofar as it is being rationalized in 
the form of an epistemological concept available for future applications; 
respectively, that one's low self-esteem or motivational deficit stems from a 
misu11den1a11di11g of one' s 'reasonable' accounts of one's 'failure' which 'so 
obviously ' demonstrate the 'true limits' of one's cognitive capacity. 
Thus, given that the fallibilism ofone's knowledge could hopefully 
disappear in an application that results in the mere solving of the problems to be 
solved, some implications could be made for the practices invol\ing intensive 
mind ' s problem solving activity. For instance, in teaching one would need to have 
taught, in addition to what she or he has already taught, that in a new problematic 
situation the knowledge to be applied needs to be accordingly modified and that in 
this sense there is not an ' ideal knowledge' . Since the relation of the teaching 
('explaining· and 'prescribing') of thinking skills to the applying of those · already 
acquired skills' appears to be an epistemologically fallible relation, the overcoming 
of 1his faJ/ibilism becomes esselllia/ for the practice of teaching. Only this 
overcoming could go through the 'understanding' that a teacher's work can never 
be completely done, that there is a persisting infiniteness in the social practice of 
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teaching and learning that e:oi;empts neither teachers nor students from fallible 
relegation of their teaching-teaming responsibilities. Rather, one needs to 
understand that in and after the teaching-learning process he or she is still in the 
very beginning of becoming a 'good thinker', and that she or he would always 
need to modify his or her knowledge in any new problematic situation in order to 
tum out to be a 'good problem solver', too. But, to be able to modify such 
knowledge, one still needs to have it. (In this sense, the problems are being solved 
as a matter of expertise, not as a matter of philosophy; the philosophical 
understanding is needed only to undo the conceptual fallibilism of our knowledge 
with respect to its practical applications). 
In conclusion, this broader context of understanding ofmy argument was 
supposed to give the sense of the therapeutic notion of philosophy in the 
perspective of its relationship and possible cooperation with expert cultures and 
everyday communication practices of modernity. As l must have already shown. 
philosophy cannot provide problem solving practices with an account of the deb'fee 
to which certain previously acquired concepts influence the epistemological 
attributions of thinking in order to prevent those practices from eventual negative 
consequences of such attributions. What philosophy can contribute is only to 
remind that the language in which expert cultures and everyday communication 
practices exercise their propositions and form their practical rules needs to be 
finally modified according to any particular problem solving situation. This 
'reminding' must somehow involve a particular understanding (in its respectively 
modified fonn) that since philosophy has already rejected its 'expert' or 
epistemological function to be a part of its 'therapeutic repertoire', its role in the 
exchange of expertise is somehow paradoxical. It 'keeps one eye trained' but 
trained on nothing specific; it is a 'therapy' but actually undoes itself as a therapy; 
it 'explains' but explains 'conditionally'; it 'reminds', 'exposes', or 'hopes', but 
does not 'prescribe'. Indeed, its competence can be conditionally explained on a 
presupposed level of culture and thus prescribed for a presupposed level of 
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everyday communication. However, its ' right application' would depend not only 
upon its 'good acquisition' but also upon its therape11tic 1111doi11g which as such is 
an indeterminate aspect of the solutions of the real problems. for, the therapeutic 
role of philosophy is only to condition the exchange of expenise by undermining 
any (1101 by offering a 'new' or 'unique') possibility for epistemological 
allrihutiom of · correctness' from one language use to another. This is why its 
specification in language can only ·conditionally' reflect as either an ' activity ' or a 
' hope' insofar as the latter are conceived of as being mere ·oppositions' to any 
recurrent phenomenon of ·metaphysics' in the discourse of modernity: 
More specifically, this is the hope that what Dewey calls "the crust of 
convention" will be as superficial as possible, that the social glue which holds 
society together - the language in which we state our shared beliefs and hopes 
- will be as flexible as possible. (Rorty p. 18) 
In Summary 
In this paper, I have employed sciemijic and philosophical notions in an 
exercise that was intended to illuminate the claim thal 11ega1ive cognitive 
dispositions and i11appropriate problem solving strategies are rooted in 
individual~' philosophically naive vie»-·s of haw their own imelligence wurlcs. In 
the specified sense here, this claim became that the scientific prescription for 
treating these cognitive problems, metacog11itio11, can be supplied or substituted 
with a philosophical 1111dersta11di11g of how the mind coordinates language and 
thought. 
I have generally assumed that the scientific accounts of cognitive problems 
and the philosophical accounts of the traditional philosophical problems converge 
in a point which poses the two types of problems both as being epistemological in 
chara,·ter and as being treated by procedures that are essentially the same insofar 
as they relate the overcoming of these problems to the mediation of a concept of 
wg11itio11. For me, this became a reason that coguitive problems be explained in 
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terms of a philosophical concept of cognition and treated by mediation of the 
philosophical procedure for overcoming the traditional philosophical problems 
which 1 called the philosophical methodology of dissolution . To justify this 
methodolO!,'Y of transfer, I needed to show. on one hand. that the scientific 
aa·o,mt of the cognitive problems is somehow ins11fficie111, and on the other hand, 
that philosophical competence for dealing with epistemological problems is 
somehow appropriate for overcoming the cognitive problems. In my argument, 
the scientific accounts of cognitive problems qualified as i11S11jficie111, insofar as 
scientists' explanations of the cognitive problems relied on philosophical 
justifications, and insofar as scientists' prescriptions for overcoming these 
problems contained epistemological concepts. On the other hand, philo.mphical 
competence has been shown to be appropriale for dealing with cognitive problems 
insofar as the philosophical methodology of dissol111io11 was represented in the 
form of the scientific prescription metacog11itio11 as an expla11alio11 and app/icalion 
of a concept of cognilion which in this case was a philosophical concept of 
/a11g11age . Subsequently. I needed a broader con/ex/ of 1mdersla11di11g concerning 
the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy in order 
to justify the use of philosophical methods for treating problems which come up in 
the scope of science, insofar as the two fields are considered as using 
characleristical/y differelll forms of inquiry. In this context, in terms of a certain 
interpretation of Habermas' notion of philosophy, cognitive and lraditional 
philosophical problems were qualified as problems of mediation, respectively, on 
the levels everyday communication and experl culture. Thus, according to what I 
called the general principle for overcoming problems of mediation, the 
compelence used for overcoming of the phi/m·ophk·al problems on the level of 
culture was supposed to be unproblematically exchanged through the level of 
everyday comm1111icatio11 in overcoming the cog11ilive problems. In my argument, 
the competence under consideration is conceived of as a 1101io11 of philosophy in 
the philosophical sense ofa therapy as opposed to ·metaphysics', which l derived 
from the examination of the philosophical concepts. 
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Consequently, I illustrated the overcoming of the cognitive problems by 
mediation of a. philosophical concept of cognition which was to convey a notion of 
philosophy m therapy; in a narrow sense. it became a 'therapeutic undoing' of 
the epistemo/ogic.:a/ points which entail these problems, while in a broader sense -
a 'therapeutic undoing' of the two presupposed levels of modernity. By way of 
c;onclusion, I discussed the problems of mediation on the level of culture in the 
metaphilosophical perspective of the question of the relationship and possible 
cooperation between science and philosophy with respect to the issues that are 
common to both. In the metaphilosophical sense of my argument, science is 
conceived of as ineligible to solve epistemological problems, even though they 
have been redefined by mediation of its 'well-proven expertise'; by contrast, 
philosophy is conceived of as ineligible to solve any scientific or practical 
problems, but as still eligible to dissolve epistemological problems. 
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